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Justice As Right Relationship:
A Philosophical and Theological
Reflection on
Affirmative Action
Rev. Robert John Araujo, S.J.*
"Justice, and only justice, you shall pursue."'
"[C]ease to do evil, learn to do good; seek justice....
"For justice, we must go to Don Corleone."3
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice. Lawyers, judges, law students, and many members of the public often
use the term. Its meaning is generally understood throughout the legal profession,
the bench, and the lay community--or so it seems. Our legal literature is replete with
the term justice, but it frequently appears and is used without a precise definition or
understanding. It is a word that is important to the legal profession, to the
institutions of the law, and to the communities of human beings, that both serve. Yet,
this word that is used in everyday life has a meaning that is often assumed but rarely
understood.
*. Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law, Spokane, WA. The author would like to
thank Mr. Mark Farrell, J.D. 2000 for his thoughtful and generous research assistance and Dean John
Clute and the Gonzaga Alumni Fund for their support. In addition to new material, this essay reflects
an integration of some of the author's earlier works, which may enable readers to recognize that
philosophical and theological inquiry can assist in the search for just results in the difficult legal
questions facing us in this early Twenty-first Century.
1. Deuteronomy 16:20.
2. Isaiah 1:16-17.
3. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). This statement was made by Bonasera-the
undertaker-who seeks revenge against two young men who "tried to take advantage" of his daughter.
Like Bonasera seeking Don Corleone's assistance in The Godfather,4 the law,
the legal profession, and the laity are concerned with justice. But what exactly is it?
Is it simply the personal revenge that Bonasera seeks, or is it something more
profound? Is it the corrective conclusion of a dispute between two or more people
which is commutative justice? Might it be the institutional punishment exacted of
those who transgress against other members of the community? Is it providing for
those with the least access to goods and services which they need to survive? Is it
seeking retribution against those who have brought harm to innocents?
The purpose of this essay is to come to grips with the term justice and to
establish a better understanding of this important expression that penetrates much of
legal, political, and human history. Throughout life, most of us participate in the
search for justice. It is something to which we believe we are entitled because we are
individuals who exist in community with other human beings. Each of us relies on
others to do some things, and to refrain from doing others. In order to regulate these
relationships, we establish publicly recognized rules identified as laws.5 It is through
these laws that many seek what they believe is just. But, is there any association
between these laws, their application and the expected ends or results we deem to be
just? These questions are at the heart of the following investigation that will examine
the coirelation between the law and justice.6 Indeed, it has been suggested by others
that the law and what is legal does not necessarily coincide with justice in spite of the
inscription over the main portal of the United States Supreme Court-"Equal justice
under law."7
If the law is a social institution, does that mean that justice must also be
understood in a similar light? This question must be answered in the affirmative.
While many may consider that they are due or owed something because it is "just,"
justice-be it social, commutative, or retributive-cannot be properly understood
without taking account of individuals in a context that brings each into relationship
with others. In essence then, justice is relational. Justice can be understood only
when those who claim something because it is "just" are considered in relation to the
others who may have concern or involvement with the issue that raises the question
4. See id.
5. The significance of people being in relationship to law and social institutions was ironically
illustrated in the Declaration of Consensus calligraphy by Anita Karl accompanying the essay by
Nicholas Lemann, which stated: "We, the relatively unbothered and well off, hold these truths to be self-
evident: That Big Government, Big Deficits and Big Tobacco are bad, but that big bathrooms and 4-by-
4's are not; that American overseas involvement should be restricted to trade agreements, mutual funds
and the visiting of certain beachfront resorts; that markets can take care of themselves as long as they
take care of us; that an individual's sex life is nobody's business, though highly entertaining; and that
the only rights that really matter are those which indulge the Self." Nicholas Lehman, The New
American Consensus: Government of andfor the Comfortable, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 1, 1998, at 37.
6. This article will focus primarily on the law found in American legal institutions.
7. See, e.g., RONALDDWORKIN, LAw'SEMPIRE97 (1986) [hereinafter, DWORKIN, LAw'SEMPIRE];
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, Chapter XII (1981) [hereinafter, FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW]; LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OFLAW 157-59 (1964) [hereinafter, FULLER, MORALITY OFLAW];
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157-63 (1961) [hereinafter, HART, CONCEPT OF LAW].
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of whether something is just. In short, this paper shall propose that the foundational
concept underlying justice is a relational one. That is, justice cannot be understood
without considering it the proper, correct, and fitting relation between individuals
whose respective interests over some particular matter are in conflict.
This was the situation in the remand decision of the important affirmative action
case of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.' That case involved the
application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' to an employer-labor union
affirmative action program instituted to increase the number of skilled minority
employees at Kaiser Aluminum and Steel's Gramercy, Louisiana plant. ° The dispute
brought together counter-arguments by a variety of individuals from different
segments of the same community affected by the conflict. In the Weber case, some
sought justice for white workers like Brian Weber who had gained sufficient union
seniority to advance into a training program that would provide new skills and higher
wages. Others sought justice for the African-American members of the community
who also should have been promoted to better-paying working positions but were
conspicuously absent from the ranks of such employment due to past exclusion based
on racial considerations.1"
Although Weber was decided by the Supreme Court over twenty years ago, 2 the
majority decision, its impact, and its correctness are still debated today. The
disagreement continues to be aired in legal, political, and academic circles. 3
8. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
10. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-200.
11. See id. at 199-200.
12. See id. at 193.
13. It is clear that to this day the matter of affirmative action is still a major issue confronting the
American legal and political community. See, e.g., Nicholas Lehman, What Happened To The Case
For Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 11, 1995; see also David Broder, A New Front In
Ballot Battle, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 23, 1999, at A-1 (suggesting that the national
disagreement about the legality and role of affirmative action and racial preference may be a major issue
in the Presidential and national elections in the year 2000). Within the courts, the subject of affirmative
action is periodically examined. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5"' Cir. 1996); see also
WILLIAM BOWEN AND DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998) and STEPHAN THERNSTROM AND
ABIGAILTHERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE (1997), for two perspectives on the continuing
role of affirmative action. The Bowen-Bok effort is supportive of continuing affirmative action, but
the Themstrom investigation is generally critical.
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II. THE WEBER CASE
A. Background
The major issue in Weber was the legality, within the context of Title VII, of a
race-conscious affirmative action plan negotiated between a union, the United
Steelworkers of America, and an employer, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.
to address racial imbalance found in the workplace. 14 Many people involved with the
litigation as well as its effect were concerned about the meaning of the law in the
context of employment practices which address issues of race, color, national origin,
sex, and religion.15
The facts underlying the development and implementation of this affirmative
action program are as follows. In 1974 the United Steelworkers and Kaiser
negotiated a multi-plant collective bargaining agreement for fifteen of the employer's
plants. 6 This agreement established an affirmative action plan to redress the
"conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclusively white craftwork
forces."17 Prior to 1974, Kaiser had hired into its craft work force only those workers
who had craft experience." Because Blacks had historically been excluded from craft
jobs in the Gramercy area, virtually none were able to meet the requirement of
previous craft experience. 9
Statistically, less than two percent of the craft workers at the Gramercy plant
were black.20 This fact contrasted with the further phenomenon that approximately
thirty-nine percent of the labor force in the Gramercy area consisted of blacks.2 ' In
principle, there seemed to be nothing that would prevent a black from entering the
higher-paid occupations of the skilled craftworkers if they had some experience. As
a practical matter, however, very few blacks could enter the more desirable
craftworker positions."
Whatever the motivating impetus for addressing the racial imbalance in the
14. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
15. See id. at 197-98.
16. See id.
17. Id. See 443 U.S. at 198-99 for a discussion about the craft work positions which required more




21. Id. at -199.
22. See id. at 198-99. It is difficult to ascertain if there was something in the case's history
suggesting that Kaiser did discriminate against blacks and it was only a matter of time before they
would face some kind of legal challenge to their discriminatory practices.
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Gramercy workforce,23 Kaiser and the Union cooperated in developing and
implementing a temporary craft training program that would be open to both whites
and blacks who aspired to those higher-paying craft occupations which necessitated
greater skill. 24 This training program was designed to prepare unskilled production
workers for the higher paying craft positions through on-the-job training.25 In order
to compensate for the disproportionately low number of blacks who were presently
in craft occupations, the plan called for a temporary allocation of fifty percent of the
openings in the training program to blacks until "the percentage of black craftworkers
in the plant [was] commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force."26
Candidates from the unskilled workforce were to be selected for the training
program according to their seniority because the principle of awarding training
opportunities in preference of those workers with the most seniority was in accord
with long-standing union traditions.27 Thirteen trainees were selected to participate
in this program during its first year of operation.2" Of those selected, seven were
black and six were white.29 Some white workers, including Brian Weber, who had
more seniority than the most senior black trainees but who were not selected for
training raised a concern.3"
After his second rejection from the training program, Weber commenced a class
action law suit alleging that the race-preferential process of selecting the craft
trainees discriminated against him and similarly situated white workers in violation
of Sections 703(a)31 and 703(d)3 2 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33
23. See id. at 223 n.2, 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) for insight about whether the "voluntary"
affirmative plan was really voluntary. Justice Rehnquist points out that a considerable amount of
Kaiser's work was for the Federal Government and was continuously being investigated by the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). See id. OFCC would periodically examine Kaiser's
employment practices to ensure that it was not discriminating against any workers on grounds
prohibited by Federal law. See also Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 218 (5"'
Cir. 1977), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99.
25. See id. at 198.
26. Id. at 197.
27. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. La. 1976).
28. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 199-200.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a) (1994). Section 703(a) of the statute states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or ten to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
B. The Litigation
While acknowledging that affirmative action programs may be an appropriate
form of relief in Title VII cases "where necessary to cure the ill effects of past
discrimination...,"34 the district court entered judgment for Weber and the plaintiff
class and issued a permanent injunction against Kaiser and the Union restraining
them from denying the plaintiffs access to the craft-training program on the basis of
race.35 The trial court further stated that "the judiciary may establish affirmative
action programs as a form of relief in certain Title VII cases without running afoul
of sections 703(a), 703(d) or 703(j).... ,3 However, it also noted that the judiciary
cannot override "the clear and unequivocal prohibitions against discrimination by an
employer against any individual on the basis of race ...
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that, "[in the absence of prior discrimination,
a racial quota loses its character as an equitable remedy and must be banned as an
unlawful racial preference prohibited by Title VII .... ,,3' The two-judge majority of
the Fifth Circuit panel considering this appeal recognized that those preferences
which favor victims of past discrimination could be an appropriate remedy if there
was a finding of previous racial discrimination.39 However, the majority also pointed
out that Title VII prohibits any preference that is based solely on race.' In affirming
the district court, the Fifth Circuit majority stated:
We deny appellants relief, not unmindful of the delayed opportunities for advancement
this will occasion many minority workers but equally aware of our duty, in enforcing
Title VII, to respect the opportunities due to white workers as well. Whatever the
merits of racial quotas..., Congress has forbidden racial preferences in admission to
on-the-job training programs, and under the circumstances of this case we are not
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994). This subsection provides that: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining ... to discriminate against any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training." Id.
.33. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 199-200.
34. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 768 (E.D. La. 1976).
35. Id. at 770.
36. Id. at 767.
37. Id. at 766.
38. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977).
39. See id.
40. See id. The majority went on to say that "unless a preference is enacted to restore employees
to their rightful places within a particular employment scheme it is strictly forbidden by Title VlI." Id.
at 225.
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empowered by the equitable doctrine of restorativejustice to ignore that proscription."
The majority saw inherent dangers if employers gave members of specific racial
groups preferential treatment where there is no evidence of past racial discrimination.
Under these circumstances, they concluded that affirmative action plans that assign
employment opportunities on the basis of racial preference violate Title VII because
this remedy is designed to correct past discrimination, but it is not engineered to alter
a racial imbalance in the absence of previous discrimination.42 The majority
concluded that affirmative action plans which address "societal discrimination"
rather than past employment discrimination are strictly forbidden by Title VII.
43
In his dissent, Judge Wisdom acknowledged that there is a strong case to be
made for interpreting Title VII in a color-blind fashion (i.e., a person's skin color
should not be relevant to most employment practices), but he also saw that societal
discrimination continued to permeate American social and economic institutions.'
In accepting that voluntary affirmative action programs may not be wise or just to all
employees (especially those from the racial majority), he found that they are legal
and fall within the scope of Title VII, particularly when needed to remedy "the
pervasive effects of centuries of societal discrimination.. ..,o
The Union and Kaiser sought review by the Supreme Court which granted
certiorari.4" In reversing the Fifth Circuit,4 the majority48 of the Supreme Court
emphasized at the outset of its opinion the "narrowness of [its] inquiry" and found
that because the voluntary affirmative action program did not involve state action,
there were no Constitutional issues involving the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.49 The majority underscored the fact that the craft training program was
adopted voluntarily.5" For the members of the majority, this case was less concerned
41. Id., (emphasis added).
42. See id. at 224.
43. See id. at 225.
44. See id. at 239 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
45. See id.
46. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 439 U.S. 1045 (1978).
47. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
48. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion in which Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
joined. See id. at 195.
49. See id. at 200. Unlike Weber, the Bakke case included these Constitutional issues because
action by the State of California was involved in the special admissions program at the medical school
of the University of California at Davis. See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Baake, 438 U.S. 265,279-80
(1978). For an informative analysis of the impact of the Bakke case on affirmative action programs and
their future, see SUSAN WELCH & JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENTS
IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS (1998).
50. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200. This is a point questioned by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. See
id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
with what Title VII requires or prohibits and more concerned with what the statute
permits."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun shared "some of the misgivings"
presented in Justice Rehnquist's dissent.52 These "misgivings" concentrated on the
extent to which Title VI's legislative history supported the result reached by the
majority. 53 In a lengthy examination of the statute's legislative history, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that Title VII prohibits all racial considerations in employment
practices-even those remedial preferential programs that attempt to redress past
wrongs or contemporary racial imbalances. 4
C. A Remand Opinion Raises A Profound Question
After the Supreme Court issued its decision, the case was remanded to the Fifth
Circuit55 where Judge Wisdom, who had previously dissented,56 stated that the High
Court was "profoundly right."57 Judge Gee who had written the earlier opinion
reversed by the Supreme Court noted his "personal conviction that the decision of
the Supreme Court in this case is profoundly wrong."" He based his disagreement
on two points. First, Judge Gee addressed statutory construction. He argued that the
plain meaning of Title VII as corroborated by its legislative history indicates that
hiring practices which rely on racial preferences are prohibited. 9 His second point
of disagreement emerged from the interpretation of the Constitution based on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson' that the "Constitution is color-blind, and
51. See id. at 200. As the opinion states: "The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue
of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide
affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in
the Kaiser-USWA plan." See id. (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 219-20. While authoring his own brief dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger
joined the Rehnquist dissent. See id. at 219 (Burger, J., dissenting). In his own dissent, the Chief
Justice argued that the majority rewrote the statute "to do precisely what both its sponsors and its
opponents agreed the statute was not intended to do." Id. at 216 (Burger, J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice also indicated that an interpreter need not consult the legislative history of the statute because
the requirements of Title VII are apparent from the face of the text. See id. at 217 (Burger, J.,
dissenting). Still, the Chief Justice agreed that Justice Rehnquist's use of legislative history
demonstrated that both supporters and opponents of Title VII reached an agreement about the intended
effect of Title VH, viz. that it would foreclose the reading given the statute by the majority. See id.
(Burger, J., dissenting). Simply put, the Chief Justice believed that the history of Title VII
demonstrates Congress's intent "to make discrimination against any individual illegal ..... Id. at 218
(Burger, J., dissenting).
55. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1977).
57. See Weber, 611F.2dat 133.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'"
In noting that the majority opinion was "gravely mistaken, 62 Judge Gee
hastened to add that it was neither an immoral nor unjust conclusion because "in
some basic sense it may well represent true justice. 63 Regardless of whether a
person agrees with Judge Gee or the Supreme Court majority and Judge Wisdom,
one can acknowledge the significance of Judge Gee's insight that the law (and what
it requires, forbids, and permits) and justice do not always precisely correlate. One
need only recall the Supreme Court's reluctant opinion in Toyosaburo Korematsu v.
United States64 to be reminded of other occasions in this century where the law and
justice did not perfectly match or even substantially reflect one another.
It is this correlation between law and justice-or lack thereof-that provides the
catalyst for this investigation. While Judge Gee's statement about the distinction
between the meaning of the statute and that of justice is sobering, it does not define
justice.
What is justice? Of what is it constitutive? Can it be better or clearly more
understood? The next section will examine how legal and philosophical minds have
defined, explained, and understood justice over the course of western legal history.
Although the contributions of these thinkers have enhanced the understanding of
what justice is, any understanding of justice is incomplete unless it takes account of
the right relationship between those involved in the controversy or dispute where the
lawyers, judges, parties, and society at large seek "justice."
III. CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE-THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY
In a responsible search for the meaning of justice and its "true form," one could
dwell on the understanding of this term's meaning within the context of contempo-
rary western legal institutions. However, this search would exclude a long legacy of
61. See Weber, 611 F.2d at 133 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
62. See id. at 133.
63. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Gee concluded his opinion with the following reflection:
[T]here are many actions roughly just that our laws do not authorize and our Constitution
forbids, actions such as preventing a Nazi Party march through a town where reside former
inmates of concentration camps or inflicting summary punishment on one caught red handed
in a crime. Subordinate magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher authority
or yield up their posts to those who will. I obey, since in my view the action required of me
by the Court's mandate is only to follow a mistaken course and not an evil one.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In this case, an American citizen of Japanese descent was convicted of
remaining in a military area in which all persons of Japanese descent had been prohibited under law.
See id. at 215-16. Despite the fact that there was no inquiry into Korematsu's loyalty to the United
States, the Court upheld his conviction reasoning that the order excluding members of Japanese descent
was a valid wartime security measure. See id. at 223-24.
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the human encounter with, and pursuit for, the meaning of justice and its relation to
the community that lives according to the dictates of some law. In starting with
Plato, we can see that this inquiry has ancient and venerable roots.
A. Ancient and Medieval Perspectives
In his dialogue The Republic, Plato often raised the question: what is justice?65
Early in Book I, Socrates, Glaucon, and Cephalus are engaged in a conversation in
which Socrates presents the central issue: "[c]onceming justice, what is it?"66
Answers were quickly offered: it is the repayment of a debt that is owed; it is giving
good to friends and evil to enemies.67 Thrasymachus, however, posited that justice
is whatever is in the interest of the stronger-might is right.68 Is it not, after all, the
strongest, the leader, those in charge who decide what is just and what is not? But
Socrates countered Thrasymachus with the suggestion that it is not power or might
itself that determines justice, but, rather, virtue, wisdom, and friendship that define
what is just and what is not.69 Moreover, he reinforces his position by pointing out
that justice is both individual as well as communal: it is the virtue of the individual
as well as the virtue of the state.7" Soon, other virtues come into play according to
Socrates.
In particular, these virtues that appear on both the individual and corporate levels
are wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.7 As habits of human conduct, they
direct the thought and the action that individuals pursue. Because they exist at the
personal and communal level, virtues can habitually direct the actions taken by
members of a community as well as the community itself to ascertain what decisions
the community should take to resolve the disagreements that surface between its
members. In essence, these virtues can promote harmony throughout a society in
which tension between its members is held in check and a right relationship is
restored.72 This harmony is characterized by the suum cuique: no one may take what
is due to others nor may one be deprived of what is due him.73 It is this notion of the
65. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1982).
66. See id. Book I, at 8-9.
67. See id. at 9-10.
68. See id. at 19.
69. See id. at 38. We shall see later on that Aristotle, in his NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, also
understands that justice, or at least its best form, is understood as true friendship--a friendship that is
not based on master and subservient, but on relationship between those few who are prepared to give
of their entire selves so that others may benefit. See infra note 77.
70. See PLATO, supra note 65, Book I, at 40.
71. See PLATO, Book IV, at 139 (discussing wisdom, at 140; courage, at 142; temperance, at 144;
justice, at 146).
72. See PLATO, at 149-51.
73. See PLATO, at 148-49.
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suum cuique which is at the heart of justice.74
Socrates suggests at the end of Crito that the suum cuique-what is due the
individual person-cannot be understood without taking into account others who
surround the individual making the claim of justice. As he notes, justice should be
foremost in the minds of people:
[i]f you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants
and agreements which you have made with us, and wrongdoing those whom you ought
least to wrong.... we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren.., will
receive you as an enemy ......
But how does an individual cultivate those qualities essential for achieving the suum
cuique? Like Plato,76 Aristotle asserted that we find the meaning of justice through
the application of virtues.
Throughout Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examined virtuous
human conduct and its relationship to "doing well" and achieving "good."77 Initially,
the application of virtuous conduct would lead the good person to the "intermediate
between excess and deficiency."" Those who practice this mean would find
themselves spared from those human appetites that promote the extremes of excess
or defect. Virtuous conduct is the guide that directs the mediate and arrests those
appetites or passions which lead to extremes. Practical wisdom is what leads the
person to a life of virtuous conduct that promotes the search for the intermediate or
mean between extremes.79 Aristotle then raised the prospect that if justice is a
desirable goal of human enterprise, it must be the product of virtuous conduct and
the search for the intermediate."0 What is just is not only lawful but also fair;
74. Joseph Raz has developed an interesting corollary to this. In his essay Autonomy, Toleration,
and the Harm Principle, he states that "one can harm another by denying him what is due to him."
See Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H. L. A. HART 313, 329 (Ruth Garrison ed., 1987). In the context of
affirmative action and the promotion of preferences for one group that are denied others, Raz argues
that "one causes harm if one fails in one's duty to a person or a class of persons and that person or a
member of that class suffers as a result." Id. at 329-30. Coercion is thus justified when it prevents
harm: the coercion here would be the imposition of an employment practice that grants preferences to
one class of individuals while at the same time denying them to other classes.
75. PLATO, THE CRrro, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 456 (W. Rouse trans., 1956).
76. See PLATO, supra note 65, Book IV, at 139.
77. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Books ]1.6, at 1106' (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1925).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1107'.
80. See id. Book lI, at 1109'.
injustice is neither lawful nor fair.8 This leads Aristotle to conclude that justice
might be the greatest, most complete, virtue because it not only directs the individual
to seek the balance of the intermediate in one's life, but it also guides individuals in
"their relations to their neighbor." 2 This point is crucial to the notion of justice as
a right relationship. Consequently, justice must be a communal rather than an
individual state because it is ultimately concerned with relation to one's neighbor.83
Thus, if a person has achieved what is believed to be just, he may create injustice for
others.
To Aristotle it is unequivocal that the communal notion of justice becomes
manifested in various ways in the society. One is the rectifying element where
transactions between people are influenced by the fair and the intermediate."
Another is found in the distributive level of human interaction where the possessions
of society useful to human existence are distributed in accordance with virtuous
conduct.85 An illustration of Aristotle's conception of justice is the judge who
determines that a member of the community has been harmed by an attacker. The
relationship of the two is equalized by the right kind of penalty which takes away the
"gain" of the assailant by acknowledging the harm experienced by the victim.86 In
essence, the relationship is in some way restored to rightness by the recognition of
the wrong and the meting out of the punishment for its commission. What solidifies
justice in the community is the understanding that comes from recognizing the
relationship between and among people.
This led Aristotle to examine the idea of friendship that bears on the meaning of
justice. Yet, friendship can take a variety of forms. There is the friendship which
is based on pleasure and is geared to obtaining physical gratification. 7 There is also
the friendship that is based on utility-a relationship that leads those who practice
it to derive some good from each other.88 Both of these forms of friendship seek a
good, but a good that is principally directed toward the self. The truest form of
friendship, which is at the foundation of justice, is one that is established on virtue
and directs individuals to seek and confer good not on themselves but on others. 9
Friendship in its truest form is the cornerstone ofjustice and enables individuals who
seek the good to act in ways that take account of the other; that wishes well on the
other; and that helps the self grieve and rejoice with the other.' However, Aristotle
put a limit on true friendship when he contended that this sort is in limited supply.
81. See id. Book V., at 1129' (This point would raise a problem in the context of repressive regimes
such as Nazi Germany where certain conduct may have been lawful but not fair).
82. See id. Book V., at 1129 b-1130'.
83. See id.
84. See id. Book V.2, at 1132'.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. Book VII. 2, at 1156'.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1 156b
.
90. See id. Book IX. 4, at 1166'.
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He suggested that "one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue
and on the character of our friends themselves and we must be content if we find
even a few such."'" But does Aristotle unnecessarily limit his important contribution
to the search for a widespread justice in the world?
In response, one can turn to another philosopher who built upon Aristotle's work
over a millennium and one half later. Like his ancient predecessor,92 Thomas
Aquinas acknowledged the significance of practical reason to the search forjustice.93
He argues that the first principle of practical reason is based on seeking that which
is good and avoiding that which is evil.' As a dictate of practical reason,95 law's
"proper effect" is to lead those who are its subjects to seek and practice virtue in their
lives.96 Because the human person is a rational being, people are inclined, but not
forced, to "act according to reason."97 Thus, while the human being has a natural
aptitude to reason that is inclined to the virtuous, "the perfection of virtue must be
acquired.., by means of some kind of training."9" Ultimately, the direction in which
reason seeks justice is not to the personal but to the communal-that is, individuals
who exist in relationship with one another." Therefore, it follows that the end of law
and the justice it seeks is the common rather than the individual good."° The soul
of justice, then, is to direct individuals in their relation with others.' Justice is not
simply the direction of activity, it also seeks the end that is good and takes account
of each member of the community affected. Justice, in essence, "is a habit whereby
man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will."' 2 This is the
suum cuique-to render everyone his or her own. 3 The justification for this
understanding of justice is the realization of what it can and will accomplish: the
retention and preservation of civil society and the continuation of communication or
91. Id. Book IX.10, at 1171'.
92. See id. Book H.6, at 1107'.
93. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Q. 90, art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Bums Oates & Washboume Ltd., 2d ed. 1927).
94. See id. Q. 94, at art. 2.
95. Seeid. Q. 91, atart. 3.
96. See id. Q. 92, at art. 1.
97. See id. Q. 94, at art. 4.
98. See id. Q. 95, at art. 1.
99. See id.
100. See id. Q. 96, at art. 1.
101. See id. Part l1-II Q. 57, at art. 1.
102. Id. Q. 58, at art. 1.
103. The maxim of the suum cuique is found in other ancient legal precepts. For example, there is
jurispraecepta sunt haec-noseste vivere; alterum non laedere; suum cuique tribuere-these are the
precepts of the law: to live honorably; to hurt nobody; to render everyone his due. Another is a
traditional definition of justice: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique
tribuendi-Justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render everyone his due.
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mutual intercourse among people."
B. Early Modem Responses
It is this matter of relationship amongst people that fascinated both Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke, encouraging them to investigatejustice. Hobbes considered
that the natural condition of the human race is that of war or conflict in which every
person is pitted against every other. 5 However, the law of nature is also guided by
the power of human reason, and this power leads individuals to understand that
reason leads them away from that which is destructive toward that which preserves
human existence."° While the individual's natural state is one of liberty, human
reason leads each subject to the conclusion that some of this unrestrained liberty
must be ceded to an authority (Leviathan) to ensure survival; otherwise, people will
remain in the state of nature which is that of war and conflict.'0 7 It is the common-
wealth, or Leviathan, that serves as the guarantor of the agreements or covenants that
people make in the reasoning state to eliminate conflict and promote peace when
disagreements amongst people arise. 8 Hobbes noted that the existence of either
justice or injustice is contingent on the existence or absence of the commonwealth."°
He also suggested that the suum cuique is sponsored by the commonwealth in that
it will sponsor justice--"the constant will of giving every man his own.""' This
necessarily entails that individuals come together in society governed by the
commonwealth to keep in check unrestrained liberty that threatens justice-i.e.,
people living in right relationship with one another. By abiding by all laws of nature,
people will obey their agreements, follow the dictates of the commonwealth, and thus
enjoy justice through the giving to each and everyone their due."'
While having a stronger sense of hope for people in the state of nature than
Hobbes, John Locke followed him by asserting that people live naturally in a state
of nature-a state that is characterized by reason obliging "all mankind who will
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, liberty or possessions . . . ."' Locke's notion of consultation should lead to
agreement on the need to establish the commonwealth that is committed to the public
good of the society.' Locke hastened to add that the laws promulgated by the
104. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, Part 11-H Q. 57, at art. 1.
105. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN at 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 92.
108. See id. at 100-01.
109. See id. at 100.
110. d. at 101.
111. See id. at 185.
112. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 6, at 9 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co., 1980).
113. Seeid.§ 135, at7l.
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commonwealth must be "bound to dispense justice."".4 Locke did not provide the
details for understanding the nature of justice. Yet if there can be some consensus
on a core meaning of the concept, what happens if the law is silent about addressing
justice? The case of Riggs v. Palmer".5 provides an important illustration of the
difference between the legal versus the just result of a law.
C. How the Law Can Be Bound to Justice-An Illustration
In Riggs, sixteen-year old Elmer Palmer killed his grandfather in order to
accelerate the testamentary gift the latter had planned to give young Elmer." 6 The
majority of the New York Court of Appeals sensibly acknowledged that the state
legislature, in enacting the revocation of wills statute, most likely intended that
donees named in wills should take the property designated as their gift under the
terms of the instrument.' Moreover, it was most likely the goal or the purpose of
the statute to enable individuals to plan for the disposal of their property when they
die, and, second, to honor these specified wishes after the testator's death. "' But the
court's majority speculated about what the purpose of the law should be, and what
the legislators may have intended if they had considered the facts of a beneficiary,
such as Elmer, taking the life of the testator in order to accelerate receiving the gift.' '
In other words, should the statute permit the unjust result of enabling a murderer to
profit from the act of homicide?
Surely the members of the court were principled people, and it is doubtful that
any of them would countenance Elmer's scheme. Moreover, it was their responsibil-
ity in effecting justice to ensure that crime does not pay. However as the dissent
pointed out, Elmer was punished with the criminal penalties provided by the law for
the commission of homicide rather than the revocation of wills statute. 20 This statute
simply did not apply to the circumstances of Elmer taking his grandfather's life. The
revocation statue was explicit about the grounds for invalidation, and murder was not
one of them. This is not to say, as Judge Gray argued in the dissent, that the law
would tolerate the scheme of one "who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily
come into the possession of his estate."' 121 Perhaps the majority would have been on
114. Id. § 136, at 71.





120. See id. at 192-93 (Gray, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 190.
firmer ground in reaching the result if it did so by not referring to the statute, even
though Elmer relied on this statute to secure his claim to the bequest. However, the
court could not avoid the status of the testamentary provision because Elmer and his
aunts (the remainder beneficiaries who would receive the gift intended for Elmer if
he should die under age, unmarried, and without surviving children) were in dispute
over who was entitled to the estate.'22 How should the court reach ajust result where
the principal body of law was silent? ,23 Ultimately, the majority decided the case in
favor of the aunts and denied Elmer the large gift left to him under the will." Thus,
in adding something to the revocation of wills statute that was not in the text, the
majority ensured that the law was "bound to justice."'25
D. Contemporary Responses
A case such as Riggs v. Palmer raises the issue of whether there can be a
separation between what the law says-or as it is reasonably interpreted in the
absence of plain meaning' 26-and what is right or what is just. H. L. A. Hart
investigated the separation thesis presented earlier by Hans Kelsen."' While
recognizing that the notion of what "ought to be" has had a significant influence on
the law, this influence in Hart's opinion was not essential. 2 ' As he noted, the laws
of Nazi Germany, while heinous in many instances, were still the law.'29 If one were
to adopt Socrates' view that failure to abide by unjust laws creates a greater
injustice,"' then one would act unjustly by contradicting the even the most egregious
laws of Nazi Germany. Hart did not follow the lead of Socrates. Rather, he
identified as the essential element of justice the principle "of treating like cases
alike."'' Yet, he hastened to add that, "This is justice in the administration of the
law, not justice of the law.' 32 Hart elaborated that the notions of justice and
122. See id. at 188-89.
123. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 41-42(1921). SeealsoHANs
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 67-69 (1970), where the author admits that law and justice are not
unrelated.
124. See Riggs, 22 N.E. 188, 191.
125. See id.
126. See generally, Robert John Araujo, S.J., Method in Interpretation, 68 Miss. L.J. 225 (1998).
127. See, H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, reprinted in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49 (Clarendon, 1983).
128. See id. at 69-70.
129. See id. at 70.
130. See PLATO, supra note 75, at 456.
131. See H. L. A. Hart, Separation of Law and Morals, reprinted in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 64, 81 (1983).
132. Id. Hart elaborates this point when he stated that, "Natural procedural justice consists therefore
of those principles of objectivity and impartiality in the administration of the law which implement just
this aspect of law and which are genuinely designed to ensure that rules are applied only to what are
cases of the rule or at least to minimize the risks of inequalities in this sense." Id.
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injustice can be equated with "fair" and "unfair."' 33 The core of Hart's understand-
ing of justice can be distilled in this point he made in THE CONCEPT OF LAW: ".....
justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion,
and its leading percept is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike'; though we need
to add to the latter 'and treat different cases differently.""'  Hart added that while
this principle may be at the center of justice, it is in need of complement.'35 As he
stated, "we must know when . . . cases are to be regarded as alike and what
differences are relevant."' 36 Yet, this approach offers little practical guidance to
those concerned about justice in the existential rather than the conceptual sense.
In short, there is need for a supplement to Hart's basic principle of justice as
"treating like cases alike," and that supplement begins with a recognition that justice
must also deal with the essence of the law and not merely its administration.'37 Hart
distinguished between the essence and the administration with the illustration of a
law that discriminates against people along racial lines even though it is "justly
administered.""'3 In the context of the affirmative action program investigated at the
beginning of this essay, one might ask whether justice is in the Civil Rights Act
itself, in its administration, or in both. Hart's answer might suggest that "justice
constitutes one segment of morality primarily concerned not with individual conduct
but with the ways in which classes of individuals are treated."' 39 Yet if the law is
"bound to justice" for classes of people, is it also "bound to justice" for the
individual as well?
It took Lon Fuller's critique of Hart to understand that there is a "deep affinity"
between the law and justice."4 Fuller claimed that both the law and justice act
through "known rules.'' 4 As he stated, "The internal morality of the law demands
that there be rules, that they be made known, and that they be observed in practice
by those charged with their administration."'42 Fuller answered the hypothesis of the
separation of law and morals by arguing that "most of the world's injustices are
inflicted, not with the fists, but with the elbows."'43 "Fists" appear to be direct,
intended transgressions of the law; "elbows" are the indirect, more subtle transgres-
sions that at first suggest a "random pattern for which we are not responsible, even
133. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 7, at 158.
134. Id. at 159.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Seeid. at 161.
138. Id. at 161-62.
139. Id. at 167.
140. See FULLER, THE MORAUTY OF LAW, supra note 7, at 157.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 159.
though our neighbor may be painfully aware that he is being systematically pushed
from his seat."'"
Fuller's insight raised a series of related questions about the law itself. Is law
directed toward addressing the transgressions caused by "fists", by "elbows", by
neither, or by both? These questions were addressed by Eric Voegelin and Hans
Kelsen in very different ways. Voegelin admitted the need to examine the essence
of the law. 4 His insight about the nature of law turned not on self-sustaining rules
as was the case with Kelsen, 4 6 but on the human effort to establish order in
society.'47 Within Voegelin's context, the law is but a means of bringing order to the
members of a society, an order that promotes "their continued harmonious existence,
and survival on the actions of the component human beings."' 48 The relationship
between and amongst people is crucial in this regard because "The normative
meaning of a rule involves at least two persons face to face in an act of communica-
tion."'49 Consequently, for Voegelin there were, "no clear line[s]" of separation
between the personal and the social.' Society and the legal community that
permeates it are engaged in an ongoing conversation and debate about what is just
and what is not. 5' The public discussion among the members of society leads to its
"true order" where the members "can unfold fully the potentialities" of their nature,
and their nature is geared not to the individual but to the social.'52
Where Voegelin brought the individual and the communal together, John Rawls
appeared to restrict the relationship between the two by emphasizing the
individual.'53 Indeed Rawls acknowledged the "role of justice in social
cooperation."' 54 For Rawls, however,justice is ultimately the concept of faimess-a
fairness directed toward the individual, 1' for "Each person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."' 56
Still, Rawls conceded that even though the individuals of the society have "disparate
aims and purposes,"'5 the "bonds of civic friendship" cultivate a "general desire for
justice [that] limits the pursuit of other ends."'5 Thus, for Voegelin, justice is the
144. Id.
145. See generally ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NATURE OF LAW AND RELATED WRITINGS 9-10 (1991).
146. See KELSEN, supra note 123, at 3-23, where the author searches for the basic norm of law.
147. See VOEGELIN, supra note 145, at 42-43.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Id. at 45
150. Id. at 49
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY].
154. Id. at 3.
155. Brian Barry has noted that Rawls' theory of justice-as-fairness is the best example of his own
theory of justice-as-impartiality. See generally BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY: A TREATISE ON
SOCIAL JUSTICE-VOL. 11 (1995) [hereinafter BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY].
156. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 3.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
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ordered society; but for Rawls, justice is that which regulates the "well-ordered
society."' 59  The manner in which Rawls understands these principles is by
understanding justice as fairness. 6°
Interestingly, Ronald Dworkin presented a different attitude on this. While
noting that fairness is important to many political systems, he asserted that justice is
not fairness as much as it is the "right" political outcome.' 6' Nonetheless, Rawls
argued that rational people would make choices in the exercise of their "equal
liberty"'62 leading to the just society. In large part, Rawls' theory was premised on
the "original position" in which the "veil of ignorance" blends together human
rationality and the need to protect each member of the community when they are
deprived of the knowledge about their own circumstances and positions in life.'
Thus, Rawls explained that:
Some measure of agreement in conceptions of justice is, however, not the only
prerequisite for a viable human community. There are other fundamental social
problems, in particular those of coordination, efficiency, and stability. Thus the plans
of individuals need to be fitted together so that their activities are compatible with one
another and they can all be carried through without anyone's legitimate expectations
being severely disappointed.t 4 Moreover, the execution of these plans should lead to
the achievement of social ends in ways that are efficient and consistent with justice.
And finally, the scheme of social cooperation must be stable: it must be more or less
regularly complied with and its basic rules willingly acted upon; and when infractions
occur, stabilizing forces should exist that prevent further violations and tend to restore
the arrangement. Now it is evident that these three problems are connected with that
of justice. 165
Dworkin's view of justice developed along similar but not the same lines. In one
emphasis on social justice, he contended that a community's practices "must be
reformed to serve more coherently and comprehensively" the vision of social justice
that it pursues-yet "it does not declare which officer has which office in that grand
159. See id. at 8.
160. See id. at 11.
161. See DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 404-405. As he further notes, "We bow to
justice, among the political virtues, by creating for it a special form of integrity. But the honor is not
arbitrary. The concrete consequences of fairness and procedural due process are much more contingent
than those of justice, and they are often matters of regret." Id. at 406.
162. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 12.
163. See id.
164. Justice, in essence, may then be a truth-the truth that defines the proper, the right relationship
between people, amongst individuals. It is not simply seeking for whatever it is that is proper to an
individual who is separated from others.
165. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 6.
project.""' While Dworkin was reluctant to specify the particulars of how justice
is to be implemented and preserved, he did adopt a notion that brings together in
community the individuals who are essential to making and keeping justice. The law
and the justice it seeks are based on a "fraternal attitude" in which individuals are
"united in community though divided in project, interest, and conviction."'67 Thus,
Dworkin recognized the need to bring each individual together in community when
he concluded Law's Empire with his aspiration that the law is that which helps make
us "the people we want to be and the community we aim to have."' 68
Insofar as justice contributes to the construction of ethical theories, Rawls
advanced the position that the two main concepts that underlie ethical theory are the
right and the good. 69 He asserted, "The structure of an ethical theory is, then largely
determined by how it defines and connects these two basic norms."'"7 Indeed, any
separation between the right (the principles for determining the course) and the good
(the goal or goals expected at the conclusion of the course) would be artificial,
inconsistent, and counter-intuitive. However, Rawls still contended that the priority
of the right over the good is essential to his conception of justice. 7' Yet is the
distinction between the right and the good, in reality, a matter of degree rather than
kind?'72
166. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 407.
167. See id. at 413.
168. Id. In some ways, Dworkin, in his LAW'S EMPIRE, overcomes some of the criticism Michael
Sandel made of Dworkin in the former's LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE. See MICHAEL
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 135-46(1982). Sandel properly points out that each
individual, as a unique entity, belong to a multitude of communities; therefore, it would be wrong to
conclude as he suggests Dworkin did in his (Dworkin's) earlier works that the issue of discrimination
and affirmative action is the concern of "the" society. See id. at 146. As Sandel states, "the society as
a whole" is an abstraction. See id. If this is true, the resolution of acts of discrimination must take
account of real and specific contexts and the people who are situated in them-in other words, the
people who are living in relationship that is troubled by discrimination of some form.
169. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 24-25.
170. Id. at 24.
171. See id. at 31-32.
172. Brian Barry takes a different tack. While he generally agrees with Rawls on the latter's notion
of justice as fairness, Barry insists that the notion of justice as a principle [the right] is independent
from the achievement of the good. See BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY, supra note 155 at 76.
Although he does not establish a conventional right-over-good theory, Barry is most concerned with
deontology rather than teleology-his subject is the right, and his concentration is on rules of justice
that are needed by any society to avoid or rectify conflict. See id. at 72. His rules ofjustice suggest that
while people may disagree on the goal or good, they must concede that people have the right to pursue
their interests-and this is justice as impartiality. See id. at 79. As he states, "there are conflicting
conceptions of the good and the object of justice as impartiality is to find some way of adjudicating
between the that can be generally accepted as fair." Id. at 82. It would seem that the right for him
provides the rules by which people arrive at a fair resolution of their conflicts over what goals they
should be pursuing. See id. While individuals may dislike the outcome of a rule, they will accept the
outcome if the rule constitutes a fair means for resolving the disagreement. See id. at 111.
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1. The Right Versus the Good
Traditionally the distinction between the right and the good has been viewed as
the distinction between deontological and teleological ethical and moral systems.
The right is concerned with principles or rules, whereas the good is concerned with
goals. 174 Rawls developed this contrast by considering the good as emerging from
utilitarian concerns whereas the right does not.77 To test the validity of his
contention, a series of questions should be addressed. Is this distinction simply
between the separate entities of the right on the one hand and the good on the other?
Or is it a difference between utilitarian and non-utilitarian considerations? It is
important for those concerned about the best meaning of justice to understand that
there can be overlap and complement as well as distinctions between the right and
the good that are often ignored. The elements of these questions will now be
considered in the following discussion.
Rawls' contribution presents a useful departure for examining the distinction
between the right and the good and how both relate to the search for "true justice."
A major argument Rawls raised is that the individuals consigned to the Original
Position (the fiction Rawls used to define justice-as-fairness) would eschew
utilitarian considerations and would opt for the two principles of justice that are
geared more to the right than to the good.'76 The keystone of Rawls' construct of
justice-as-fairness is that it, unlike utilitarianism, avoids any movement toward the
teleological.' Rawls observed that the utilitarian principle of achieving the
maximum good runs counter to the principle of justice because it makes no effort to
improve the conditions of the least well-off member of the community. Because of
this, Rawls concluded that... in justice as fairness the concept of the right is prior
173. See e.g., Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 778, 779 n.86 (2000) (book review) (citing RICHARD B.'BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE
PROBLEMS OFNORMATvE ANDCRmcALETHICS 354,391-405 (1959) (differentiating theological from
deontological or "formalist" ethics); WLLIAM K. IRANKARA, ETHICS 19, 25-27, 30-33, 113 (2d. Ed.
1973)).
174. W. D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD, and FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS supplies a detailed
discussion of the traditional view of the right and the good. See W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
(1930); W.D. Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939). His FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS was an effort to
update, confirm, and revise the earlier views on moral theory which first appeared in THE RIGHT AND
THE GOOD. See id. Ross reached the conclusion that, while moral goodness and rightness are
independent is some ways, a morally good action can be the right action in some circumstances. See
id. As will be seen with Rawls and Kymlicka, Ross earlier saw a connection between the right and the
good in some, but not all, situations. See Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS, supra at 309.
175. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 449.
176. See id. at 31.
177. See id. at 30.
to that of the good." '178
To reinforce his point, Rawls proposed several contrasts between the right and
the good. His first distinction was that considerations about rational choice and
deliberative rationality focus on how each person pursues personal interests and
goals once the two principles of justice (i.e., access to equal rights to basic liberty,
and fair addressing of social and economic inequalities) are in place.'79 There is no
need for principles about rational choice because each person will be entitled to plan
his life in accordance with the two justice principles. Rational choice succeeds rather
than precedes the justice principles. Thus, the goods and the goals must be a
function of justice, not vice versa.180
Rawls second contrast was that the right (i.e., the principles of justice) is
uniform whereas conceptions of the good can take on a variety of manifestations.'81
The good for one person may very well be substantively different from that for
another person because variety characterizes rational choice.'82 However, the right
for each person is conditioned by justice principles that are not expressed by
variety.
183
Rawls third contrast centered on the point that the exercise of rational choice and
the pursuit of the good require access to the facts and conditions of a person's
position in life whereas the exercise of the right is restricted by the "veil of
ignorance." '184 He elaborated on this third contrast by developing some distinctions.
Once the right is "discovered" but before individuals pursue personal goods, the
construction of constitutions and basic political/social arrangements needs more
information than is available under the veil of ignorance but less than is required by
individuals when pursuing the goods for their lives. A second distinction is that
rational choice and pursuit of the good are evolving or dynamic (organic) 85 whereas
exercise of the right is static.'86 Finally, the exercise of rational choice and the
pursuit of goods is comparative in nature while the exercise of the right is much more
uniform. It is antithetical for the right to rely on comparisons. The rules or
principles of justice consist of an integrity that is opposed to variety.'87
The degree to which these distinctions can be pursued presents several major
challenges to Rawls' initial views about the right being prior to the good. Will
Kymlicka sifted through the questions posed by these distinctions and provided a
framework for answering them-a framework which establishes why the good is vital
178. Id. at 31.
179. See id. at 449.
180. See id. at 446-47.
181. See id. at 447
182. See id.
183. See id. at 447-48.
184. See id. at 448-49 (defining Veil of Ignorance).
185. I use the term organic in a sense similar to that used by Robert Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 209 (1974).
186. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 447-48.
187. See id. at 557, 559.
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to developing an understanding of justice and to the system of justice with which
lawyers and lay people are inextricably involved."'s Kymlicka hastened to question
whether there is any real issue regarding the priority of one over the other." 9
Elements of this criticism were eventually addressed by Rawls himself when he
recognized and examined several connections between the right and the good not
previously made in Theory."9
Kymlicka maintained that the contrasts proposed by Rawls in Theory confuse,
rather than clarify, the issues of the right and the good.' 9' It is beneficial to use
Kymlicka' s critique as a means of sharpening, rather than denying, the points initially
made by Rawls in 1971 concerning the distinctions between the right and the good.
Kymlicka directed his first criticism at Rawl's belief that utilitarians ignore the
full moral significance of the distinctness of persons because they do not account for
the distinctness of persons.'92 According to Kymlicka, Rawls improperly conflated
theology and utilitarianism. What is at issue is not the distinction between people
and their individual claims, but the equality given to each individual's claims in
formulating principles of justice.'93 Moreover, Kymlicka further argued that
utilitarianism can be a deontological theory, which Rawls denied.1" Achieving a
fundamental level of equal consideration for each person concerned Rawl's and this,
argued Kymlicka, is consistent with the political morality of utilitarianism as a
deontological theory of equal consideration.' 95
Kymlicka directed his second criticism at Rawl's view about a fair distribution
of the good which is at the heart of justice-as-fairness.'96 Ultimately, Kymlicka
advocated that the real distinction depends, not on distribution but on proper
definition of the good.'97 Because Rawls avoided imposing a particular view of the
good on people, his theory leads to variety (the "thin theory of the good") in the
goods people choose.'98 This accords with Rawl"s non-perfectionist theory of society
where he saw that essential human interests will be less limited and more protected
by non-perfectionism. 99 Rawls believed that perfectionist theories are geared to
188. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989).
189. Seeid. at21.
190. See John Rawls, Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 173, 173-
211 (1993). "
191. See KYMuCKA, supra note 188, at 21.
192. See id. at 31-32.
193. See id. at 32.
194. See id. at 32-33.
195. See id. at 32.





goods (teleology), rather than principles (the right).2" Yet this concern obscures an
important, as well as accurate, understanding of the nature and relationship of the
right and the good.2' Kymlicka referred to Rawl's questionable position that
perfectionists are primarily concerned with maximizing "their preferred good."2 °2
Kymlicka demonstrated how perfectionists and non-perfectionists do not simply
adhere to one basic view apiece. 0 3 Just as there is variety among the views of non-
perfectionists, so there is variety of views among perfectionists.2" This being the
case, it is possible for both teleologists and deontologists to pursue a variety of
goods. °s
However, Kymlicka's critique must be reconsidered in light of Rawl's
subsequent work. Like Kymlicka, °6 Rawls discovered that the right and the good
may be more complementary than was originally suggested in Theory.20 7 While still
remaining prior in Rawls' estimation, the right is not divorced from the good.20"
Connections between them can be observed on two levels: the first is through the
principles of justice, which influence the exercise of rational choice and the goods
pursued by individuals; the second is through the constraints imposed by social and
political institutions on the exercise of rational choice.2"9 Rawls conceded that, for
the principles of justice to enhance liberty, the limits placed on the exercise of
rational choice cannot be too restrictive.21
Although Rawls earlier made more of the distinction than the relationship
between the right and the good, he subsequently acknowledged a link between an
individual's exercise of rational choice and pursuit of the good, and the constraints
imposed on these choices by the political and social institutions generated by the
principles of justice.2 ' However in making this connection, Rawls implicitly and
paradoxically recognized some further distinctions between the right and the good-an
acknowledgment that is vital to this inquiry."' While Rawls attempted to show how
"admissible ideas of the good" respect the priority of the right and the political
conception of justice," 3 he identified several distinctions which demonstrate
dependence and relationship between the two-a dependence which makes an
important point about understanding what "true justice" is.2"'





205. See id. at 35-36.
206. See id. at 21.
207. See Rawls, supra note 190, at 173.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 176-78, 201-04.
210. See id. at 174
211. See id. at 207-08.
212. See id. at 176-204.
213. See id. at 176.
214. See id. at 176.
400
[Vol. 27: 377, 2000] Justice As Right Relationship
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The first distinction focused on goodness as rationality.2t5 In targeting their
respective goals in life, individuals generally exercise rationality." But, some




While an individual may reasonably desire a particular goal, rationality ultimately
cautions against some goals because they conflict with the principles of justice or
they may be prohibited by social and political structures erected by the principles."'
This distinction emerges more sharply when the difference emerges between plain
rational choice and rational choice subject to institutions conditioned by the right.219
Plain rational choice can lead an individual to elect a particular good. Rational
choice exercised in accordance with the right, however, may identify the selection
as a good not worth pursuing or incapable of being pursued because it conflicts with
the principles of justice and political and social institutions."2
The second distinction extends from the first and emanates from the manner in
which individuals select primary goods as contrasted with the method used by
citizens.22 Rawls distinguished between individuals (persons who manifest little
interest in their culture and society) and citizens (persons who are very concerned
about those with whom they share in a community.222 Both individuals and citizens
exercise rational choice in the identification and selection of primary goods.223 But,
individuals choose primary goods independent of any external factors including
relationships with those other persons with whom they share a community.
224
Citizens, on the other hand, choose them in accordance with the rights and duties
imposed by social and political institutions founded in accordance with the justice
principles.225 The person qua individual and the person qua citizen do not operate
under the same rational scheme for identifying primary goods.2 6 The citizen's
selection of primary goods will necessarily be influenced by those primary goods
"advantageous for all" whereas the individual would select primary goods without
this influence.227 The rational choice that assists the citizen in selecting primary
goods consequently bears the hallmark of mutuality: what is good for one agent can
215. See id. at 176-78.
216. See id. at 177.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 176-78.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 178.






be good for other agents.22 This is relevant to the conception of justice as right
relationship. Rawls may have conceded that the citizen may well be concerned about
the suum cuique.22 This concern is absent in the exercise of rational choice by the
individual. Thus, the selection of primary goods by the citizen bears a social and
.relational component; that of the individual does not.23° Brian Barry seems to have
conceded something along this line when he stated that even though justice as
impartiality does not tell individuals what they must seek, it does indicate "how are
we to live together, given that we have different ideas about how to live." '231
The distinction between the individual and the citizen provides the foundation
for a further contrast between the good and the right. The citizen is a member of
social and political institutions. Citizens who exercise rational choice in the selection
of goods do so in accordance with political virtues-"virtues of fair social cooperation
such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of
fairness." '232 A citizen is guided by a sense of public virtue which permeates one's
exercise of rational choice with freedom, equality, and social cooperation; the
individual, on the other hand, does not rely on these virtues.233
A critic of this interpretation might argue that these distinctions lead to a
perfectionist state to which Rawls is opposed.2" This objection can be countered by
the recognition of a further distinction which follows from the previous three.235
While citizens and individuals share an interest in seeking goods, the concept of the
good for the citizen implies the good for all.236 The nexus between the good for one
member and the good for other members of the society raises the concept of the good
of the political society which is intertwined with the good of the citizen.237 Again,
evidence in support of justice as relationship [or the suum cuique] surfaces. This is
where Rawls' final distinction concerning the idea of the "good of [a well-ordered]
political society" comes into play.23 These interrelated concepts do not necessitate
the ideal political community. They do, however, show that citizens who exercise
228. See id. at 180.
229. See id. at 184-85.
230. See id. at 178-90.
231. See BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY, supra note 155, at 77. Barry illustrates this point with
the story of Robinson Crusoe who had no need for justice as impartiality until he encountered Man
Friday. See id.
232. See Rawls, supra note 190, at 194.
233. See id. at 190-95.
234. See STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SwtFr, LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANS 32 (1992). These
authors take this point further. They argue that liberals like Rawls, who oppose perfectionism, present
a view of social and political institutions which unite rather than separate people's good with the right.
See id. As Mulhall and Swift state, "talk about the priority of the right over the good only serves to
conceal this crucial point." See id.
235. See Rawls, supra note 190, at 201-06.
236. See id. at 202.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 201.
402
[Vol. 27: 377, 2000] Justice As Right Relationship
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
their rational choice do so for themselves and for the well-ordered society. 239 The
point here is that citizens-but not individuals-seek goods both for themselves and
others. 40
As Rawls experienced an evolution in his belief about the priority of the right
over the good, he adopted a view acknowledging some connection and compatibility
between the two.24' While the right and the good overlap in some areas, they may be
distinguishable in others.242 In the final analysis, the distinctions are better
understood if seen as those of emphasis rather than separation. The distinctions
between the right and the good are of degree rather than kind. As Kymlicka
accurately pointed out, there is no real issue "about which of the right and the good
is prior. '243 When the distinctions between the two are analyzed, it becomes
conspicuous that the connections and interrelationships between the good and the
right outweigh the differences. The right and the good are different, but also
interdependent and complementary. The contrasts between the two are of degree, not
substance; they reveal as much about unity as they do about separation. Those
searching for "true justice" may appreciate not only the distinction between the right
and the good, but also of their interdependence as well.
2. Is There A Connection Between Justice And Morality?
This last point raises a question about the role of morality in the process leading
up to making a just decision in difficult cases where justice seems elusive. 2" Here,
a new set of questions surfaces. Is it important to consider the role that moral
considerations play in the search forjustice? Must moral considerations play a role
in the reasoning process of seeking justice? These questions take on further
significance as one ponders the point made by Robert George: "Laws cannot make
men moral. Only men can do that; and they can do it only by freely choosing to do
the morally right thing for the right reason. 245
If George is correct, it would seem logical to argue that the members of a
community dealing with law and the search for just solutions to difficult cases must
incorporate moral considerations when they seek the goal (the good) of justice. It
would also appear that the person concerned about "true justice" is a moral reasoner
239. See id. at 180, 202-04.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 174.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 169-241.
243. See KYMLICKA, supra note 188, at 2 1.
244. By the "moral" and "morality," I mean the use of ethical wisdom in confronting the issues of
public life. Individuals and groups are moral if they act virtuously in their conduct toward one another.
The moral choice is right or good. The immoral choice is wrong or evil.
245. See ROBERTGEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLICMORALITY I (1993).
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who focuses on the good rather than simply the rule/right. John Finnis once
suggested that legal reasoning, in large part, is technical rather than moral
reasoning. 246 This assertion raises an issue about the separation between law and
morals. Is the separation real and necessary, or is it a fiction? Those searching for
justice must find answers to these questions. They may well be acquainted with
Ronald Dworkin's lawyer-judge Hercules who is gifted with "superhuman skill,
learning, patience, and acumen. '247 Unlike Hercules, most people concerned about
the true form of justice can make no claim to being something other than human. Of
greater influence to such individuals is the model constructed by Judge Cardozo who
argued that a conscientious judge is like the "wise pharmacist" who must balance and
combine a variety of ingredients including logic, history, custom, and a sense of right
in order to arrive at ajust decision. -48 When confronted with Finnis' s statement, one
may be perplexed. Realizing that Finnis's concept of practical reasonableness
underlies legal reasoning by raising the fundamental moral issue about what ought
to be done,249 a person should conclude that there is more to Finnis' statement.
A conscientious individual might agree that difficult cases and the search for
justice defy easy solutions. Those concerned with obtaining true justice often apply
a corpus of relevant judicial precedent, and other legal authority to the case under
decision. Some of this work is technical, perhaps even mechanical in the application
of relevant precedent and other authorities to each factual context. But, this does not
preclude probing the moral issues within difficult cases. Unlike Dworkin's Judge
Hercules who searches for one right answer,250 the person seeking true justice
acknowledges that there may well be several potential solutions for difficult cases.
It is precisely in the hard cases such as Weber where moral reasoning is often
necessary to reach justice.
Finnis correctly acknow*ledged that moral investigation is a component of the
legal and judicial processes. It is the "backbone" of legal reasoning, and it helps
246. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 142 (Robert P. George, ed. 1992) [hereinafter FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
THEORY]; see generally also RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL
ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998) (discussing the role of moral reasoning in
legal interpretation).
247. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-06 (1977).
248. See CARDOZO, supra note 123, at 162.
249. See FINNIS, NA'URAL LAW, supra note 7, at 12.
250. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 257-58; see also DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1995) (elaborating on his "one right answer" thesis). Dworkin introduces Hercules in his
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), where he describes his mythical judge as,
[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen... [who] is a judge of some
representative American jurisdiction... [Hercules] accepts the main uncontroversial
constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts... that statutes have
the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty
to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as lawyers say,
extends to the case at bar.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-06 (1977).
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shape the enterprise. 25 ' The search for objective moral truth is vital to deciding hard
cases because this investigation is constitutive of ascertaining "the most basic human
rights. 252 In the final analysis, Finnis recognized a nexus between addressing moral
issues and legal reasoning.253 This connection becomes evident when a person
discovers that identification of the moral-making the right decision to resolve a
difficult case-is rationally determined.
What furthers justice and human flourishing cannot be determined by exclusive
reliance on technical reasoning. Justice and human flourishing must ultimately
incorporate "a principle of fairness" based not on a separation but a synthesis of legal
and moral reasoning.254 Reason deprived of moral consideration will never, in itself,
determine what is just, what is the "greater good and lesser evil. 2 5 The ability to
use moral reasoning to reach thejust solution should be more apparent the longer one
contemplates and pursues the true nature of justice.
However, Jeremy Waldron presented an interesting investigation by raising
questions about the relevance of moral realism to legal decision-making.256
Ultimately, he saw that any link between the moral and the legal is specious, and he
concluded that moral decision-making by lawyers andjudges is inappropriate.2 7 The
gist of Waldron's thesis is that lawyers and judges who claim to arrive at moral
decisions often arrive at different decisions that conflict with the claims of others
who also believe that their conclusions are moral.58 It is not the lawyer's or judge's
moral subjectivity that Waldron sees as being fatal to moral claims. Rather, it is the
disagreement among the variety of conflicting moral claims that lawyers make, and,
which in his view, can lead to different results. 9 The ongoing debate about
affirmative action-what is right and what is not right with it-illustrates his point.
Yet, it is worthwhile to recall that H. L. A. Hart-a staunch adherent to the
separation thesis-implied some "point of necessary intersection between law and
morals" when he critiqued the Utilitarians' "emphatic insistence" on the separation
25 1. See FINNIs, NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 246, at 148.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. As Finnis argues, "moral absolutes give legal reasoning its backbone" and "moral absolutes are
rationally determined." Id.
255. See id. at 151-53.
256. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORAL OBJECTIVITY IN NATURALLAWTHEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 163 (Robert George ed., 1992).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 183-84.
259. See id. at 184.
of law and morals in legal reasoning. 260
One could turn to the evaluation of the moral component of legal reasoning
made by Neil MacCormick to resolve this question. -' MacCormick retreated from
his earlier attraction to "the separation of law and morals" thesis.26 2 MacCormick
spanned the gap between the moral and the legal in his identification of a "necessary
connection" between law and morality that avoided his previous detection.261 This
nexus is manifested in those legal systems which aspire to just decisions. The
reasoning leading to just decisions tends to rely on compromise between, and
tolerance of, the respective positions of the parties to the legal dispute. This
connection between law and morals, while weak, is still significant for
MacCormick.264 It is also practical because law and morality share concerns about
how individuals must ultimately live together in society.265 This living-in-together-
ness is a problem thatjustice as right relationship seeks to address. MacCormick saw
the promising link between morality and law in their mutual, practical interests to
resolve conflict and to establish a just result.266 The quest for a just result suggests
the existence and necessity of a legal order in the human community called the Rule
of Law.267 What bolsters the Rule of Law for MacCormick and many others is found
in the consensus that the Rule must be practically oriented toward an efficiency that
is fair, determinate, good, and just.268 If the Rule of Law is not geared to this
efficiency, individuals in conflict may turn to alternative methods of resolving their
disputes, and avoid the elements of practical reasoning shared by law and morals.
But the skeptic may raise another objection to the contention that there is a nexus
between legal and moral reasoning. If a portion of the law is independent of moral
reasoning, may this segment be expanded to demonstrate that most legal cases
involving disputes between people can be decided without any need for moral
reasoning? Many thoughtful individuals would answer this question in the negative.
The technical considerations that insulate some aspects of legal reasoning from moral
evaluation cannot be applied to the substantive issues of human conflict which
emerge in the disputes that are at the core of legal cases. Otherwise, this would lead
to a mechanical jurisprudence which is ill-suited for resolving these difficult issues,
260. See Hart, supra note 127, at 64. But see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelitY to Low-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630(1958) (discussing Professor Fuller's response which develops
an inextricable relationship between law and morality).
261. See Neil MACCORMICK, NATURAL LAW AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND MORALS, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 113 (Robert P. George, ed. 1992).
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 118.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 120. In his earlier work, MacCormick noted that moral reasoning is not a "poor
relation of legal reasoning," rather, he insisted that "legal reasoning is a special, highly institutionalized
and formalized type of moral reasoning." See id. at 272-74. For MacCormick, the legal and the moral
necessarily share parts of the same social setting. See id.
267. See id.
268. See FINNiS, NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 246, at 121-25.
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where moral reasoning is essential. In these cases, the facts, the equity of the parties'
positions, and other relevant considerations would be overshadowed and perhaps
even eliminated by this mechanical approach to legal reasoning. Like the Cardozian
jurist,269 many searching for the true form of justice are rational and reasonable
people. If this assumption is correct, then the conflict about the meaning of the law
in each case is usually not a disagreement between illogical or irrational persons but,
rather, is between rational and logical ones. Notwithstanding their rationality, it is
clear that the litigants and their lawyers often disagree over the meaning of the law
as it applies to their dispute. Many will see that the law itself does not contain an
internal mechanism that automatically resolves the disagreement between these
rational agents. But, the law has been established by people as the body of general
rules to guide and regulate how they live together. Consequently, must the reasoning
needed to find the meaning of the law in difficult cases be expanded? Can reliance
on background moral considerations essential to how these people can restore the
ability to live in a right relationship with one another be necessary forjust resolution
of interpersonal disputes?
Ultimately, legal reasoning that searches for truejustice, and moral reasoning are
not separate enterprises. That some legal reasoning is not based on moral reasoning
does not automatically lead to the conclusion "that legal reasoning is impervious to
moral reasons."27 While moral reasoning need not permeate the entire process of
legal reasoning (particularly when the questions focus on technical matters such as
general procedure), it is not required to be completely omitted from the process. A
strict separation of law and morals is a doctrine that has little bearing on the legal
process. Especially in those difficult cases where reasonable people credibly and
persuasively espouse conflicting understandings about the meaning of the law; one
searching for true justice might conclude that what is needed to clarify the meaning
of the law in such a context is the law's moral justification.27 While reasonable
people may dispute the particular moral justification reinforcing the meaning of the
law, there is considerably less disagreement that it is a moral justification which
underlies our understanding of the law and the legal reasoning which supplies that
understanding in hard cases. But when we get to the hardest of cases and the moral
seeker of true justice seems to be boxed in by what the law demands, is this person
free to disobey the law?
269. See CARDOZO, supra note 123 and accompanying text.
270. See Joseph Raz, On The Autonomy Of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIs 2, 14 (1993).
27 1. This point stands in contrast to Dworkin's Judge Hercules' "best political justification." See
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 380.
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3. May The Moral Person Disobey The Law?
Judge Gee, in his remand opinion raised the prospect of whether he should
adhere to the Supreme Court's decision when he stated that he had the opportunity
to make an election. As he said,
[F]or the above reasons I think [the Supreme Court's decision] gravely mistaken, I do
not say that the Court's decision is immoral or unjust. Indeed, in some basic sense it
may well represent true justice. But there are many actions roughly just that our laws
do not authorize and our Constitution forbids, actions such as preventing a Nazi Party
march through a town where reside former inmates of concentration camps or
inflicting summary punishment on one caught red-handed in a crime. Subordinate
magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher authority or yield up their
posts to those who will. I obey, since in my view the action required of me by the
Court's mandate is only to follow a mistaken course and not an evil one.
272
1
There has been much discussion about whether there is an obligation to obey the
law or not.2 73 The question presented here presumes that there is some obligation on
the part of the seeker of true justice to obey. Related to this question is the issue
regarding the extent to which this obligation is voluntary. Assuming that some
aspects of obedience to the law are mandatory and others are voluntary, how does
any obligation to obey the law affect the positions and actions taken by this searcher?
Philip Soper claimed that there is a weak obligation to obey the law in that there is
"some moral reason to do what the law requires. '274 The obligation to obey, for
Soper, is neither absolute nor irrefutable but prima facie.275 There can be substantive
reasons for not obeying an unjust law, or not obeying a just law in particular
circumstances where obedience would constitute injustice. 27" Nonetheless, two
points reinforce Soper's claim that there is a moral reason to obey the law. The first
is that law is part of a "supremely effective coercive system" that offers its subjects
272. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 132 , 133 (5th Cir. 1980) (Gee, J., on
remand).
273. Another commentator has investigated and developed the relationship between the responsibility
of citizenship and obligation due the law. See T.R.S. Allan, Citizenship and Obligation: Civil
Disobedience and Civil Dissent, 55 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 89 (1996) (arguing that legal obligations must
be understood in the context of moral judgment). For Professor Allan, whether a person obeys the law
or not is based on a premise that the citizen (presumably this would include the lawyer) will obey the
law upon his judgment concerning the law's "purposes and effects." See id. at 119. Thus, the
relationship between obedience and disobedience is contingent on the moral basis of the law that
appeals to reason rather than the threat of the exercise of force. See id.
274. See Philip Soper, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 127, 132 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
275. See id.
276. Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae that not all human law binds people "in conscience"
when such law contravenes God's law, especially where the human law "inflicts unjust hurt on its
subjects." See AQUINAS, supra note 93, Q. 96, at art. 4.
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both security and an attractive alternative to the chaos of anarchy. Second, the law
is defended by its subjects who are the frequent beneficiaries of its ability to
coordinate social life and by those whose duty it is to enforce the law. 277 But is the
obligation to obey the law always voluntary? Does the concept of voluntariness imply
that the action pursued by an individual is done freely and intentionally and not
mandated by some coercive authority? 278 It is important to answer these questions
in order to assess what position the seeker of true justice must take in hard cases
where the law is either immoral or, if it is not, would dictate a result which is
immoral or unjust.
In order to address these issues, it will be helpful to determine what is meant by
legal obligation within the context of law and obedience to law. An examination of
the positions taken by several major contributors to this discussion will frame the
investigation. One of the first definitions about legal obligation was offered by
Socrates in the Crito dialogue.279 Socrates had been condemned to die because of his
violation of Athenian law.2 80 Yet, questions arise as to whether Socrates had been
justly accused and justly convicted.' Crito offered Socrates a tempting alternative
to death; tempting because contained within the plan for escape was the argument
that disobedience to the law would be morally justified in this case.282 Socrates
demonstrated in the Apology that the allegations he faced were unsubstantiated, and
that the application of the law was unjust.-'- Crito informed Socrates that his escape
could be arranged by payment of a small sum of money.284 However, Socrates
responded that even though he may be wrongly convicted, it would be a far greater
wrong to take the law into his own hands by escaping from lawfully imposed
punishment. 285 For Socrates, the injustice done to him paled in contrast to the
violence he would commit against the state by escaping punishment for the
unjustifiable conviction. 286 But those seeking true justice may not be satisfied by
Socrates' example and counsel.
Richard Wasserstrom redefined the question faced by Socrates in his investiga-
tion of "the obligation" to obey the law.287 He reconstructed the question which
277. See Soper, supra note 274, at 153.
278. See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY & SOCIETY 218, 223 (P.M.S.
Hacker et. a]. eds., 1997).




283. See PLATO, APOLOGY, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO (R.E. Allen trans., 1984).
284. See CRITO, supra note 279.
285. See idl.
286. See id.
287. See Richard Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, 10 UCLA L. REV. 780 (1963).
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Socrates faced by testing the claim that "because one does have an obligation to obey
the law, one ought not ever disobey the law. 2 88  Wasserstrom identified the
falsehood of assuming that a person has an absolute obligation to obey the law
because he demonstrated that there are circumstances which canjustify disobedience
(such as is the case involving the false charges against Socrates). 289 Wasserstrom
challenged Socrates's view by claiming that even if one begins with a prima facie
obligation to obey, disobedience can be morallyjustified when strict adherence to the
law constitutes greater violence to justice than obedience. 290 His point reflects
Rawls' view that, while there is a moral obligation (derived from the principle of
fairness) to obey the law, such obligation can be overcome by other obligations.2 9'
The nucleus of Wasserstrom's position is his concern "with moral obligations and
morally justified actions.2 92  Writing at the time of widespread civil rights
demonstrations protesting the evil of segregation, Wasserstrom argued that it was not
"inconsistent to assert both that indiscriminate disobedience is indefensible and that
discriminate disobedience is morally right and proper conduct. 293 Given the context
in which he was writing, the author did not advocate unbridled disobedience. 94 He
did argue, however, that disobedience to oppressive laws directly or indirectly
disfavoring some citizens over others could be morallyjustified. 95 Yet Wasserstrom
did not address the question whether the obligation to obey the law is voluntary when
he stated that he was "not at all concerned with the question of why, in fact, so many
people do obey the law." '296 Insight about the voluntary nature of obedience to the
law must be sought elsewhere.
M.B.E. Smith advanced the bold view that not only is there no obvious
obligation to obey the law, there is no prima facie obligation to obey any laws of
one's government.297 Smith defined a prima facie obligation as one in which a
person has a moral reason to obey the law. 298 Absent some other moral reason which
would take precedence over the first to obey the law, a failure to obey the law would
be wrong.299 In Smith's view (which is in sharp contrast with Soper's)3°°, debts of
gratitude to one's government for supplying basic services and security are
insufficient to impose a primafacie obligation to obey.3"' Any argument from fair
288. See id. at 790-9 1.
289. See id. at 801-02.
290. See id.
291. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 153, at 333-34, 352.
292. See Wasserstrom, supra note 287, at 785.
293. See id. at 793.
294. See id. at 805-07.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 785.
297. See M. B. E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law, 82 YALE L.J. 950,
950 (1973).
298. See id. at 951.
299. See id. at 952.
300. See Soper, supra note 274.
301. See Smith, supra note 297, at 953.
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play (which both Hart and Rawls support" 2) is not directed toward the obligation to
obey as much as it is directed toward guiding one's relationships with fellow
citizens." 3 In addition, offering one's consent to the presence and operation of a
government is not aprimafacie obligation to obey the law." Smith pointed out that
virtually every legal system contains either pointless or harmful laws to which
citizen's obedience would be either meaningless or detrimental. Therefore,
avoidance of, and possibly disobedience to such laws, in some circumstances, would
be the morally correct thing to do.305
While there may be many harmful or pointless laws, there are many others which
are either beneficial or neutral in their outcome." 6 Smith appeared to agree with
Aquinas °7 in stating that some types of disobedience (e.g., against immoral laws) can
be morally justified.3 8 However, it would be mistaken to conclude that it would
always be morally justifiable to ignore or disobey the law, particularly when the
law's enforcement is based on moral grounds or when the law generates substantive
benefits for all humanity:" Moreover, many laws are crucial to coordinating the
events of daily life (e.g., most traffic regulations), and obeying them would not be
unjust-particularly in an urban setting during rush-hour traffic.3"'
Anthony Honor6 has supplemented the discussion by addressing the question of
why individuals should obey the law.31' His answer advanced a political argument
why there is an obligation to obey: obedience to law is "healthy" because it makes
members of a society more mindful that they are conditionally dependent on one
another.' 12 While Honor6 did not dismiss the existence of circumstances that can
morally justify disobedience, his position agreed with Soper's that there is a general
prima facie obligation to obey." 3 The prima facie obligation is premised on the
existence of myriad complexities found in contemporary life. Honor6 argued that
302. See H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1967); RAWLS,
THEORY, supra note 153. § 53, at 350; see also Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY 9, 9-10 (1964).
303. See Smith, supra note 297, at 956-57.
304. See id. at 953-54.
305. See id. at 956.
306. See id. at 958
307. See AQUINAS, supra note 93.
308. See Smith, supra note 297, at 958.
309. See id. at 959-60.
310. My example of the urban setting could take on a different hue if one were to consider whether
a motorist ought to obey all traffic regulations in the dead of night when no other motorists are observed
using the streets.
311. See Tony Honor, Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation, 67 VA. L. REV. 39
(1981).
312. See id. at 44.
313. See id.
because of these complexities, like those in the Weber case, sensible individuals must
depend on the existence, implementation, and enforcement of the laws which help
people meet these complexities. Putting aside the acknowledgment that the law
serves many practical human needs, he did not reach the second component of the
question,-is the obligation voluntary?"'4 Honor6 implied that the obligation is not
voluntary, and he concluded that the obligation to obey is of necessity rather than
choice because people are dependent on one another."' In his view, people obey the
law out of practical necessity."6
What if there are other reasons for obeying the law besides the most fundamental
of practical reasons, for example, survival? Joseph Raz has assisted in finding a
solution. Raz initially held a position similar to Smith's that not only is there no
obligation to obey the law, there is not even a primafacie obligation to obey it.317
But in doing so, Raz made two concessions: (1) some people may have moral reasons
for obedience, and (2) most people have good, prudential reasons for obedience most
of the time." 8 Raz's two concessions imply two conclusions. The first is that some
people have individual reasons based on moral or prudential judgment for obeying
the law. The second conclusion which follows is that such compliance is voluntary
rather than mandatory insofar as the individual is willing to accept the consequences
of disobedience. Raz subsequently cautioned that his denial (that there is no
obligation to obey the law) does not mean that people should disobey the law, nor
does it imply that it is immaterial whether individuals obey or disobey.3 9 In order
to make his position more clear, Raz examined the concept of consent as the
relationship between an individual and the authority which enacts a law. Within the
context of contemporary political institutions having infinite rules that regulate
people's lives, Raz's notion of consent is a sensible manner of investigating if
obedience is voluntary or otherwise.
First, Raz regarded "consent" as a cognitive agreement that acknowledges a
change in the normative situation of a person. Second, consent eventually imposes
the performance of action that demonstrates the normative change. Third, consent
has a public element in which the individual who offers the consent holds out to
others (usually members of the same political society) the first two conditions 2-
Yet, Raz's notion of consent is not an inviolable rule that always binds people to
obey. If the society seeks what is just, and a person tends to identify with this
society, then "it is morally permissible for [that] person to adopt an attitude of
conscientious watchfulness" in which obedience is not performance of an obligation
314. See id.
315. See iLd. at 61.
316. See id. at 45-46.
317. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (1979).
318. See id. at 237, 242.
319. See Joseph Raz, Authrity and Cowsent. 67 VA. L. REV. 103. 104 (1981).
320. See id. at 119-20.
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but exercise of a person's moral judgment that this is what ought to be done. 32 ,
Guiding Raz's investigation of the relationship between individuals and the law
is the issue of whether the law is itself morally justified. According to Raz, the
question of whether there is any obligation to obey cannot be answered until it is
established that the law itself is morally grounded. Only then can one assess a
person's moral obligation to obey the law.3 2 It would seem that the stronger the
moral justification for a law, the more a moral person is obligated to obey it. In turn,
the weaker the moral justification, the less one is obliged to honor it. Because
individuals are moral agents who often have different, personal decisions to make,
the extent of any obligation to obey will vary from person to person . 23
Reasons for following or not following the law, according to Raz, tend to be
individual, based on the moral justifications of the law, and the circumstances
(including moral ones) of each individual in relation to each law. Some individuals
may also be more affected by some laws and less affected by others. This leads Raz
to identify "an attitude of respect" for the law that is founded not on an obligation to
obey the rules established and enforced by the authority, but on the premises that the
law is one's law because it is either (1) the law which one has respect for or consents
to through "voluntary or semi-voluntary obligations, '324 or (2) the law of the
community to which one belongs and identifies. 25
Rather than having an obligation to obey, one has a relationship to the
community, the source of all law, that grows as one's identification with it grows.
This is akin to the relationship between a person and the community.326 What
emerges is an obligation to obey not so much the law as one's attitude toward the
community to which a person belongs. -7 As Raz states, "if there is a general
obligation to obey the law, it exists because it was voluntarily undertaken" as a result
of a person joining and remaining with the community.32 Surely, a person living in
a totalitarian state may follow the law because of the harsh consequences of not
doing so. But even here, there is a sense of voluntariness when a person's prudent
judgment and realization about the practical considerations associated with obedience
and disobedience influence his or her decision.
However, when looking at democratic states and the societies in which they
321. See id. at 130-31.
322. See Joseph Raz. The Obligation fo Obey: Revision and Tradition. I NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POIY 139. 140 (1984).
323. See'id. at 146.
324. See JOSEPH RAZ. THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 99 (1986) 1hereinafter RAz. FREEDOM].
325. See Raz. supra note 322. at 154.
326. See RAZ. FREEDOM. s pra, note 324. at 104.
327. See Raz,. spra note 322. at 154.
328. See id. at 155.
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exist, the story is somewhat different in that the voluntary nature of citizen obedience
is more characteristic of the political institutions. The stronger the bond with the
community (and its law), the stronger the voluntary obligation to be obedient to its
rules. The less one identifies one's self with the community, the weaker that
voluntary obligation.
It is not simply a free spirit which autonomously decides whether to obey a
particular law or to obey any law in a particular context. Rather, it is the moral
reasoner who seeks the good and looks at the law through the lens of justice. As
mentioned earlier in the discussion on whether legal reasoning is moral reasoning,
the law consists of those rules simultaneously used by each person along with the
community at large to direct how people live in peaceful, beneficial, and flourishing
coexistence with one another-how they live justly in relation to one another. When
the law is not used to achieve this goal of ensuring that the members of the society
live in right relation with one another, the duty or obligation to obey these rules may
be questioned since the law's existence and application that are directed toward
achieving the good simultaneously for each person is in doubt.
It is at this point that John Finnis makes an extraordinary contribution to the
discussion about the nature of justice and its essential core of right relationship
between individuals. le suggested that justice requires each person to seek what is
important to human life not only for the self and "his own sake but also in common,
in community."'3 29 In order to accomplish this, Finnis identified three elements of
justice.33 ° The first is called "other directedness. '33t Essentially, this means that
justice is interpersonal or inter-subjective and concerns each person's relations and
dealings with other individuals.1 2 The second component of justice deals with
duty-the rights individuals have as understood by what is owed or due to them by
others." 3 The final element is equality, an equality not based on identicalness, but
on proportionality, equilibrium, or balance.334 Finnis concluded his preliminary
analysis of justice by arguing that arbitrary self-preference is substituted for the
pursuit of the common good of the community.3 ' It is important to note that the
common good for Finnis is "the good of individuals"-the "object of all justice and
which all reasonable life in community must respect and favour."" 6 While equality
is an important part of justice and, in particular, distributive justice, the "objective
of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the




333. See id. at 162.
334. See id. at 162-63.
335. See id. at 164.
336. Id. at 168.
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community .... It is at this stage where the relation and role of the common
good in achieving justice must be examined.
E. Practical Reason and the Common Good
In the Prima Secundae of his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas presented his general
theory of law. He defined law as rules or measures of acts whereby individuals are
induced to act or restrained from acting.:' His concept of the law helped establish
the ground from which the present investigation will develop and take shape.
337. See id. at 174. Finnis makes the wry observation
If redistribution means no more than that more beer is going to be consumed morosely before
television sets by the relatively many, and less fine wine consumed by the relatively few at
salon concerts by select musicians, then it can scarcely be said to be a demand ofjustice. But
if redistribution means that, at the expense of the wine, etc., more people can be preserved
from (non-self-inflicted) illness, educated to the point where genuine self-direction becomes
possible for them, defended against the enemies of justice. etc., then such redistribution is a
requirement ofjustice.
/i. at 174. Eric Rakowski, in EQUAL JUSTICE. has focused on the issue of distributive justice and
concluded that justice is equality-"equality of fortune." See ERIC RAKOWSKI. EQUALJUSTICE I ( 1991 ).
In recognizing that individuals have different strengths and weaknesses that account for what they have
or do not have, each person's due is "a right to compensation at the expense of those who fared better.
to the extent that the unlucky did not willingly assume the risk of whatever disadvantaged them, and
assuming that specific culprits cannot be found to make reparations." See id. at 2. There are some
views of distributive justice in which the entitlements of individuals are considered solely on the basis
of looking at individuals and not individuals who live in community or relationship with others. See
id. An illustration is found in the work of Robert Nozick who addresses the insertion of principles of
distributive justice into the law and the legal structure of society. See id. He suggests that these
principles
give each citizen an enforceable claim to some portion of the total product: that is. to some
portion of the sum total of the individually and jointly made products.... It is on this batch of
individual activities that patterned distributional principles give each individual an enforceable
claim. Each person has a claim to the activities and the products of other persons,
independently of whether the other persons enter into particular relationships that give rise to
these claims, and independently of whether they voluntarily take these claims upon themselves,
in charity or in exchange for something.
NOZICK, supra note 185, at 171-72 (1974). It is unclear from Nozick's approach what happens to those
who are present in the community but are not citizens of it. See id. Second, it does not seem important
that the claim a person makes to the products of one's labor or of another's labor is ever considered in
the context of the claims of other individuals who also have needs. See id. In other words. Nozick's
understanding of distributive justice is independent of considering an individual's claims in relation
to the claims of others who must be involved with the same distribution of products. See id.
Consequently, his principles of distribution would seem to concentrate on the claims of specific
individuals rather than on the competing claims of the individuals in the community in which these
principles apply. See id.
338. See AQUINAS. suipra note 93. Q. 90, at art. I.
Aquinas acknowledged that law is generally directed toward the common good of
mankind.339 This basic point established a goal or the teleological dimension of the
law which, is an important element in defining true justice. Aquinas further
identified the several kinds of law as eternal, divine, natural, and human. 4' The
eternal law34' is teleological and concerns God's plan of "divine wisdom directing
all things to the attainment of their end."34"2 The divine law is related to the eternal
law in that it directs the last end of people and orders what they ought to do or avoid,
judges interior human movements, and punishes those evil deeds which human law
cannot or does not punish.343 Human law is the derivative of practical reason which
directs the human race to known or ascertainable principles applicable to matters of
human conduct.344 But these descriptions and definitions of the law do not provide
much insight into substantive knowledge about the particulars of the law. Rather,
they provide the inquirer with the ability to reflect upon what the law ought to be in
a broad way.
Dean Anthony Kronman has acknowledged an important contemporary role for
practical reasoning or wisdom central to Aquinas's definition of human law. While
acknowledging the strong skepticism against practical wisdom in both legal
education and the profession, Dean Kronman asserts that "practicing lawyers still
need the intellectual and affective powers whose combination constitutes the virtue
of practical wisdom." '345 As he further noted, practical wisdom is a character trait of
what the "lawyer-statesman" needs as guidance in difficult deliberations essential to
doing the good of serving both the client and society.346 This notion of doing good
emerges elsewhere in the efforts to determine what is true justice. Again Thomistic
thought comes to the rescue.
Drawing from Aquinas' First Principle, Etienne Gilson suggested that the first
and foremost principle of legal prescriptions is that humans are to do good and avoid
evil.347 Gilson's understanding reflected Aquinas' point that law provides an
important vehicle through that human reason can discern what is good and what is
evil.348 The frequently cited passage of the First Principle makes this point as
follows: "the first precept of law, that good mis to be done and ensued, and evil is to
be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this ... 
339. See id. Q. 90, A. 2, at art. 2.
340. See id. Q. 91.
341. See id.
342. See F. C. COPLESTON, S.J., AQUINAS: AN INTRODUCTION To THE LIFE AND WORK OF THE
GREAT MEDIEVAL THINKER 220 (1995).
343. See AQUINAS. sitpra note 93, Q. 91, at art. 4.
344. See id. Q. 91, at art. 3.
345. ANTHONY KRONMAN. THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 269
(1993) [hereinafter. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER].
346. See id. at 41-44.
347. See ETIENNEGILSON. THE PHILOSOPHY OFST. THOMAS AQUINAS 327 (Edward Bullough trans..
Rev. G. A. Elrington ed.. 1929).
348. See AQUINAS, sutpra note 93, II-I, Q. 91. at art. 2.
349. See id. I1-1 Q. 94, at are 2.
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As mentioned earlier, there is a telos or goal associated with Aquinas' method
for living a moral life in which good is sought and evil is avoided. Within the
context of the Summa Theologiae, the telos is identified with justice, the object of
which directs "man in his relations with others ... ."' At the heart of the
interpersonal relationship, and therefore at the heart of justice, is "a kind of equality"
because the name of justice implies equality for "things are adjusted [such as a
person is in right relationship with another person] when they are made equal, for
equality is in reference of one thing to some other." '' As social beings, people have
a variety of relationships with other persons. For these relations to be right, they
must be rectified "in relation to the person to whom they are directed [and] ... about
such dealings there is a special virtue, and this isjustice."352 For Aquinas, justice has
another identity which is "truth" and truth is achieved "when the rectitude of the
reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the
reason... ."' What is this "rectitude of reason" which is essential forjustice? The
answer to this question appeared in Aquinas' examination of the virtue of prudence.
If the goal of human existence is to live in right relation with one another in
accordance with the First Principle and if this goal is to be attained through the virtue
of justice, how do people-members of a wide variety of communities-come to
discover what it is that will constitute the good in relations with their neighbors? It
is through prudence. Aquinas exhorted, "Prudence is a virtue most necessary for
human life. For a good life consists in good deeds." '354 Here, Aquinas made the
connection with justice through the notion of "rectitude of choice." 5 He argued as
follows:
350. See id. 1l-I Q. 57. at art. I.
351. See id. A. P. d'Entr~ves has concluded that the concept of equality of people is fundamentally
related to the theme of natural law. See A. P. D'ENTREVES. NATURAL LAW: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY
21-22 (Harper Torchbook 1965). Lloyd Weinreb has made a helpful contribution to the understanding
of equality that emerges from natural law systems. See LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
161 (1987). Weinreb argues that. "equality has value as the complement of liberty; it is only in
connection with liberty that equality can be understood as a human value at all." See id. I agree with
Weinreb that liberty (freedom) must somehow serve as a complement to equality. After all, one can
look at a group of slaves and argue that they, as members of a community, have and share equality. The
point is that equality must be tied in with human goods like liberty, opportunity, wealth, and self-respect
identified by John Rawls' "thin theory of the good." See KYMLICKA. sulpra note 188, at 33 (1989).
John Finnis identifies life, knowledge. play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship). practical
reasonableness, and religion as the relevant goods pursued by humans. See FINNIS. NATURAL LAW,
stpra note 7. at 85-90. Elsewhere, Weinreb has pointed out that the conflict and tension which arise
between equality and liberty reveal that understanding one means that we must understand the
other-"[t ]heir reconciliation takes us beyond either considered by itself." See WEINREB. supra. at 183.
352. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 11-11, Q. 58. at art. 2.
353. See id. at art. 4.
354. See it. I1-1, Q. 57. at art. 5.
355. See itt.
[I]n order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does
it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And,
since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two
things; namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end .... And
to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by
a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to
the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the
reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to
the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to
lead a good life. " '
Aquinas elaborated on the significance of prudence to justice and doing good by
arguing that moral virtues cannot exist without intellectual virtues such as
prudence.357 Prudence offers and directs people to "the right reason about things to
be done," and gives people the understanding necessary to decide both practical and
speculative matters."' Knowing and understanding what is moral, what is "the good"
of the First Principle, cannot be accomplished without reliance on the intellectual
virtue of prudence.359
Prudence is also a cardinal virtue-one of those virtues on which all others
hinge-according to Aquinas, and, as such, has an inextricable relation to justice as
a second cardinal virtue.36° Prudence exists in the human act of reasoning which is
directed in its operation into justice.36" ' As a cognitive faculty, prudence gives a
person concerned about understanding justice the perception or vision which
becomes the foundation of human knowledge. 6 2 In turn, human knowledge makes
an individual know through reason what is good, so that this individual's work will
be good. 6
Exactly what is the good which is sought? Is it the antithesis of evil, or is it
something' else? In the context of moral virtue, it is human good that is sought.364
As an end or telos of the moral virtues, human good must "of necessity pre-exist in
the reason." '365 Prudence does not appoint the end, but serves as the means or
direction by which people are guided toward this end. 6 The relevance of this goal
of the human good is vital to the American legal system.
If there is some question that the human good is geared toward the individual in
356. Id. (emphasis added).
357. See id. 11-1, Q. 58, at art. 4.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See id. 11-I, Q. 6 1, at art. 2.
361. See id.
362. See i. 11-11, Q. 47, at art. I.
363. See id. at art. 2-3.
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isolation, rather than the individual in relationship with other people, then Aquinas
provided an answer to this question.367 He formulated a solution that "[p]rudence is
right reason applied to action. '36" This method of right reason follows the path of
first, making the inquiry; second,judging what has been discovered through inquiry;
and, third, taking action toward that which has been inquired about and judged.36
Once this process is pursued and right reason is implemented, it becomes evident that
the common good is better than the individual good according to right reason.
While the common good has the upper hand over the individual good,3 7' the two are
nonetheless intertwined because the concern for the common good can only become
manifest if the sum total of the individual goods are viewed as being equal to one
another.372
Understanding the issue of how these perspectives of the good are to be
achieved and how justice is to be done-within the context of prudence-is a vital
component in the process of defining true justice. The virtue of prudence "perfects
reason" and is essential to the development of the moral virtues, especially justice
which is concerned with the external and inter-relational operations of human
affairs. 373 The question of affirmative action deals with these aspects of human
affairs. Law can be understood as a body of rules and regulations intended to direct
human conduct with a public effect. For example, laws impact individuals who are
struggling with their relationships with one another. As a body of rules, the law is
in need of interpretation and understanding so that lawyers and the rest of society can
deal directly with human interrelationships and their regulation as covered by the
law. It is precisely the responsibility of those concerned with seeking justice to
engage in this interpretation and understanding to ensure that the goal of justice-of
right relationship With the neighbor-is obtained. Legal regulation exists not for the
sake of regulation itself, but, rather, for the sake of peaceful reconciliation of
differences and disputes.3 " Aquinas addressed the connection between justice for
367. See id. i-Il, Q. 47, at art. 8.
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. See id. II-11. Q. 47. at art. 10.
371. See id. ll-Il, Q. 58, at art. 5.
372. See id. !1-11, Q. 57. at art. I.
373. See JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS IN THOMAS AQUINAS'S SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE 92 (1992) Ihereinafter KEENAN, GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS].
374. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 1-1l, Q. 58, at art. 8 ("1Slince justice is directed to others, it is not
about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain
special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them."); see also art. 10
("[Tihe matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that
operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain
proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person.").
the one and justice for all when he stated that "[i]t is proper to justice, as compared
with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others . . . . In
developing this relationship, it is important that the parties involved acknowledge the
existence and the needs of others. As John Lucas" stated, "[n]ot to hear [the other]
*.. is implicitly to deny his status as a person, his human worth. 376 Thus, justice
cannot be rendered until each person hears the other: audi alteran partem-hear the
other side, hear both sides, no one should be judged unheard. 377 By doing this,
justice seekers may begin to see that justice is a concept that relies on each person
in relationship with the other.
IV. THE NOTION OF RELATIONSHIP AND THE LAW
There are two relevant points about relationship which come from Biblical
traditions. The first is the question which God posed to Cain who killed his brother
Abel: "Then the Lord said to Cain, 'Where is your brother Abel? He said, 'I do not
know; am I my brother's keeper?"''37 The second comes from the exhortation of St.
Paul: "For the whole law is summed up in a single commandment, 'You shall love
your neighbor as yourself.' ,,3"7 Both of these scripture passages demonstrate ancient
principles regarding living in right relationship with others, be they siblings,
neighbors, or strangers. In the late twentieth century, many democratic states still
grapple with issues surrounding relations between people of different races-a
matter with which Weber is concerned.5  While many individuals may hold the view
that racial discrimination is a thing of the past, recent events such as discriminatory
practices engaged in by a multi-national employer illustrate that racial discrimination
is not'a relic of history but is still, unfortunately, an extant and pressing issue.
Nonetheless, the focus of this paper remains on the question of affirmative action and
justice in the context of the United States and the fashion in which Weber presents
these questions:.-
At this point, it would be helpful to examine a school of jurisprudential thought,
Critical Race Theory, which has raised pertinent concerns about race,justice, and the
role of affirmative action. While Critical Race Theory has contributed to the
understanding of the problems posed by Weber, the conception of justice which
375. See id. II-11. Q. 57, at art. I.
376. J. R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 87 (1980).
377. See id. at 93-94.
378. Genesis 4:9 (New Revised Standard).
379. Galatians 5:14.
380. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
381. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Eecutives, On Tape, Discussed hpeding a Bias Suit, N. Y.
TIMES. November 4, 1996. at A I (concerning the alleged efforts by several Texaco managers to destroy
evidence relevant to pending discrimination claims made by minority employees, and the racial epithets
used by these managers to derogate these employees); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories:
Reflections ofOne Black Woman Low Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46,49-51 (1990) (relating
the -elevator story"an incident about racial differences, attitudes, perceptions, and discrimination).
382. See supra notes 7-56 and accompanying text.
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emerges is incomplete in that it does not take account of the interrelationship of all
who are concerned with and affected by the search forjustice in cases involving race.
A. The Oppositionist Voice
It is the face of contemporary racism that minority legal scholars who share the
designation Critical Race Theorists continue to elevate consciousness of their fellow
citizens. 3 ' Some Critical Race Theorists question whether racial minorities of the
United States are able to live in a right relationship with their neighbors. In
particular, the Critical Race Theorists examine contemporary legal theory and
doctrine to examine, identify, and critique what Cornel West termed "the construc-
tion and maintenance of social domination and subordination" which adversely affect
racial minorities.384 Although West views Critical Race Theory as a vital response
to revealing and relieving the "social misery" of racial discrimination, he conceded
that.there is hope "for human freedom and equality" supplanting the "flagrant
shortcomings" of the past and present of racial subjugation.'
Any contemporary examination of race relations and the legal developments
directed to combat discrimination in the U.S. would be incomplete if it did not take
into consideration the work of the Critical Race Theorists. This school of legal
theory and practice focuses on the perspective of racial minority cultures about
social, political, and economic issues. In a variety of ways, this school makes the
point that legal developments-including those geared to addressing and resolving
discrimination- have frequently ignored the perspectives of racial minorities. The
contentions of the Critical Race Theorists raise important problems about the state
of race relations and the need for affirmative programs that take account of the views
and experiences of racial minorities to address the law and underlying social policies
of anti-discrimination. Many Critical Race Theorists conclude that new models
reflecting the specific views of racial minorities are needed in legal discourse and
383. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic. Critical Race Theor": An Annotated Bibliogrqphy 79
VA. L. REV. 461. 461 (1993) (including a detailed bibliography of Critical Race Theory scholarship
which examines the "complex interplay among race, racism, and American law"). One need not be
restricted to Critical Race Theory scholarship to be reminded of the discrimination which people of
color have suffered in the United States. For example, in Mark Twain's Huckleberr" Finn, there is a
conversation in which Tom tells Aunt Sally of a boiler explosion on a riverboat. See MARK TWAIN,
HUCKLEBERRY FINN 244 (1985). Aunt Sally asks if anyone was hurt. and Tom responds. "No' m. Killed
a nigger." See id. The objectification of this black person is complete when Aunt Sally retorts, "Well,
it's lucky; because sometimes people do get hurt." See id.
384. See Cornel West, Foreword. in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGs THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT xi (1995) [hereinafter KEY WRITINGS1.
385. See iL at xi-xii.
development, especially the development which addresses the law of race relations
and anti-discrimination enforcement. To many Critical Race Theorists, the
traditional models of anti-discrimination largely reflect a majoritarian perspective
which ignores or excludes the perspectives of racial minorities.
As with many schools of legal philosophy, it is difficult to present a simple,
coherent statement of the central tenets of Critical Race Theory without doing any
misdeed to the variety of perspectives of this movement's major contributors.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a recent anthology of Critical Race Theory writings
presents a good synthesis of the principal tenets of this school of jurisprudence. 86
At the outset, the principal editors of this work, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda,
Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, concede that, "there is no canoncial set of
doctrines or methodologies" to which the members of the Critical Race Theory
movement all subscribe.387 However, a consensus among Critical Race Theory's
members demonstrate that two themes are central to this movement. The first is the
investigation of "how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of people
of color have been created and maintained in America"; the second is a determination
not simply to comprehend "the vexed bond between law and racial power but to
change it." '388
The common goal of Critical Race Theory concentrates on the creation of "new,
oppositionist accounts of race" in the United States. 3 9 One may conclude that terms
like "oppositionist," appear unorthodox. Some of the leaders of Critical Race Theory
state from the outset that their work is a form of antithesis or "adversarial scholar-
ship. '390 This designation issues from the fact that the members of Critical Race
Theory see this movement as a counterpoint to "the prevailing orthodoxy that
scholarship should be or could be 'neutral' and 'objective.' 39', In essence, the goal
of Critical Race Theory scholarship is to "create new, oppositionist accounts of race"
within an American context.
In substantial part, Critical Race Theory is opposed to any cultivation of
American law or legal institutions that propose the role of "color blindness" to the
progress of social, political, and legal development implemented to combat racial
discrimination.93 While Critical Race Theory and traditionally liberal views of race
386. See id. at xiii-xxxii.
387. See id. at xiii.
388. I.
389. See id.
390. See id. at xi-xii.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id. at xv; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. 559 (1896) (Harlan J.. dissenting). In
his dissent, Justice Harlan may have minted the phrase "color-blind" when he commented that "in view
of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind. and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." See id.; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Cotstittion is Color-Blind, "44
STAN. L. REV. I ( 1991 ) (critiquing the color-blindness theory).
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relations in the United States appear to hold much in common, Critical Race Theory
tends to critique many traditional liberal views regarding merit, color-blindness, and
even some applications of affirmative action. 394 As some of its principal advocates
declare, "the reigning discourse seem[s], at least to [them], ideologically impover-
ished and technocratic.""39
A major presupposition of Critical Race Theory is that "racial politics," rather
than formal "legal doctrine" (such as the invention of "color blindness") is crucial
in developing laws dealing with racial discrimination. 96 In lieu of a coherent legal
theory, Critical Race Theory is focused on a particular or deconstructionist approach
to the law that relies on the unifying force of racial distinction. This force is used to
analyze contemporary legal institutions and legal norms without necessarily
proposing its own body of normative principles. At the core of Critical Race Theory
is a permeating racial consciousness and identification that is essential to the critical
methodology its adherents employ.397 The identification of Critical Race Theory,
which largely but not exclusively focuses on the experience of Black America,
excludes the possibility that it could have much in common with white or majoritari-
an views. Paradoxically, the telos of Critical Race Theory is a tense synthesis of an
"institutionalization of difference" and a quest for equality.
A principal target of Critical Race Theory is "racialism"; that is, those
"theoretical accounts of racial power that explain legal and political decisions which
are adverse to people of color as mere reflections of underlying white interest. 396
From a Critical Race Theory perspective, racialism tends to be one of the principal
justifications for "color-blind," "objective," or "meritocratic" approaches to the
law.3  For Critical Race Theory, the role of racial "community-building" is
essential.4" In such a community race and racial identification are ultimately what
counts. Ironically, this constitutes both the strength and the weakness of Critical
Race Theorists. Its strength is derived from the ability to raise consciousness about
the inequality that exists because of racial discrimination. To eradicate racial
discrimination, one must take account of how racial distinction has been at the root
of this evil. The virtue of Critical Race Theory is its ability to awaken the conscience
to the horrors that have resulted from racial distinction and to serve as a reminder of
"how deeply issues of racial ideology and power continue to matter in American
394. See KEY WRITINGS. supra note 384, at xv.
395. See id. at xvii.
396. See id. at xx.
397. See id. at xxi.
398. i. at xxiv.
399. See id.
400. See id. at xxvii.
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life.""'' The weakness of Critical Race Theory is that its primary focus on racial
distinction eclipses the possibility and the need to see that people, regardless of racial
difference, hold much in common. Its fundamental flaw is that the emphasis on
racial difference precludes the need to search for and identify the sameness of
people-a sameness that promotes harmony, rather than dysfunctional and
counterproductive separation-notwithstanding their racial differences and the
experiences which follow from these differences.
In order to understand the principal message of Critical Race Theory and the
solutions it offers to address racial injustice, it would help to understand how it
departs from previous legal scholarship. Like other Critical Race Theorists, Richard
Delgado argued that the legal academy has historically been comprised of individuals
who are for the most part white and male.0 2 For Delgado, this physical characteristic
is responsible for shaping and directing traditional civil rights scholarship to be
devoid of the minority scholar's unique perspective.4 3 As Delgado stated, many of
white majority scholars, who have investigated racial discrimination and civil rights,
remain "unaware of basic facts about the situation in which minority persons live or
ways in which they see the world."' This commentary reflects a perspective found
throughout Critical Race Theory; scholars who come from the white majoritarian
background, even though their sympathy with minorities is very strong and sincere,
cannot fully comprehend or explain the suffering that racial discrimination has
caused members of the minority populations. 5
Critical Race Theory maintains that minority scholars must be given a forum for
their unique and essential voice. This forum will ensure that their distinctiveness is
not blended into "dominant political discourse" which would eliminate the African-
American community's ability to survive politically and economically.40 6 If this
401. See id. at xxxii.
402. See Richard Delgado, The Ihperial Scholar: Reflections On A Review Of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561. 561 (1984). The racial and sexual composition of the legal
academy today has changed dramatically. See id. Indeed, there is evidence strongly suggesting that
the "oppositionist" voice is now very much a part of the mainstream academy. See Fred Shapiro, The
Most-Cited Law Review Articles, Revisited, 71 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 751. 758-59 (1996).
403. See generallv Delgado. supra note 402. However, there seems to be a transition underway in
which "'minority" scholars are joining the ranks of "'majority" scholars in the legal academy. See
Shapiro, supra note 402, at 758-59; see also Frances Olsen, Affirmative Action: Necessar.
" 
But Not
Stufficient, 71 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 937. 937 (1996). In both the Shapiro and Olsen articles, the authors
cautiously suggest that women and minority legal scholars who have traditionally been the "outsiders'*
of the academy may now be the new "insiders." See gemterally Shapiro, supra note 402; see also Olsen.
supra.
404. See Delgado, su ra note 402, at 567-68.
405. See id. Mari Matsuda echoed this sentiment. She argued that. because it is the members of
racial minorities who have suffered racial discrimination, only they can **speak with a special voice"
about the shortcomings of the law and how it might better address discrimination in order to achieve
greater justice for racial minorities within society. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking at the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies amnd Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987).
406. See Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, anmd Retrenchment: Tran.formation amid
Legitimationm in Antidiscrimination Low. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1387 (1988).
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distinctiveness is not preserved, the complaints about late twentieth century
discrimination will not be effectively disclosed.4 °7
A critic of the Critical Race Theorists might respond by arguing as follows: if
Americans were able to engineer a society of color-blindness, then the strongest form
of equality would prevail and people would be treated according to their intrinsic
merits and contributions, not their racial classification. The Critical Race Theorists
counterclaim that color-blindness is not so much a solution as it is part of the
problem of racial discrimination. To Critical Race Theorists, color-blindness is
really a camouflage that conceals or disguises the views and values of a white
majoritarian culture-one that may be well-intentioned but is still majority and white.
But, this analyst of Critical Race Theory might turn to John Rawls' veil of
ignorance" 8 in which the principles of ajust society are developed when its members
do not know who they are in terms of racial background, economic and social status,
etc.4" In response, Critical Race Theorists argue that the simultaneously essential
and exclusive perspective of racial justice which American culture desperately needs
will never be achieved if the differentiating characteristics attributable to racial
groups are eliminated from the quest to develop a more just, more equal society. As
Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun argued, the recognition of racial and cultural
identity are essential in order to understand more fully the concerns of groups who
have not received a fair share of the goods and privileges that society has to offer.4"'
Assimilation of one group into another is not protective of the first group's ability
either to safeguard its "self-expression" or to raise its claim for social justice when
this group or any of its members become the victim of racial discrimination.4 '
Lani Guinier focused on the point made by Torres and Milun in the context of
drawing the boundaries of legislative districts.1 2 For her, the conventional, liberal
notion of "one person, one vote" fails as a theory of meaningful participation in a
democracy.4 3 Guinier defended the need to protect the representation of distinctive
racial groups; however, she also saw that geographic redistricting which takes
account of population concentrations of racial minorities, while imperfect as a
solution, is still needed.414 Underlying Guinier's assertion is the premise that racial
407. It should be noted that Critical Race Theory speaks from the perspective of the United States.
rather than from a more global one.
408. See RAWLS. THEORY. s pra note 153. at 136-38.
409. See id. at 137.
410. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn M ilun, Translating Yonnondio b.% Precedent and Evidence: The
Mashpee hidian Case. 1990 DUKE L. J. 625. 658 (1990).
411. See id. at 659.
412. See Lani Guinier. Groups, Representation. and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes. 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589. 1596 (1993).
413. See id.
414. See i(l. at 1594.
minorities "experience a common 'group identity"' which must be protected and
advanced in the electoral and other political processes."' She contended that the idea
that political fairness can be guaranteed by the fiction of electoral fairness through
the practice of "one person, one vote" is false.416 Herjustification for this is that the
best form of political representation takes account of three vital factors.4 7 First,
legislators "should" represent unanimous rather than divided constituencies; second,
every voter's ballot "should count toward the election of a representative"; and, third,
"the unit of representation should be psychological, cultural, and/or political, rather
than territorial."4"8 While she acknowledged that racial groups are not monolithic,
Guinier also recognized that racial identification is important to electing the best
representatives who can advocate important remedial positions for groups who
experience racial discrimination. Yet, Guinier did not take account of the fact that
blindness to racial and ethnic characteristics can enable a racially diverse electorate
to search for common interests as they select their representatives.
Neil Gotanda has been outspoken in his criticism that "color-blindness,"
especially from a Constitutional perspective, is not a solution but a part of the
problem of racial discrimination.4 9 He contended that the claim that the U. S.
Constitution is color-blind ultimately "fosters white racial domination. '4 2° The
underlying justification of this point is that the concerns of racial minorities are not
protected if the minority community is precluded from injecting racial considerations
into Constitutional discourse.42 ' Derrick Bell extended this notion when he
suggested that racial minorities will continue to suffer discrimination if the racial
majority is able to block out racial considerations which are a source of their
"fears."4 22 It would appear that any quest for conciliation and integration, which does
not also take account of racial distinctness, will never provide racial equality. The
racial majority will always substitute its views of equality for those of the racial
minority who experience the discrimination.
John Calmore echoed Bell by advocating racial equality from an "oppositionist"
perspective.42 3 While acknowledging that distinctively cultural divisions based on
racial classification are not necessarily inevitable, these divisions are not "necessarily
a bad thing."42 ' As part of the "oppositionist" message, Calmore argued that the
415. See id. at 1617.
416. See id. at 1620-2 1.
417. See id. at 1621.
418. See id. at 1621-22. These would be difficult to achieve because any block of voters, including
those identified along racial lines, will have a wide variety of perspectives.
419. See Gotanda, sopra note 393, at 2.
420. See id.
421. See id. at 16, 55-62.
422. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363. 370 (1992).
423. See generally John Calmore, Critical Race TheorY, Archie Shepp, ad Fire Music: Securing
atn Authettic hitellecttal Life in t Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992).
424. Seeid. at2131.
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"universality of white experience" as political and social presuppositions is false. 25
These presuppositions perpetuate mistaken universality that sustains domination of
the white majority over racial minorities.
While acknowledging that "individuals do not belong merely to one discrete
community, ' 42- members of Critical Race Theory see the need for"social transforma-
tion and self-respect" which take account of and promote racial and cultural
distinctiveness.4 27  The necessity for this distinctiveness is reinforced by the
stratification in society that follows racial classifications which enable the white
majority to dominate the black minority.4 28 At the root of Calmore's message is the
mandate to save future generations "so that they will have their chance to save the
nation[.]14 2
9
Charles Lawrence reiterated this point by suggesting that in order to avoid the
dehumanization of racial discrimination, the continuing ability for people of color to
present and validate their "common experience" in public forums is essential to the
cause of civil rights."' To Lawrence, sustaining this voice is crucial for combating
the stereotypes about black people which have been long held by members of the
white majority.43" ' Without this voice, racial domination and repression will continue,
but the presence of this political perspective will have a therapeutic effect on the
social and political standing of those who have been oppressed.
While Critical Race Theory has increased understanding about the extent of the
problem of racial discrimination, there is another side of Critical Race Theory which
propagates the problem of injustice fueled by racial distinction and discrimination.
In essence, the oppositionist view perpetuates in a new fashion the separate-but-equal
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.
432
Elements of Critical Race Theory suggest that there can never be any deep,
substantive reconciliation between the current white majority and the colored
minority. Critical Race Theorists often use the currently popular vehicle of narrative
to present the context of why reconciliation is not possible. Derrick Bell's narrative
from his early career as a civil rights attorney in Mississippi offers an illustration.433
He recalls a conversation with an organizer of the desegregation of Mississippi Delta
schools who had been terrorized physically and psychologically by proponents of
425. See id. at 2160-61.
426. Id. at 2186.
427. See id. at 217 1.
428. See id. at 2181.
429. See id. at 2230.
430. See Charles R. Lawrence, m, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2238 (1992).
43 1. See id.
432. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
433. See Bell, supra note 422, at 378.
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segregation.434 When he asked her why she persisted in her crusade, she replied, "I
am an old woman. I lives to harass white folks."43 Without doubt, the speaker had
experienced much hardship and harassment in her life due to racial oppression. But
her statement was not directed at those responsible for or who harbored hatred for
African-Americans. Rather, her campaign was targeted at a class of people identified
not by racist beliefs and actions but by their skin color. Professor Bell probably had
good reason to admire this woman for the determination and courage she had
displayed in the face of long standing racial discrimination and persecution. Yet, he
did not question the implication of this statement: "I lives [sic] to harass white folks."
What if this statement had been uttered by some other individual who had been
oppressed for years by the members of another racial group, but the circumstances
were slightly changed so that the speaker was a Jew speaking of Gentiles, or a
Palestinian speaking of Jews, or a Hutu speaking of a Tutsi, or a Bosnian speaking
of a Serb, or a Kurd speaking of an Iraqi? Would the reaction be any different?
Should it?
This freedom to castigate individuals from other groups was displayed in the
events surrounding the resignation of Professor Anita Hill from the law faculty of the
University of Oklahoma.436 Upon notice of her resignation, one of her colleagues in
lamenting her departure commented that Professor Hill "has no argument with the
rest of the faculty .... The angry white men are quiet, grumpy and non-confronta-
tional." '437
These attitudes reveal the presence of an imprudent and unnecessary wedge of
separation being forced into distinctions of race and widening the gap between racial
groups within the United States. These phenomena, which cultivate little or no
relationship, are at the core of injustice. The idea of "distinctly separate cultures" '438
is at the root of racial discrimination. The absence of relationship sponsored by
segregationist views is sustained by the oppositionist view. While he talks about
forging bonds between and amongst people of color to form communities of
"'multicultural synergy,"' John Calmore implied that those who search for common
ground, be they racial majority or minority, propose a false and unworkable
assimilationist thesis that is doomed to fail.439 He also advocated the following:
[the need to] contend with a growing segment of colored intellectuals who have joined
that camp [of dominant society]. These colored intellectuals are prone to suffer a race-
image anxiety, rely on a Eurocentric cultural frame of reference, and adopt a model of
resolving racial conflict that emphasizes assimilation- integration goals and value
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. See Jo Thomas, Anita Hill Plans to Leave Teaching Post in Oklahoma, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1996, at B5.
437. See id.
438. See Calmore, supra note 423, at 213 1.
439. See id. at 2225-26.
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orientations. ' 440
From Calmore's statement, one could follow up with the question: is there any
possibility of reconciliation between different groups of people if the differences
between groups must always be paramount over their similarities? If this question
were to be answered in the affirmative, there would be little hope for racial and other
reconciliation to take root. This becomes particularly true if one considers the
possibility of today's majority becoming tomorrow's minority, while at the same time
today's minority becomes tomorrow's majority. What, then, is one to make of the
emphasis of distinction and difference-a set of issues which has been at the core of
discrimination and the response of affirmative action? There would be little room
for hope that racial differences can be minimized, that tension between racial groups
can be decreased, and that harmony and understanding between different racial
groups can be promoted if such attitudes were to continue and dominate.
B. An Alternative to Oppositionist Voice
There is an alternative to this predicament of separation between groups where
one justifies the ability to badger members of the other group simply because they
are members of the other racial category. While echoing some of the consciousness-
raising sentiments of Critical Race Theory scholars discussed earlier, Anthony Cook
presented a reflection not found with the other oppositionist voices.4 ' Although
many Critical Race Theory scholars desire to transform existing dominant racial
structures that oppress people of color, Cook additionally argued the need to
transcend existing racial tensions and to do so from a theological perspective.442 In
presenting this alternative, he turned to the "reconstructive theorizing" of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.-no stranger to the quest for civil rights for every person."' Cook
relied on the experience of Dr. King and his theology and belief in God as the basis
of constructively addressing the racial conundrum in the United States.4'" Cook's
approach focused not on the deconstructive critique shared by Critical Race Theory,
but on the reconstructive role of theology and religious perspective in promoting
440. /d. at 2227.
441. See generally Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990).
442. See id. at 986.
443. See id. at 987-88.
444. See id. at 1023-104 1; see also Robert J. Araujo, Political Theory and Liberation Theology: The
Intersection of Unger and Gutijrrez, I I J. LAW & RELIGION 63 (1994-95) (discussing law, public life,
and religious belief).
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reconciliation and justice in a world and a country hungering for both.445 In relying
on the circumstances of the black slaves in the New World, Cook called attention to
the transformative reliance in the Word-in the teaching of Jesus Christ who
proclaimed at the beginning of his public ministry the need to work with the
downtrodden, the imprisoned, the poor, and the sick.446 Although Jesus drew strong
reaction (some positive, some negative) from his listeners,447 he raised consciousness
about the social responsibility of every person even the marginalized of the
community. Jesus' central message was to adopt and practice the Great Command-
ment of loving God and your neighbor in everyday life.44 It is the constant practice
of the Great Commandment that inevitably leads to reconciliation between those who
are in opposition to one another.449 As Cook pointed out, the message and teachings
of Jesus "bolstered a sense of self-esteem diminished by the debilitating and
degrading practices of a culture that relegated them to the status of objects."45
Cook drew attention to Dr. King's "objective to rebuild community from the
social death of slavery and segregation" by promoting a "sense of individual self-
worth... ""' Unlike the more restrictive and exclusive communities addressed by
other Critical Race Theory scholars, Cook presented a holistic approach to this
enterprise. As he contended, "[b]y closing the chasm between the individual and the
society, [between] religion and ethics, and [between] spirituality and everyday
existence," Dr. King was able to address both oppression as well as reconciliation.452
As Cook noted,
King held that disobeying human law, even unjust law, must be done out of love and
with a willingness to suffer the penalty for its breach. Through this unjust suffering,
the transgressor evidences the highest respect for law and order while remaining true
to his higher Christian duty. 53
Although King was a practical man who understood the "limitations" and
shortcomings of human nature in achieving a racially just society, he did not give up
hope in achieving such a society either.454 King was intent on seeing that the rights
of every person were promoted and protected because they were God-given and not
manufactured or granted by the state. 55
445. See generallyv Cook, supra note 441.
446. See Cook, supra note 441, at 1019; see also Isaiah 61:1 -2; Luke 4:18-19.
447. Jesus taught in a synagogue. See Luke 4:14-30. At first, "[a]ll spoke well of him and were
amazed at the gracious words that came from his mouth." Luke 14:22. Yet, a few verses later, the same
listeners "were filled with rage" and were prepared to throw Jesus over a cliff. See Luke 4:28-30.
448. See Leviticus 19:18; see also Luke 10:25-37 (the parable of the Good Samaritan).
449. For several Biblical passages about reconciliation, see Acts 7:26; 2 Corinthians 5:18-20.
450. See Cook, supra note 441, at 1020.
451. See id. at 1022.
452. See id. at 1026.
453. See id. at 1027.
454. See id. at 1034.
455. See id.
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Cook concluded that it is a community dialectic in which people of diverse
backgrounds, cultures, races, and beliefs come together to deliberate, participate, and
be respectful of one another in order to build a part of God's dominion in this
world.456 Nothing better advanced these approaches to combating racial injustice
than Dr. King's Letter from a Birmingham Jail.457
King understood that he was subject to the injustice of racial discrimination
when authorities incarcerated him for contempt of an order restraining him and other
ministers from conducting a peaceful civil rights march in Birmingham, Alabama in
1963.458 He wrote from a prison cell in Birmingham to his fellow Christian ministers
who had encouraged him not to violate the restraining order.4 9 He reminded his
readers that he was keenly aware of the "interrelatedness of all communities and
states" and that the toleration of injustice in any one place constitutes the threat of
injustice to every place.46° Given the choice, he preferred negotiation to civil
disobedience; however, when those who conducted negotiations in good faith were
exhausted by the bad faith of those with whom they were negotiating, such
exhaustion created "the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in
society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the
majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. 46' For King, separation and
secession were anathema; inclusion, engagement, dialogue, and brotherhood were the
goals. 462 For justice to prevail over racial discrimination, relationship rather than
separation was essential.
While acknowledging distinctions from the racial majority, Dr. King did not
456. See id. at 1044. As Professor Cook argues, "[wlith such mutual respect and openness to each
others' pain, suffering, and faith, we must work out more fully and struggle toward King's ideal of the
Beloved Community and thereby hew from our mountain of despair a stone of hope." Id. Professor
Lawrence echoes this sentiment with the following:
Perhaps I am overly optimistic in believing that in the process of this difficult exploration we
may discover and understand a collective self-interest that overshadows the multitude of
parochial self-interests the unconscious seeks to disguise and shield. But of one thing I am
certain. A difficult and painful exploration beats death at the hands of the disease.
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 388 (1987).
457. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted in David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birminghaln, and the Letter from Birmingham
Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 835 (1993).
458. See Walker v. Birimingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967); see also Oppenheimer, supra note
457, at 791-92.
459. See Oppenheimer, supra note 457, at 835.
460. See id. at 836.
461. See id. at 836-38.
462. See id. at 838, 843-44 (calling the black race to continue to work for freedom and not accept
the status quo).
believe in separation or secession from the majority.463 He spoke in terms of
relationship, of brotherhood." Even though he shared their exasperation with the
never ending episodes of racial discrimination, he criticized African-Americans who
pursued the route of separation and secession.465 King publicly disagreed with the
view held by Elijah Muhammad of the Black Muslims, finding great fault with a
political and social movement that "is made up of people who have lost faith in
America, who have absolutely repudiated Christianity, and who have concluded that
the white man is an incorrigible 'devil'."466
Castigation based on racial association is an evil thing to which separation based
on racial classification is closely related. The labor to eradicate stigma and racial
discrimination which members of racial minorities have suffered for too long is noble
and virtuous. But the need to preserve separation from majoritarian groups continues
and enhances racial discrimination. Shylock467 of William Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice portrays well the circumstance in which a member of a minority
group reminded his fellow citizens that he is so much like them; yet, ironically,
despite the compassion and understanding he sought for himself, he was quite willing
to deny another.468 Shylock responded to Antonio's circumstances as follows:
He hath disgraced me, and hindered me of half a million, laughed at my losses,
mocked at my gains, scorned my nation, thwarted my bargains, cooled my friends,
heated mine enemies; and what's his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath
not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same
food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same
means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you
prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we
not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we
will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge.
If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why,
revenge. The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better
the instruction.1
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To the extent that Critical Race Theory advocates a separationist or secessionist
463. Recently, attention has been given to another type of separation or secession from society. See
Allan Gurganus, At Last, The South Loses Well, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at El5 (relating the
movement in South Carolina to remove the Confederate flag from the South Carolina State House). The
author notes that those forces wishing the flag to remain represent a "balkanization" that should cease.
See id. As he says, "[tlhe New Secessionism places ethnic identification above national purpose, group
grievance over human commonality. Correct me, but isn't that why the Civil War was fought? Isn't that
why all thinking people understand: The right side won?" Id.
464. See Oppenheimer, supra note 457, at 839, 844.
465. See id. at 843-44.
466. See id. at 844.
467. Shylock was a Jew in Christian Venice.
468. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, in THE YALE SHAKESPEARE act I,
sc. I (Wilbur L. Cross et. al. eds., 1993).
469. Id.
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thesis, it sustains rather than addresses the question of racial tensions and distrust
that inevitably lead to segregation and discrimination. The social antidote to racial,
discrimination is focused not on separation but mutuality-reciprocity and
relationship which enable each person to see the image of one's self reflected in all
others. The solidarity among racial minorities upon which the members of Critical
Race Theory rely can become the leaven that solves racial problems when extended
to the universal, that is, to all members of the human race.
Society needs solutions to the injustice of racial discrimination, but these
solutions must include all, not just some, members of the community. 70 A simple
but overlooked solution is the search for relationship with those who are a part of the
injustice that is experienced-either through the desire to combat or the shared status
of being victim. This relationship can be cultivated through a dependence on human
virtues.
C. Virtue As A Path Toward Reconciliation
In the film To Kill A Mockingbird, the local judge asks Atticus Finch, a white,
small-town Southern lawyer to defend a black man who is wrongfully charged with.
raping a young white woman.47 Both Finch and his client are virtuous, compassion-
ate, and merciful men who extend compassion to the suffering victim to achieve the
overriding goal of equity and justice under law. Both share wisdom or practical
reason which helps them to discern the situations each faces; each man is gifted with
prudence which directs their respective actions; each possesses courage which steels
them in dealing with their respective adversaries; and each seeks thejustice premised
on their recognition of the common heritage of mankind.472
470. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 504 (1995). Duxbury
suggests that Critical Race Theory scholars seem to question the possibility of a consensus and, instead,
labor for a legal system acknowledging the reality of difference. See id.
471. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).
472. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 468, at act IV, sc. I. Portia, portraying a doctor of the law,
exhorts Shylock to reconsider his demand for Antonio's pound of flesh as follow:
The quality of mercy is not strain'd, It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place
beneath; it is twice bless'd; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes: 'Tis mightiest in the
mightiest; it becomes The throned monarch better than his crown; His sceptre shows the force
of temporal power, The attribute to awe and majesty, Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of
kings; But mercy is above this sceptred sway, It is enthroned in the heart of kings, It is an
attribute to God himself, And earthly power doth then show likest God's When mercy seasons
justice. Therefore, Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That in the course of justice
none of us Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy, And that same prayer doth teach us all
to render The deeds of mercy.
Id.
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While a person may ask if this is all that need be known about virtue, one should
keep prominently in mind the fundamental point about virtues: they are "a good
quality of the mind" by which people live righteously.473 If the function of ethical
systems is to guide citizens in their moral deliberation toward right action,474 a society
whose members treasure virtue should expect to have better moral agents as its
citizens."' The course which the moral agent takes is directed toward a goal, a
telos.4 76 Because individuals are also social beings whose existence is grounded in
relationships with others, the concept of the telos can assist each person to
understand and answer more deeply the ethical and moral questions which members
of society face as they seekjustice for themselves and for others. Justice is premised
on the harmonious reconciliation of differences such as discrimination within
society.477
Some scholars argue that the telos of a virtue-based method is inextricably
intertwined with the means to achieve the goal.478 This approach provides a catalyst
that moves society and its members toward a better understanding of the end-an end
which forms a specific kind of person and promotes a kind of society that stipulates
behavior directed toward ajust society. 79 For some individuals, being a certain kind
of person identifies the sort of moral questions one addresses.48 This observation
and conclusion suggest that the practice of virtue acknowledges the sense of
"otherness"; that is, in making moral decisions about who we are, what our goals are,
and what means we use to get there, we necessarily think of other individuals as we
work toward the goal. The practice of virtue relies on a sense of community, on an
awareness of relationships with others. I suggest here that the notion of living in
right relation with others parallels the cultivation of the virtue of justice which is
essential to a reduction of racial discrimination.
As noted earlier in this essay, Plato was one of the first to investigate the
relationship between virtue and justice.48" ' For him, justice was the fundamental
473. See AQUINAS. supra note 93, l-I, Q.55, at art. 4.
474. See James F. Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: Making A Case As It Comes Of Age, 67 THOUGHT
115 (1992) [hereinafter Keenan, Virtue Ethics].
475. See id. at 116.
476. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 189 (Duckworth
1981 ) ("[T]here is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of
a whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity ... " Accord Keenan, Virtue Ethics,
supra note 474, at 120, 123; Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., An Appeal ForA Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT
158, 159 (1992). As James Keenan stresses, "[only in virtue ethics is a telos constitutive of method;
no other ethical system can make that claim." Keenan, Virtue Ethics, supra note 474, at 123.
477. 1 have developed the idea of a telos underlying the social institution of law elsewhere. See
Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Teleology of Law: Citizenship and Discipleship, 35 CATH. LAW. 57-58
(1994).
478. See Kotva, supra note 476, at 159.
479. See id. As this author further suggests, "the means cannot be separated from the end because
the means are central to the end. A telos which embodies the virtues of justice, courage, and fidelity
cannot be severed from acts and social arrangements that arejust, courageous, and faithful." Id. at 160.
480. See id. at 166.
481. See PLATO, supra note 65, at 147-48.
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component of society-"that one man should practise one thing only [justice] the
thing to which his nature was best adapted .... -482 Above all else, justice-as a
virtue-was the guarantor of other important virtues like temperance, courage, and
wisdom, which facilitate reconciliation within a society.48' These virtues are
important because they aid in directing human conduct which helps achieve the goal
of a society in which its members live in right relationship with one another.
Aristotle saw justice as the "complete virtue. 484 In refining his understanding of
justice as the greatest of virtues in which a person seeks to be in right relationship
with others, Aristotle concluded that people who are true friends485 have no need for
any other kind of justice because their friendship is the truest form of justice.486
Thomas Aquinas saw virtue as the good quality of the mind which facilitates people
living righteously. He also acknowledged that the virtue of justice is a good habit in
which each person perpetually renders to the other person that which is due, the suum
cuique. 87 Mary Ann Glendon reaffirmed Aristotle's position in her contemporary
argument that the tendency to make some but not all rights absolute in the American
legal culture has minimized the significance of fraternity. 48 Glendon also argued
that unrestricted individualism can foster a climate that is inhospitable to "society's
losers"4 8 and, because it neglects civil society, it undermines both civic and personal
virtue. For her, individualism "shuts out potentially important aids to the process of
self-correcting learning [and promotes] mere assertion over reason-giving.""49
The virtue of justice is practiced or engaged in by human beings in a community
setting. It is not understood as something which is good or proper simply for the
individual alone; rather, it manifests itself in good relationships or true friendship
482. See id. at 147.
483. See id. at 148.
484. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 77, Book V, Chapter 1, 1129b, at 399.
485. For example, true friends wish well to one another. See id. Book VIII, Chapter 3, 1156b, at 475.
486. See id. Book VII, Chapter 14, 1155a, at 471-472,. For a helpful discussion of diverse views
concerning the role of friendship in practical legal counseling, see generally Jack L. Sammons, Rank
Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran 's Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 1 (1995); Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran Jr., Lawyers as
Strangers and Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 69 (1995); John
M. A. DiPippa, Jacob's Blessing: a Review of Shaffer's and Cochran's Model of Moral Counseling,
18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 85 (1995).
487. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 11-1, Q. 58, at art. I.
488. See MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-
48 (1991) [hereinafter GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK]. Christopher Mooney has similarly commented on this
theme in the context of the law and legal profession. See CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC
VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION xi (1986). Mooney argues that the law's
"privatizing impulse has tended to become dominant and it no longer conceives its primary mission to
be the responsible exercise of public virtue." See id.
489. For example, "society's losers" include those who are especially dependent on others.
490. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 488, at 14.
where each person renders the other his or her due.49' Justice as a virtue manifests
itself in the midst of people who are in relationships with one another; it does not
exist in the vacuum of persons who are isolated from one another or who seek
separation from one another. The virtue of justice depends on community, and its
prerequisite is two or more people who acknowledge one another's existence and
honor the other's right to co-exist. Each person expects his or her own right to exist
to be honored by the other. An important goal of the virtue of justice is the
achievement of multiple levels of reciprocity throughout society where each person
renders to the other those concerns which each has for the self.
Much of the kind of justice which has emerged in the present-day American
legal culture has lost a good deal of its community-oriented goal. Some contempo-
rary understandings about "justice" lead to a narrow focus on some individual's or
select group's-not the entire community's-concerns because of the strong desire
to protect isolated individuals rather than all the individuals in the community setting.
For John Finnis, this necessitates an understanding of justice as the realization of
basic human goods for one's self as well as for others.492 In a similar fashion,
Professor Glendon points out that the social, the communal, and the purpose-oriented
components of duties which are the correlatives of rights are infrequently discussed
in this contemporary environment.493 She correctly argued that these components are
essential to dealing justly with some of the urgent legal issues which have, in the
American context, been cloaked with near-absolute rights of privacy, individual
autonomy, and isolation.494
If one tries to determine what is the just goal for both contemporary American
49 1. At Exodus 19:15, the Hebrew people were notified about the importance of giving the other that
which is due: "You shall not render an unjust judgment; you shall not be partial to the poor or defer to
the great: with justice you shall judge your neighbor." Exodus 19:15. In a similar vein, the Prophet
Zechariah warned: "Thus says the Lord of hosts: Render true judgments, show kindness and mercy to
one another; do not oppress the widow, the orphan, the alien, or the poor; and do not devise evil in your
hearts against one another." Zechariah 7:9-10.
492. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 7, at 161.
493. See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 488, at x-xiii, 14, 45, 47-48, 171-72.
494. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 37-38 (1987)
[hereinafter GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE]. While proceeding from a different school of thought,
Joseph Raz has offered a parallel thought. See RAZ, FREEDOM, supra note 324, at 250. Raz addresses
the subject of personal autonomy and suggests that while "an individual's freedom, understood as
personal autonomy, sometimes conflicts with the interests of others, it also depends on those interests
and can be obtained only through collective goods which do not benefit anyone unless they benefit
everyone." See id. Elsewhere, he acknowledges that the morally good person recognizes that the
individual's interests are so inextricably related with those of other members of society "that it is
impossible to separate his personal well-being from his moral concerns." See id. at 320. Raz makes
it clear from the outset of The Morality of Freedom that his argument supports "a liberal morality on
non-individualistic grounds." See id. at 18. His search is for a "morality which regards personal
autonomy as an essential ingredient of the good life, and regards the principle of autonomy, which
imposes duties on people to secure for all the conditions of autonomy .... " See id. at 415. Raz does
not offer an elaborate definition of the good life. He explains the good life as "a life which is a free
creation" in which there will be "a multiplicity of valuable options to choose from ..... See id. at 412.
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society as a whole and its individual members-be they from the racial majority or
minority-a virtuous solution to interpersonal conflict could emerge. In response to
legal controversies that work their way into courts, racial justice-as-virtue avoids the
problems associated with the "winner-take-all" attitude. But, as a practical matter,
how does a race-conscious society move toward the goal of justice as virtuous
people? This is where the virtue of prudence comes into play.
If the virtue of justice prescribes the just goal or end, then prudence and
compassion are means to that end.495 Permeating prudence is the virtue of
compassion which tempers the just end.496 The virtues of prudence and compassion
work in tandem to promote improvements in social structures that will simulta-
neously display greater charity toward both individuals and society at large-toward
the victim of racial injustice as well as the perpetrator.497 Aquinas saw the
connection between the virtue of prudence which directs people so that they relate
their own good, to the good of others (the common good).498 Plato's understanding
495. See Kotva, supra note 476, at 166 n.9 (acknowledging his debt to James Keenan, S.J. for this
insight); see also, Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickel 's Philosophv of Prudence, 94 YALE L. J. 1567
(1985). Dean Kronman examine,s through the vehicle of Alexander Bickel's political philosophy, the
value of prudence as both a political and legal virtue. See id. at 1569. Kronman further explains
prudence:
By prudence, I mean a trait or characteristic that is at once an intellectual capacity and a
temperamental disposition. A prudent judgment or political program is, above all, one that
takes into account the complexity of its human and institutional setting, and a prudent person,
in this sense, is one who sees complexities, who has an eye for what Bickel called the
"unruliness of the human condition". . . A prudent person is also one with a distinctive
character-a person who feels a certain "wonder" in the presence of complex, historically
evolved institutions and a modesty in undertaking their reform; who has a high tolerance for
accommodation and delay and is able to accept the final incommensurability between any
system of ideas and the world as it is given to us with all its raggedness and inconsistency;
who values consent but is not demoralized by the process of irrational compromise that is often
needed to achieve it. In the prudent person these qualities of intellect and character are joined.
Id. (citations omitted).
496. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney And The Jurisprudence Of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101, 1134-37 (1990).
497. When the disciples asked Jesus to teach them how to pray, he reminded them to "forgive us our
debts, as we have also forgiven our debtors." See Matthew 6:12.
498. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 1H-H, Q. 50, at art. 2. For a helpful discussion of the relationship
between virtue and law, see DANIEL WESTBERG, RIGHT PRACTICAL REASON: ARISTOTLE, ACTION, AND
PRUDENCE IN AQUINAS 229-44 (Clarendon Press 1994). Westberg cautions against seeing only
contradiction between law and virtue, and examines the link between them. See id. As Westberg
argues, "[t]he reading of the moral philosophy of Aquinas in deontological terms is a bad mistake..
• ." Id. at 234. In the context of the law profession and the common or public good, Robert Katzmann
has acknowledged the "inextric[able] link" between the self interest of lawyers (and their responsibility
as members of a profession) and the public. See Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW
FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 1, 15 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995). As he states, "the law firm and
the public good are inextricably linked and that each can draw strength from the other in ways that
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of temperance advances the importance of prudence because prudence is the virtue
which brings harmony into society by promoting concord among all the elements of
the community."'
My concern about virtue raises considerations which every member of the
contemporary American society can reflect upon and adopt. I suspect that even those
with the strongest racial group orientation would take comfort knowing that their
opponents practice the virtues of compassion and temperance. Both virtues provide
an atmosphere which helps reassure that every view will be heard and that individual
and mutual concerns will be carefully evaluated-just as the opponent's concerns
will be. The considerations set the stage for another important virtue: courage.
Courage is the virtue that enables any person to meet the challenge of harm or
danger when one attempts to take action based on the care and concern that citizens
should have for their fellow citizens."c The exercise of this virtue takes place when
people from any racial group face risks and threats in controversial cases but are
prepared to seek the just end for all, not just some, of their fellow citizens."' One
need only think of someone like Martin Luther King, Jr. who displayed this virtue in
his life of devotion to his fellow citizens.
Underlying the virtues of justice (which recognizes the goal), prudence (which
provides the means for acting justly), and courage (which reinforces those who take
the action essential to reachingjust goals), is the virtue of wisdom. Wisdom provides
the insight, the sound judgment by which citizens come to understand their
community as well as individual goods and the nexus between them." 2 Wisdom
nourish both." See id.
499. See PLATO, supra note 65, at 145-46.
500. See MACINTYRE, supra note 476, at 179. In the context of the legal profession, Dean Anthony
Kronman has described courage as resisting the pressures of "doing what his client wants in every
case." See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 345, at 145. Kronman further states, "A
courageous lawyer is prepared to take risks for what he or she believes is right-to risk anger, contempt,
and a lower income for the sake of the law's own good-and nothing can be a substitute for the
fortitude this requires." Id.
501. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 345, at 123. Azariah reminded Asa and the
people not to abandon hope for God would give them courage if only they believed in Him:
In those times it was not safe for anyone to go or come, for great disturbances afflicted all the
inhabitants of the lands. They were broken in pieces, nation against nation and city against
city, for God troubled them [because of their apostasy] with every sort of distress. But you,
take courage! Do not let your hands be weak, for your work shall be rewarded!
2 Chronicles 15:5-7. In a similar fashion, God came to give courage to St. Paul when he was on trial
before the religious authorities: "That night the Lord stood near him and said, 'Keep up your courage!
For just as you have testified for me in Jerusalem, so you must bear witness also in Rome."' Acts 23:11.
502. A remarkable example of this virtue is King Solomon, who, when presented with a difficult case
(trying to determine which woman claiming the same child was the real mother), was up to the
challenge to dispense justice. "All Israel heard of the judgment that the king had rendered; and they
stood in awe of [Solomon] because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to execute
justice." I Kings 3:28. It is clear that Israel was reminded of the correlation between wisdom and
justice, when Moses told them:
See, just as the Lord my God has charged me, I now teach you statutes and ordinances for you
to observe in the land that you are about to enter and occupy. You must observe them
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enlightens not only the individuals but the actions which they pursue in public life.
Cultivation of this virtue can open the mind as well as the heart to matters which the
person not relying on the virtue of wisdom may miss. It parallels prudence, and
works in tandem with it." 3 In a virtue-oriented approach to the problem of racial
injustice in America and elsewhere, wisdom guides each citizen in the quest for
understanding who we are as individuals and as members of society and what we
want to become. In the American culture that is strongly characterized by "individual
autonomy and isolation," 5" the focus of individual and community attention on who
we are can be blurred. Wisdom helps remove the blur that otherwise inhibits the
ability to identify not only who we are now but also what we want to be in the future.
When wisdom permeates our consciousness, our knowledge of ourselves becomes
more secure and more certain. And, when our self-knowledge grows, the vision of
who we want to become both as individuals and as members of communities will
become all the more clear. When our knowledge of who we want to become is better
defined, our "moral idealism [can] be found and maintained."5 5
If these virtues of prudence, justice, wisdom, compassion, and courage develop
a model of the virtuous citizen, have they been used in concrete contexts involving
the quest for racial justice? The dissenting voices of Justices Curtis and Mclean in
Dred Scott,5"6 Justice Harlan in Plessy, °7 and Justices Murphy, Jackson, and Roberts
in Korematsu °8 are models of virtuous citizens who illustrate the model which seeks
to achieve racial justice.
These individuals relied on virtues to deal with three of the most notorious cases
of racial discrimination in American history. Dred Scott raised the issue of the status
diligently, for this will show your wisdom and discernment to the peoples, who, when they
hear all these statutes, will say, "Surely this great nation is a wise and discerning people!" For
what other nation has a god so near to it as the Lord our God is whenever we call to him? And
what other great nation has statutes and ordinances as just as this entire law that I am setting
before you today?
Deuteronomy 4:5-8.
503. The Book of Proverbs is a great source of the correlation between wisdom and prudence. For
example, we are reminded the "fear of the Lord" is essential. "For learning about wisdom and
instruction, for understanding words of insight, for gaining instruction in wise dealing, righteousness,
justice, and equity; to teach shrewdness to the simple, knowledge and prudence to the young-... The
fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge." Proverbs 1:2-7. The author of Proverbs personifies
Wisdom and has her say, "I, wisdom, live with prudence, and I attain knowledge and discretion." See
Proverbs 8:12.
504. See GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 494, at 38.
505. See Keenan, Virtue Ethics, supra note 474, at 123.
506. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,529-633 (1856) (McLean, J. and Curis, J., dissenting).
507. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
508. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225-72 (1944) (Roberts, J. and Murphy, I.,
dissenting).
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of an African-American slave who had been taken into a territory where slavery was
illegal."° In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roger Taney noted the popular
sentiment that black people have "been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations."5 ' Taney investigated this sentiment in the context of the foundational
documents of the republic, including the Declaration of Independence and the United
States Constitution."' In his desperate effort to justify the Court's decision on both
legal and moral grounds, he turned to the language of the Declaration which states
that "all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; [and]... that to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted... 51 2 Taney asserted that this language was not intended to apply to the
African race presumably because this class "formed no part of the people who
framed and adopted" the Declaration." 3 Regrettably, the Chief Justice presumed that
no one in "the civilized world" would suppose that these protections would extend
to the "negro race."5"4 His presumption that the "unhappy black race were separated
from the white by indelible marks... and were never thought of or spoken of except
as property,"55 took no account of other, more ancient authority in the Bible telling
Christian and Jew alike that blacks had been earlier thought of in quite another
regard.5"6
D. The Application Of Virtues
The dissenters exercised virtue when, in the face of overwhelming opposition,
they publicly acknowledged that the Chief Justice and the rest of the Court were
wrong. Justices McLean and Curtis raised questions and offered answers about the
case and its racial injustices which escaped the consideration of the members of the
509. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 400.
510. See id. at 407. Chief Justice Taney continued with traditional views of blacks as articles of
merchandise who could "justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit." See id.
511. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
512. See id. at 410.
513. See id.
514. See id.
515. Id. (emphasis added).
516. See, e.g., 2 Chronicles 14:9-13 (telling about the conflict between Asa's army and that of the
Ethiopian Zerah who had "an army of a million men and three hundred chariots ...."). Isaiah's
prophecy tells of King Hezekiah being warned that King Tirhakah of Ethiopia (sometimes called Nubia)
"has set out to fight against you." See Isaiah 37:9. Jeremiah's prophecy informs about the Ethiopian(or Nubian) Ebed-melech, a servant but also a man of influence in King Zedekiah's household, who
persuaded the king that evil doers had cast Jeremiah into a muddy cistern and that the king should have
the prophet rescued. See Jeremiah 38:7-13. To this request, the king agreed and, because of Ebed-
melech, Jeremiah was rescued from certain death. See id. Again, in the New Testament, we hear of the
Ethiopian eunuch was the treasurer of the queen of the Ethiopians, who was baptized by Philip. See
Acts 8:26-40.
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majority. In particular, it was the appropriation and exercise of the virtues of
wisdom, courage, compassion, prudence, and justice which enabled the two
dissenters to understand the case more deeply and to offer a better, more equitable
solution. At the outset of his dissent, Justice McLean challenged Taney's view that
the law had long acknowledged the inferior position of the members of the black
race. He pointed out that the different and inferior treatment extended to the black
was "more a matter of taste than of law."5"7 In fact, the legal tradition would tend to
support the dissenters' view more than the position of Chief Justice Taney and the
majority. For example, under both European civil and English common law, the
removal of a slave from slave territory to non-slave territory led to emancipation." 8
The notion that the Negro slave was anything less than another fellow human
being deserving of the same entitlements of citizenship did not comport with the law
of other civilized nations prior to and at the time Dred Scott was decided." 9
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Taney maintained that the Negro was not entitled to the
same rights and privileges as citizens because they were not deemed citizens by the
framers of the Declaration and the Constitution.520
No doubt these thoughts had a strong impact on Justice McLean who acknowl-
edged that "James Madison, that great and good man, a leading member of the
Federal Convention, was solicitous to guard the language of [the Constitution] so as
not to convey the idea that there could be property in man." ''  McLean was a
517. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
518. See id. at 534 (McLean, J., dissenting).
519. Under his compilation of the English common law of 1765 to 1769, William Blackstone noted
that the "spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that
a slave or negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and so far [with
regard to all natural rights] becomes a freeman." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book I, Chapter 1, at 127-28 (4th ed., James DeWitt Andrews ed., Callaghan &
Co. 1899). Blackstone later commented that because the principles of English law give no countenance
to slavery, "the slave is entitled to the same protection in England before, as after, baptism; and,
whatever service the heathen negro owed of right to his American master, [the same] ... is he bound
to render when brought to England and made a Christian." Id. at 425.
520. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410-12.
521. See id. at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Madison, as a principal drafter of the
Constitution and co-author of the FEDERALIST PAPERS suggested otherwise in a way that supports the
dissenters and counters the majority. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., Belknap Press 1961). The first insight offered by Madison concerning the
wrongness of slavery is in his contrast and comparison between the Confederation and the Constitution.
Importation of slaves would have been a permanent feature under the Confederation, but under the
Constitution, it would be permitted for only twenty years. See FEDERALIST No. 38, $ 9. Admittedly,
this particular text of Madison was silent on the propriety or impropriety of slavery beyond this period
of twenty years; the only clear point was the recognition that the importation of slaves beyond the year
1808 would no longer be tolerated. See id. However, in several subsequent papers, Madison questioned
the longevity of the institution itself. Madison mentioned not only the cessation of slave importation
practical individual who understood well the times in which he lived. Yet, the
execution of his office in this case was guided by the virtue of practical wisdom and
prudence. While noting that the federal republic was not created especially for
blacks, it was nonetheless created to include them because, at the time of the
Constitution's adoption, there were states in which blacks did enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizenship. 22
Justice Curtis' research revealed that at the time the Articles of Confederation
were ratified, all free, native-born inhabitants of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina "though descended from African slaves
• .. were not only citizens of those states," but also enjoyed "the franchise of
electors", on equal terms with other citizens." '523 This attitude of five of the states is
vital to understanding exactly who were the "people" who formed "the more perfect
union" of the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's analysis of the two clauses
examined earlier suggested that the Negro race was "not regarded as a portion of the
people or citizens of the Government" formed under the Constitution." 4 In applying
wisdom, prudence, courage, andjustice, McLean convincingly argued to the contrary
that "as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five states, and so in every
sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those for whom and
whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established. 5 5
To dispel the myth that the Black race was inferior to the White race as
suggested in the social history referred to by Chief Justice Taney, McLean wisely,
prudently, and justly reminded his fellow citizens that the white man had also been
enslaved at different times in different communities; as he stated, "white men were
after 1808, but the stiff fine for the time as well. See FEDERALIST No. 42, 1. Madison was not
satisfied with so indirect a criticism of slavery and its maintenance as an American institution. He
continued by arguing that it would have been preferable to not postpone the banning of importation
until 1808 but to outlaw continuation of this "barbarism of modem policy" immediately. See id. at T
7. The most extensive discussion of slavery and the status of the negro offered by Madison appears in
Federalist No. 54 which addressed the matter of apportioning seats to the House of Representatives.
Madison acknowledged that the Constitution was a document of compromise, rather than one of
complete principle. See FEDERALIST No. 54, T 7. Madison began his critique in by suggesting that
opponents to the Constitution understood slaves to be property rather than fellow human beings;
however, the Madisonian Publius quickened the chase by offering an opposing view. See id. at 1 3.
He disabused the reader that a slave is merely property rather than a person. See id. at 1 4. Madison
argued that while the slave may "appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those
irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property," he recognized that the Negro
is a member of society who is both rational creation and moral person. See id. at 4.
522. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537.
523. Id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis resigned from the Supreme Court shortly
after Dred Scott was decided. -Although he gave financial considerations as justification for his
resignation, it has been pointed out that his dissatisfaction with the outcome of Dred Scott was an
important factor as well. See Emily Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A Histor, of Federal
Judicial Service and Disservice- 1789-1922, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 356 (1993).
524. See DredScott, 60 U.S. at 411.
525. See id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
442
[Vol. 27: 377, 2000] Justice As Right Relationship
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power, and is against right. '5 26 One
important justification for this view offered by Justice McLean was that he took
seriously the language of the Declaration quoted by the Chief Justice that "all men
are created equal... [and] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. ' 27
As Justice McLean said, "A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his
Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to endless
existence. 528
With these thoughts in mind, one might think that forty years later after a civil
war was fought and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were
added to the Constitution, the question of equality of the races would have been
addressed and answered once and for all. However, the case of Plessy v. Ferguson5 2 9
raised once more the existence of practices and beliefs which forced inferior status
on individuals who were either black or shared some African ancestry. Plessy had
a mixed racial ancestry- he was seven-eighths white and one-eighth black. 3° We
also know that he was a citizen and "entitled to every recognition, right, privilege,
and immunity secured to... the white race." '' On June 7, 1892, Plessy boarded a
train whose operators were obliged to carry both white and black passengers, but, in
accordance with a state statute, were also required to "provide equal but separate
accommodations for the white, and colored races..." 32 Plessy violated the law when
he purchased a first class ticket and sat in a coach reserved for white passengers:"'
Any passenger who violated this provision by sitting in a coach or area designated
for the race not his own was liable to criminal prosecution and subject to either a fine
or prison sentence if convicted. 34
As a consequence of his action, Plessy was charged with and convicted for
violating the statute. 5 He subsequently challenged the state laws on the grounds
that they violated' the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery and the
Fourteenth Amendment which prohibited race-restrictive state legislation. 36 In his
526. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
527. See id. at 410.
528. Id. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice McLean's view reflects the thoughts of St. Paul in
his letter to the Roman Christian community where he states: "Esteem others more highly than
yourself... Do not be proud, but be ready to mix with humble people. Do not keep thinking how wise
you are." Romans 12:1 Ob, 16.
529. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
530. See id. at 538.
531. Id.
532. See id. at 540.
533. See id. at 538.
534. See id. at 541. Excepted from coverage under this act were nurses "attending children of the
other race." See id.
535. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896).
536. See id. at 542.
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decision for the majority affirming the judgment convicting Plessy, Justice Brown
found that Plessy's position was premised on the fallacy that "enforced separation
of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority." '537 Justice
Brown bristled at the notion that equal rights could only be achieved with "an
enforced commingling of the two races." 3 ' He rejected this proposition by declaring:
"If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary
consent of individuals." '539 But the wise and discerning person might ask how could
other individuals discover these "natural affinities" or develop "mutual appreciation"
if they were legally forbidden to be with one another?
Justice Brown concluded that if Plessy were considered white, as indeed he
might be under some state laws where the proportion of white to black ancestry was
crucial- in determining this question, that would have dramatically changed the
complexion of the case and very possibly its outcome:" ° There were no separate
concurring opinions, and there was one dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Harlan, who identified the "wrong values" which justified the Court's opinion:"'
Justice Harlan has been described as "the quintessential voice crying in the
wilderness" because he publicly rejected the separate-but-equal justification of
Louisiana law. 42 In seeking justice for Plessy, Justice Harlan exercised wisdom and
courage because he:
... transcended, without slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he sought to announce
fundamental constitutional truths as well. He spoke not only to his peers, but to his
society, and, more important, across time to later generations. He was, in this sense,
a secular prophet, and we continue, long after Plessv... to benefit from his wisdom and
courage.'
It took wisdom to see and courage to challenge the erroneous view of the majority
opinion with these words: "The destinies of the two races.., are indissolubly linked
together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall
not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law." '44 Justice
Harlan could step back from the case and observe that "[t]he arbitrary separation of
537. Id. at 551.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. See id. at 552. A few years ago, Judge Leon Higginbotham wrote that it was not bad people
who allowed the "separate but equal" rule of Plessv, but rather "wrong values" which poisoned the
society and allowed treatment of its citizens of color in such a harsh way. See A. Leon Higginbotham,
An Open Letter To Justice Clarence Thomas From A Federal Judicial Colleague. 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1005. 1010 (1992).
541. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer took no part in the
deliberation or deciding of this case. See id.
542. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents. 37 HASTINGs L. J. 427, 431-32 (1986).
543. lI. at 432.
544. Plessv, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J.. dissenting).
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citizens" along racial lines generates an unconstitutional "badge of servitude" that
cannot be reconciled with any source of lawful authority. " '5 With these virtues
guiding his investigation, Justice Harlan identified that the majority's rationale to
uphold the state action in Plessy would lead to injustice of a subtle variety. Noting
that slavery as a lawful institution was now a thing of the past, Justice Harlan
courageously prophesied that this "sinister legislation" would dangerously interfere
with the goal of enabling citizens, regardless of their race, to obtain "the blessings
of freedom" guaranteed to all.546
World War II brought again to the nation's highest court questions regarding
official conduct denying to some what was expected by others. The occasion was the
internment of Japanese-Americans and the petitioner was Fred Korematsu, an
American citizen of Japanese extraction who remained in a particular area of
California contrary to the mandates of the Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 issued
by a U.S. Army general. General DeWitt's exclusion order mandated that all persons
of Japanese ancestry were to be removed from specified areas of the west coast of
the United States as long as hostilities with the Japanese Empire continued. 47 While
noting that most Japanese's loyalty to the United States was not in question,... and
while taking account of the belief that "nothing short of the gravest imminent danger
to the public safety" could constitutionally justify the conduct pursued by the military
authorities against American citizens,549 the majority opinion authored by the great
civil libertarian Justice Hugo Black concluded that not even "the calm perspective
of hindsight" could say that at the time, actions taken by the Federal authorities
against Japanese-American citizens who were physically removed from their homes
and interned in prison camps were not justified." '° But once again, several
individuals whose actions were influenced by wisdom, courage, and prudence took
steps to voice their concern that a great injustice had been accomplished under the
guise of the Constitution.
It was wisdom which led Justice Roberts to comprehend that thousands of loyal
American citizens who happened to be of Japanese ancestry were being forced into
"concentration camps" (as the Jews and other non-Aryans were in German camps
around the same time) without any evidence whatsoever of conduct or belief which
545. See id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
546. See id. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
547. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1945). Unlike the court in Plessv see
supra notes 529-42 , and accompanying text, the Koremnatsit court was able to dignify the petitioner by
acknowledging that he had a first as well as last name. He was not simply the petitioner, he was a
human being entitled to the dignity which a body of names gives to each person and his individuality.
See id.
548. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 219.
549. See id. at 218.
550. See id. at 224.
would place into question their loyalty to their country.5" Unlike their counterparts
in the Nazi camps, Fred Korematsu and his fellow citizens may not have been
literally deprived of life, but they were denied their liberty by General DeWitt's
orders. Sharing the wisdom of Justice Roberts, Justice Murphy also had the courage
to identify this action taken by the Federal government for what it was-an "ugly
abyss of racism. 55
2
Justice Murphy offered prudent counsel which is just as helpful today as it was
in 1945, to detect and avoid the chasm of racism. His focus was on the issue: how
a nation can "deal intelligently with matters so vital to the physical security of the
nation."553 Justice Murphy's practical wisdom provided him with the clarity of vision
enabling him to acknowledge publicly that there were afew Japanese-Americans
who were disloyal to the United States evidenced by action they took that aided and
abetted Imperial Japan. 54 Justice Murphy's courage and wisdom enabled him to
reveal to his fellow citizens the danger of making the unjustifiable conclusion that
if a few Japanese-Americans were disloyal, then they must all be suspect. As he
asked, what became of that important legal principle and common sense that only
"individual guilt is the sole basis for the deprivation of rights. .. "?5 5 For Justice
Murphy, the goal was a "democratic way of life" for all Americans regardless of their
race, or ancestry. 56 In the exercise of prudence, this goal could not be achieved by
engaging in the blindly discriminatory action pursued by the west coast American
military authority. The exercise of virtues in dealing with racial discrimination did
not stop with the work of the dissenters in Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu.
In a nationally broadcast address made in 1963, President John Kennedy called
the attention of the American people to the pressing legal, political, and social issues
of civil rights. "7 Kennedy was concerned with and alarmed about the impoverished
social, economic, and political status of the African-American. 5 8 In his speech, he
called the nation's concentration to the imbalances in the status of the African-
American within the exercise of human conduct and institutional practices which
solidified these inequities. 59 In particular, the President called attention to the plight
of the African-American whose wage, education, and general living circumstances
were further reduced by the lack of equal opportunity to compete for educational and
employment opportunities because of artificial barriers erected over racial
differences."
551. See id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
552. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 233 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
553. See id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
554. See id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
555. See id. (Murphy, J.. dissenting).
556. See id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
557. See generally Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights. 237 PUB.
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Among most of the statements issued by political, social, and religious leaders
during the middle of this century in regard to the civil rights movement, few, if any,
surpassed the President's in its graphic and compelling advocacy of the need to
provide for and cultivate equality of opportunity for every American. In his
passionate address to the nation, Kennedy simply, but bluntly, advanced the cause
for raising the consciousness about the lack of and the need for equality and the
awareness of the suffering experienced by Americans who were deprived of the
substance of equality when he stated:
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and
equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want
to be treated. If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant
open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best public school available,
if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot
enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be content
to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his place? Who among us would
then be content with the counsels of patience and delav?"'
The President indirectly showed the American people how the concern about both
the individual and common goods are related through the inconsistency of denying
other persons that which individuals expect for themselves. As Reinhold Niebuhr
once mentioned, "[t]he most perfect justice cannot be established if the moral
imagination of the individual does not seek to comprehend the needs and interests of
his fellows."56" After all, each person may some day find himself or herself to be that
fellow.
Another perspective that needs to be considered is that of Kent Greenawalt who
has reflected on the questions surrounding civil rights and discrimination. As lawyer
and legal philosopher, he has considered the relation between law and ethics or law
and morality.56 In the realm of discrimination and equality, Greenawalt has pointed
56 1. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). As if responding to the points made by President Kennedy. Lloyd
Weinreb suggests:
Equality of opportunity has to find an equilibrium between the extreme that merely reflects
current practice and policy and endorses the success of those who succeed, and the other
extreme that eliminates all differential qualities and tends toward a lottery. It has to find a
basis for consistent application over the whole course of life, so that opportunities are real and
significant without being so decisive that equality of opportunity thereafter is out of the
question.
WEINREB, supra note 351, at 175.
562. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS
257-58 (1932).
563. See, e.g.. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987); RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
out that ethical evaluation can be "vitally important" to the legal evaluation of social,
political, and economic conditions which consign certain groups or classes of
Americans "to a permanent underclass." 5" The reality that our society could permit
and foster an underclass of citizens strongly suggests that inequality rather than
equality prevails in some regions of American society.
D. Virtues Open The Relationship Between The Individual And The
Common Good
The notion of equality can mean different things to different people. Within an
American legal framework, equality does not mean nor does it have to mean that
everyone must be treated exactly alike. Such a fiction would not withstand the
scrutiny of reality. Many might agree with Jean Porter who stated, "that a normative
commitment to equality does not imply that everyone is equal in every respect....
565
This point raises the question: in what way are Americans to be considered equal?
Another way of considering the issue is with the following inquiry: how are the
interests of the individual reconciled with those of other individuals and, in turn, how
are they reconciled with those of the community?
5 6
The investigations of Thomas Aquinas, particularly his examination of virtues,
provides a good deal of insight that is useful in addressing the problems of racial
discrimination. Critics of this approach might argue that Aquinas was torn between
emphasis on the individual versus the common good. In the realm of a discussion on
contemporary civil rights and racial discrimination, it might seem paradoxical that
Aquinas would argue that "a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
5 67
This thought, by itself, tends to eviscerate the notion of equality and the common
good which Aquinas discusses elsewhere.168 But this portion of Thomistic thought
must be evaluated in the context of the rest of Aquinas' treatment of the issue. He
stated that humans love, or ought to love, God first; yet, by loving God, each
individual also loves (and cares for/has concern for) the neighbor. 6  As Aquinas
564. See KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 10-11 (Alfred A.
Knopf 1983).
565. JEAN PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE: THE RELEVANCE OF AQUINAS FOR CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 23 (1990) [hereinafter PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE].
566. Oscar Brown raised the question in another way: "The equality of justice, another leading motif
in Thomistic doctrine on law and providence, could scarcely be preserved if unequals were ranged
equally. Rather, since the equality of justice is a proportional one, unequals must be maintained in
inequality precisely to preserve the order of true justice." OSCAR BROWN, NATURAL RECTITUDE AND
DIVINE LAW IN AQUINAS: AN APPROACH TO AN INTEGRAL INTERPRETATION OF THE THOMISTIC
DOCTRINE OF LAW 72 (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1981).
567. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 11-11, Q. 26, at art. 4.
568. See id. 11-Il Q. 58, at art. 10; but see, AQUINAS, supra note 93 at art. 7. James Keenan provides
a helpful discussion about the inconsistencies in the Stunina Theologiae on this point. See generally
KEENAN, GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS, stupra note 373.
569. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, I1-I1 Q. 25 at art. 4.
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argued, God is loved "as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is
founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker
of the aforesaid good," he must also have concern for the neighbor "by reason of his
fellowship in [the good of God]." 57 The sensibility of what Aquinas has to offer
begins to unfold: God, as the common good of all humanity, becomes the focus of
our concern for one another, 7 ' because the more we love God "the more [we put]
enmities aside and show love towards [our] neighbor."57 2 Self-love is tied to love of
God, and love of God is interrelated with concern for our fellow human beings:"'
Aquinas acknowledged that this component of his work is compatible with Mosaic
law which has both religious and civil components. He noted that the precepts of the
decalogue, such as the Ten Commandments, are the foundation of the moral precepts
for the Christian,574 because the Decalogue mandates that we love both God and our
neighbor. 75 While love of God has a strong religious bearing, the love of one's
neighbor clearly has both strong civil and religious significance.
Elsewhere, Aquinas took additional steps to reconcile the differences between
the individual good and the common good. There is for Aquinas a vital bond
between the good of the community and the good of the individual:
the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or
kingdom ... [and] since man is a part of the home and state, he must consider what
is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many . . . [for] the good
disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole .... ."'
Porter interpreted Aquinas to mean that the "individual and communal good stand in
570. See id. HI-H, Q. 26, at art. 4.
571. See id. at art. 3.
572. See id. 1H-ti, Q. 25, at art. 8.
573. It would not be prudent to assume that Aquinas consistently viewed and explained the
interrelationship of love, justice, and the individual and common goods in the Sttnina Theologiae.
James Keenan notes the following:
Toward the end of the Secunda secjundae, Thomas asserts not only that the love of neighbor
is secondarily related to charity but also that it is accidental to charity. Earlier, Thomas had
asserted that neighbor love belongs to justice and love of God to charity. Later, however, he
argues that the end of charity is love of God and of neighbor; and, still later, that love of
neighbor is an extension of the love of God. But finally, Thomas argues that the love of
neighbor is accidental to charity. Thomas sees that even neighbor love can be enacted from
another motivation. There are other reasons for neighbor love than charity... No act but the
love of God is essentially an act of charity. Love of neighbor is not an act of charity unless one
loves God.
KEENAN, GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS, supra note 373, at 135-36.
574. See AQUINAS, supra note 93, 11-1, Q. 100, at art. 3.
575. See id. at art. 4.
576. /d. 11-I1 Q. 47, at art. 10.
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reciprocal relationship such that the good of the individual is intrinsic to the common
good." '577 As the correlation between the individual and common goods increases, the
precept of Thomistic thought that the first principle of justice is equality becomes
increasingly evident. 7 8 Implicit within the principle of justice-as-equality are the
notions of mutuality and reciprocity among individuals.
The theme of mutuality and reciprocity of individual and common goods is
examined in the investigation of John Finnis. As Finnis pointed out, "the good that
is common between friends is not simply the good of successful collaboration or co-
ordination, nor is it simply the good of two successfully achieved coinciding projects
or objectives; it is the common good of mutual self-constitution, self-fulfillment, self-
realization." '579 Finnis echoed, albeit in a different voice, much of what has been
suggested earlier in the discussion of virtues about the interrelationship of law,
prudence, justice, and equality. Finnis saw justice being a function of the exercise
of practical reasonableness which acknowledges that human beings seek to achieve
human goods not only for themselves, but also for others-for the members of the
community and for the community itself. 8° His understanding of justice was
premised on three elements: "other-directedness" (how we relate to and deal with
other people); the duties we owe each other; and, equality among individuals. 8' In
a contemporary mode, Finnis appropriates and reaffirms the nexus between the
individual good and the common good identified and addressed by Aquinas. He
noted that while the exercise of personal rights by an individual is not subject to the
common good, the recognition and practice of these rights is "a fundamental
component of the common good."582 For Finnis, "the common good is the good of
individuals, living together and depending upon one another in ways that favour the
well-being of each."5 3
E. A Return To Racial Discrimination And Affirmative Action
Let me refocus this examination that relies on virtuous conduct to seek just
solutions to racial discrimination by briefly commenting on Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke. 8 The first claim of inequality and discrimination surfaced
in the conclusion made by University officials that, due to past racial discrimination,
the school admitted an insufficient number of minority students to the entering
classes of its medical school. 5 The second claim of inequality and discrimination
577. See PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE, stpro note 565, at 125.
578. See AQUINAS, stwra note 93, 11-11. Q. 57, at art. 1.
579. FINNis, NATURAL LAW, supra note 7, at 14 1.
580. See id. at 161.
581. See id. at 161-63.
582. See id. at 218.
583. I. at 305.
584. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
585. See id. at 269-73.
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came from Allan Bakke, a white male, who was twice unsuccessful in obtaining
admission into the medical school.586 Bakke argued that the University discriminated
against him because it failed to consider him for are of the positions of the entering
class governed by the special admissions program. "87 The contention was that this
program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and Title VI of the-Civil Rights Act of 1964.588 The justices of the
Supreme Court wrestled with the difficult issues of the remedial purpose of the Civil
Rights Act-the protections afforded individuals historically denied opportunities
because of race or ethnic heritage and the desirability that Americans be treated
equally so that those persons qualified for admission into educational programs
would not be denied opportunities to participate because of the artificial barriers
caused by racial and other prohibited discrimination.58 9
The allegation of reverse discrimination by Bakke placed historical and social
discrimination of Black-Americans against an affirmative action plan designed to
address this long standing exclusion from equal opportunity. Lloyd Weinreb defined
this conflict accurately when he identified the variety of "injustices" that emerge
from cases such as Bakke.5 As Weinreb pointed out,
If the minority is preferred, we deny a crucial possibility of self-determination for
some members of the majority, who lose out even though they are individuals more
deserving according to the understood criteria than some members of the minority who
benefit. If the minority is not preferred, we deny such possibility for some of them;
without affirmative action, no "equality of opportunity" is sufficient, because
differential entitlements in the past have made them undeservedly less able to
compete."'
After commenting on the unsuitability of solutions based on utility, the future
well-being of communities, and immediate social needs, Weinreb looked elsewhere
for resolution of the problems generated by racial discrimination. In his search for
answers to these problems, he discovered that
[T]he least unjust solution-at any rate, the solution that minimizes the burden of
injustice for any individual-is for the community as a whole to bear the cost of
remedying the injustice of the past and to recognize the claims of both groups, until
coherent principles of liberty and equality reemerge together and become a part,
586. See id. at 276-77.
587. See id. at 277-78.
588. See id.
589. See id. at 284-87.
590. See WEINREB, supra note 351, at 233.
591. See id. at 233.
seriously and substantially, of the community's reconstituted way of life. '92
But how do members of the community come to realize the sense of Weinreb's
recommendation? Jacques Maritain's understanding of the human person could very
well help in reaching this "reconstituted way" of community life.593 Maritain
recognized that "the common good is the human common good, [which] includes
within its essence.., the service of the human person." '594 For Martain, to be truly
human is to be a person in dialogue and communication with other persons. 95 But,
this communication among individuals does not exist simply for itself; rather, it
exists so that each person can (1) have knowledge of the other person(s), and (2)
extend help to other(s).5 96 As with Aquinas, Maritain sees an important connection
between the good for the person and that for the community:
There is a correlation between this notion of the person as a social unit and the notion
of the common good as the end of the social whole. They imply one another. The
common good is common because it is received in persons, each of whom is a mirror
of the whole. '
Within his understanding of the common good derived from Thornistic though,
Maritain offered some substantive contributions to resolve the dilemmas posed by
discrimination, affirmative action, and reverse discrimination. For Maritain, justice
determines the evolution of the common good. 98 Accordingly, justice simulta-
neously mandates that the good for the community "must flow back upon persons"
so that each person's freedom to pursue a meaningful existence can expand. "99
592. Id. For Weinreb, this community will have to be a harmonious one which "will subscribe to
principles of liberty and equality that are congruent and give a coherent shape to its members'
conceptions of themselves as self-determining actors within a determinate social order." Id.
593. See JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD (John J. Fitzgerald trans.,
1972).
594. Id. at 29. Maritain made the distinction between the individual which is the material pole of
the human and the person which is the spiritual pole. See id. at 33. Maritain, moreover, was
sympathetic to Aquinas' view of the person as that "which is most noble and most perfect in all of
nature." See id. at 32 (quoting Aquinas). Both saw that love of the self (the human person) is tied into
the love of God. See id. at 32-33.
595. See id. at 41-42.
596. See id. at 47-48.
597. Id. at 49. Maritain explained the end of the social whole this way:
The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But if the good of the
social body is not understood to be a common good of huntan persons,just as the social body
itself is a whole of human persons, this conception would lead to other errors of a totalitarian
type.
Id. at 50. In his practical commentary. Maritain saw that the greatest problem of totalitarian
governments (of his time) as the repudiation of respect for the person; any move toward "human
exaltation" is through "'myths of outward grandeur and unending efforts toward external power and
prestige." See id. at 96-97.
598. See id. at 55.
599. See id.
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American legal institutions are to safeguard the rights of individuals. They also
target the elimination of impermissible discrimination based on categories and
classifications (e.g., race, ethnic background, religious belief, or sex) that have little
to do with the person's ability to contribute to personal and communal development.
In operating these legal institutions, members of the American national commu-
nity-as individuals and as elements of the community-should have access to what
Maritain called the "liberty of expansion." 6" What the laws and their interpretations
must not do is isolate any person from his or her liberty of expansion. If this were
to occur, the expansion and flourishing of the community is detrimentally affected.
These undesirable results can be avoided and individuals and communities will
flourish if the citizens of our society seek justice directed by the virtue of prudence.
Each person's work to safeguard liberty of expansion becomes society's work. As
Anthony Cook suggested, the diverse communities of American society can flourish
if the following: their members converse with one another; they participate with one
another in public life; they deliberate with one another about how the community is
to be governed for the benefit of all and the detriment of none; and, they cultivate
mutual respect for one another."0
In the final analysis, communities realize that their individual good is contingent
on the communal good, and that this result is based on whether the two are seen in
relationship with one another. The good for all cannot be maintained; unless the
good for the one is also maintained. By the same token, the good for each is
threatened until the good of all is secured. Earlier I referred to the scriptural
commandment to love your neighbor as yourself. Recognition of this scriptural
commandment is important because the command requires members of a community
to be intimately aware of their similarities as human beings. Specifically, what does
the commandment mean in the context of rectifying racial injustice?
I think it means this: when people are willing to discuss questions surrounding
race relations, they can, and often do, learn a lot more about the subject. This is
especially possible when talking with others who hold different views. As people
dispose themselves to engage in a difficult, but still important, discussion, they must
come together in a community that does not necessarily share the same views, but
does share the same interest in this topic. As a community, they can build a
foundation of recognition that they have something in common (our humanity begins
and ends in the same way: with life and death). This commonality forges the
foundational link between individuals and helps recognition that all share a "likeness
to one another." 602
600. See id.
601. See Cook, suipra note 441, at 1044.
602. See PHILIPJ. Rossi, S.J., TOGETHER TOWARD HOPE: AJOURNEY To MORALTHEOLOGY (1983).
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This approach of recognition of likeness with the other may seem incompatible
with notions of individuality and freedom. Yet, as Philip Rossi noted, the mistake
people often make about themselves and their freedom is that they "conceive of
freedom primarily, if not exclusively, by reference to human agents in their
individuality and independence, rather than in terms of their shared human
communalities and their fundamental interdependence."6 3 While many think their
independence makes them human, it is really their social dimension and interrelation.
The fact that individuals are also members of a society, distinct human beings who
nevertheless flourish when they relate to one another-not in isolation from one
another. It is, after all, human interdependence that brings people together into the
community of human beings.6' Community fosters exchange among people (and
their interests). The exchange, in turn, promotes the opportunity to see that human
interaction is mutually beneficial, that it serves and promotes their common good to
"care for one another's well-being. '60 5 At this point, the stage for understanding
justice as a relational concept should be recognized. But if justice is a relational
concept, does this assist in the resolution of racial discrimination and affirmative
action cases?
V. JUSTICE As RIGHT RELATIONSHIP
Brian Weber's story is useful to construct and illustrate the notion of justice as
right relationship. It is a case in which the law struggles to do a good thing-to
rectify the harms of discrimination. Does it always achieve the just result? To reach
this just result, it is essential that all sides or interests are heard in the context of and
in relation to the other, before judgment is passed. Justice cannot be achieved until
the due of each person is understood; and each person's due must take into account
the due of every other person who is involved.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly Title VII, was Congress's response
to the discrimination experienced and suffered by American denied equal opportunity
to participate in employment arenas.60 6 More particularly, the Civil Rights Act was
603. See id. at 5.
604. See id. at 68. As Philip Rossi argues,
[Tihis community is, first and foremost, acommunity of mutuality: a community of those who
conscientiously foster the skills that enable the essential interdependence of their lives to work
for the attainment of good for one another. Mutuality fostered in this way constitutes the core
of the charity or love that in the Catholic tradition has been claimed to be the fundamental
form of the life of virtue. Thus the human community that provides a condition fundamental
for satisfying, for each and all, our basic human cravings is a community in which charity
gives form to virtue.
Id. at 68.
605. See id. at 145.
606. See Griggs v. Duke PowerCo., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971). The unanimous Court stated: "The
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Id.
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designed to remedy the denial of full citizenship resulting from religious, ethnic,
racial, and sex discrimination. 7 In the initial legislative debates regarding this
proposal, the focus of Congress's concern was on the status and plight of the
African-American." 8 The terms of the statute frankly state:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual...
or...to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." °9
Moreover, Congress specified that it shall be an unlawful employment practice: "to
discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to
provide apprenticeship or other training."6 It was, of course, a training program that
was at the focus of the Weber case.
Even a careful examination of the terms of the statute, whether it be the specific
provision under investigation, or some larger segment of the complete statute of
which the specific provision is a part, does not automatically lead one to the statute's
meaning. Perhaps the terms and phrases of the statute provide distinct images in
each interpreter's mind about meaning. For example, one interpreter may conclude
that an employer who asks candidates in a pre-employment questionnaire to list the
candidates' personal attributes such as race, color, sex, and religion-may commit an
unlawful employment practice because such information might be used to evaluate
the candidate. Another interpreter may consider that the employer who gives each
candidate this questionnaire does not commit an unlawful employment practice
unless there is a nexus between the information gathered and action taken by the
employer that discriminates against and is prejudicial to this applicant.
In another factual context such as the one found in Weber, interpreters can give
the language of Title VII different emphasis and, therefore, different interpretations.
607. In addition to employment discrimination, which is covered by Title VII, the scope of the issues
include: discrimination in public accommodations (Title VIII), in the participation in and enjoyment
of benefits from Federally assisted programs (Title VI), and in the participation and enjoyment of
benefits of Federally funded educational programs and activities (Title IX). See Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(f) (West 1999): 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (1999); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C.
2000 et seq. (1999); Educations Amendments of 1972 § 901 et seq., as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681
et seq. (West 1999).
608. See Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 248 PUB. PAPERS
OF THE PRES., JOHN F. KENNEDY 483 (June 19, 1963).
609. § 703(a). 78 Stat. 255,42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1994).
610. § 703(d). 78 Stat. 256.42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(d).
For example, one person may construe the language to mean that affirmative action
designed to redress racial discrimination relies on racial classification to combat
discrimination. For this interpreter the affirmative action remedy employs one form
of racial discrimination to address another form. But, any form of racial discrimina-
tion used in employment practices violates the statute; therefore, affirmative action
(which the statute does not mention by name) is an impermissible and unlawful
remedy. Another interpreter may look at the same language and factual context and
conclude that if affirmative action is the only effective means of eliminating long
standing racial discrimination in the workplace, it is harmonious with the language
of the statute.
I now introduce a hypothetical judge, Sophia, who will illustrate the role of
justice as right relationship. She concludes that the issue in the case is whether the
employment practices of Kaiser and the union discriminate against workers from the
racial majority because they rely on racial, ethnic, religious, or sex considerations.
If there is this discrimination, does it violate Title VII?
Sophia is familiar with the facts of the Weber case. She recognizes that Kaiser
is not consciously attempting to favor racial minorities and exclude white employees
from the on-the-job training program. Also Sophia sympathetically understands the
plight of racial minorities excluded from the social, political, and economic
mainstream of American culture. She acknowledges that racial minorities,
particularly African-Americans, have historically been denied access to employment
opportunities because of their race. The fact that the Gramercy-area labor force is
almost forty percent African-American but only compromises two percent of the
higher skilled, higher paid craft positions, however, she realizes the disproportionate
distribution of these positions to white workers.
Our judge is a sensitive and objective person. She acknowledges and
appreciates the disappointment of the disgruntled applicant twice denied entry into
the on-the-job craft training program. Thejudge knows the applicant is an employee
in good-standing who has acquired seniority necessary to be accepted into the
training program were it not for the affirmative action plan.6"' The judge acknowl-
edges the discrimination allegation because of this plan giving racial preference to
more junior black workers thereby excluding him, thereby excluding the applicant
due to racial considerations. Also the judge, accepts the logical force of the
pleadings that the use of racial considerations deprived him of the opportunity to
participate in the craft training program resulting in discrimination. This judge faces
the charge that the employer's plan deprived the applicant of employment opportuni-
ties because of racial considerations which violate the provisions of Section 703 of
the Civil Rights Act.
This conscientious judge must examine meaning of the words of Section 703 in
611. See United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber. 443 U.S. 193. 199 (1979) (explaining that Brian
Weber had more seniority than the most senior black employee who was selected into the training
program under the affirmative action plan).
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the context of this case. She concludes that the on-the-job training program is an
employment practice because it was used by the employer to train or retrain workers
to do particular kinds of work demanding higher skills. Also, she determines that the
affirmative action plan designed to promote greater opportunities for racial minorities
is an additional employment practice of the company and the union.
In applying the determinations to the present case, Sophia identifies two areas
of Section 703(a) which seem to be dispositive. First, subsection (2) contains a
provision which deals with denying an individual of employment opportunities
because of "such individual's race."'612 It seems that this subsection could apply to
the applicant. After all, the applicant twice was denied the opportunity to participate
in the training program due to race, even though he had more seniority than the most
senior African-American who was chosen to participate in the program. However,
Sophia sees that Weber, as a member of the majority white race, was not necessarily
deprived of the training program on racial grounds because other white workers were
selected for this training." 3 The judge concludes that the plain language of
subsection (2) is open to several interpretations. In the final analysis, she could
plausibly opine either that Brian Weber was deprived of an employment opportunity
because of his race, or that he was not deprived of the opportunity because other
white workers more senior to him were chosen.
Sophia wonders if subsection (d) of Section 703 is less susceptible to such
different conclusions;6"4 if so, is it more helpful in answering whether the applicant
had suffered discrimination. She acknowledges that the employer and the union
developed an on-the-job training program designed to grant members of its current
workforce an opportunity to enter the sought-after craft worker positions. Twice the
employee applied for admission to the program and twice was turned down, even
though less senior black workers were accepted. Sophia can see merit in Weber's
claim that this employment practice, giving African-American plant workers training
opportunities, worked against him due to race.
Due to the selection and participation of white employees in the program, Sophia
can conclude that white workers were not denied participation in the training
program because of non-remedial racial considerations." 5 However, if either no
612. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994).
613. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
614. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
615. This conclusion was based on the premise that the ratio of one-black-to-one-white continues
until racial imbalance is eliminated. If this ratio were to change substantively so that a disproportionate
number of workers from one racial group are selected (thereby excluding a disproportionate number of
workers from other races), using racial considerations to place production workers into the craft training
program would be suspect. See Harry E. Groves & Albert Broderick, Affirmative Action Goals Under
Title VII: Statte, Legislative History, and Policy, I I T. MARSHALL L. J. 327, 340-41 (1986)
hereinafter GROVES AND BRODERICK, Affirmnative Action 1.
white workers been accepted on either occasion or if their number was disproportion-
ately small, Sophia would probably conclude otherwise. But, a proportionate number
of whites were accepted into the training program, even though the applicant was
not.
616
Judge Sophia pauses to reflect on the adequacy of resolving the applicant's case
by simply applying the plain language of Section 703 to his case.617 She is satisfied
that this approach might resolve the case for some individuals (e.g., where no whites
were admitted into the training program); however, she is not satisfied that it is the
preferable way to apply the law in this case. In order to ascertain if some better
result of this difficult case can be achieved, the judge examines the intent of
Congress in enacting Title VII.
In searching for the intent of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Sophia begins with the language of the statute to determine what institutional intent
can be ascertained from the text itself. Sophia concludes that while the language of
Title VII does not reveal very much about intent, it does illustrate Congress's
concern with widespread discrimination and deprivation of employment opportuni-
ties based on grounds of race, sex, ethnic or religious background or color. Little
more of the intent of Congress can be revealed by the language of Title VII.
Next, Judge Sophia turns to the traditional method of examining the legislative
history to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. In so doing,
Sophia's search resonates with the Supreme Court's statement that the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act is voluminous and the portion underlying the
enactment of Title VII is vast.6"8 Sophia asks what, if anything, does this bounty of
legislative history reveal, about the meaning of Title VII in the context of the present
case.
6 1
The nucleus of Sophia's inquiry concentrates on what Congress, as a legislative
institution, intended the Civil Rights Act to mean in the realm of employment
discrimination and employment opportunity. This much is clear: member after
member of Congress reiterated individual concerns over "the plight of the [African-
American] in our economy. 20  Many members expressed their corporate and
individual concerns that the black worker in the American labor force is reduced to
616. See Weber. 443 U.S. at 208.
617. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
618. See Regents of Univ. of Calif. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 284 (1978); see generally Weber. 443
U.S. 193.
619. See Earl Maltz. Stanttory hiterlretation And Legislative Power: The Case For A Modified
hitentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. I, 13-14 (1988) (commentating that the legislative history
of a statute can demonstrate multiple intentions of the legislature and its members). But see P. Wald,
Sonie Observations On The Use Of Legislative History i The 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 195,201 (1983) (supporting the view that legislative history in the field of civil rights legislation
is not helpful in ascertaining legislative intent because of the level of political compromise needed to
enact this type of legislation). Cf. Weber. 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
620. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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menial positions with little, if any, hope of advancement into higher paying jobs.6 2'
Although the Weber Court agreed that the legislative history supports the conclusion
that Congress did not intend to preclude the use of affirmative action plans such as
the one used by Kaiser to remedy the condition of the African-American in the labor
force, Judge Sophia reaches a different conclusion.
While acknowledging that much of the legislative history reveals Congressional
concern about the economic inferiority of the black worker caused by discrimination
in employment practices, she does not agree that the 88th Congress intended that
temporary and voluntary affirmative action programs would be a solution to the
economic discrimination faced by the African-American. To the contrary, she
contends that this vast resource of legislative materials reveals a very different
institutional intent of Congress to promote a color-blind society in which concerns
about race and ethnic background (along with regard to sex, religion, and national
origin) were not to be considered in the hiring, training, and promotion of workers.
While the Supreme Court majority stated that private, voluntary affirmative
action plans were not prohibited by Congress because it intended to integrate "blacks
into the mainstream of American society,""62 Sophia contends that such an
interpretation conflicts with her reading of this history. She concludes that the 88th
Congress did not intend to permit voluntary resolution of racial discrimination in
employment practices through affirmative action programs such as the one developed
by the employer in this case. Sophia does not see that Congress intended such
remedial actions to be permissible because, in her estimation, Congress never
envisioned them in the first place.
Moreover, Sophia finds the Weber Court's discussion and analysis of Section
7030)623 of Title VII to be problematic.6 24 She does not construe the legislative
history to support the conclusion reached by the majority that private affirmative
action plans constitute one of the means of voluntary resolution of discrimination
mentioned in one House Report.6" 5 Like Justice Blackmun, Judge Sophia is skeptical
that the legislative history supports the creative conclusion reached by the majority.6 26
Similarly, it is doubtful that voluntary affirmative action programs were ever
identified and discussed by the 88th Congress from 1963 to 1964 when it worked on
621. See id. at 202-03.
622. See id. at 202-04.
623. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (stating: "Nothing in this title shall be interpreted to require any
employer...to grant preferential treatment to an individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons.").
624. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-06.
625. H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 18(1963).
626. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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this legislation.627
Militating against the majority's conclusion is Justice Rehnquist' s plain language
approach.6 2' His analysis revealed a very different and plausible conclusion about
what Congress intended when it enacted Title VII. The bulk of this evidence reveals
that Congress wanted to promote a society blind about color, race, sex, and religion
because, in such a society, discrimination based on these factors would be eliminated,
or so Congress and its members thought in 1964.629
Sophia sees that the 88th Congress intended the entire Civil Rights Act to
prohibit race as a factor in making any decision about employment. In other words,
considering race as a factor in employment decisions would violate the law. As the
text of Section 703 states, "[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to [a list of types of prohibited action] ... because of ... race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....630 In short, the 88th Congress viewed any
employment practice that relied on these considerations as illegal and supportive of
the same discrimination which Congress intended to combat. So, in one sense, Title
VII was implicated when racial considerations were at the source of Mr. Weber being
denied training for several craft positions at the Gramercy plant.
Sophia appears to agree with Justice Rehnquist that Congress did not foresee the
need for affirmative action programs as a way of interpreting and implementing Title
VII. Congress did not intend the use of affirmative action programs for stamping out
racial and other discrimination in employment practices. To the contrary, the
legislative history demonstrates that members of Congress viewed such practices as
discriminatory because they relied on racial preferences violative of Title VII.63'
Judge Sophia cannot avoid the conclusion that if congressional intent is the key
to interpreting Title VII, Justice Rehnquist's approach would substantively be more
accurate in ascertaining the will of Congress than would the majority approach.
Sophia however, thinks that the Rehnquist approach would not because the Civil
Rights Act did not substantially change the lot of racial minorities, especially
African-Americans. Consequently, Sophia considers an alternative approach that
relates to but extends legislative intent: what were the Congressional goals of the
Civil Rights Act?
By pursuing this inquiry about Title VII's purpose, Sophia garners additional
insight into the meaning of the statute vis-a-vis discriminatory employment practices.
Sophia' s investigation of Congressional intent revealed the legislature's concern with
the inferior status of racial minorities in the workplace. But, Congress also
demonstrated that the means to achieve statutory goals were through a color-blind
society. Does Sophia see this as the exclusive method of dealing with the inferior
627. See id.
628. See id. at 222-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
629. See id. at 252-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
630. See Civ. Rights Act § 703.
631. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 247-51 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (discussing the legislative history of
Section 703).
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employment status of African-Americans?6 32 Not necessarily, particularly when she
examines the broad goals of the statute.
One specific issue that Congress had to address was the lack of equal opportu-
nity for African-American to compete successfully in the employment market
because of racially discriminatory employment practices. To be equal meant more
than simply having hotels, restaurants, and universities opened to black people; it
also meant that African-Americans must have the same opportunity to earn wages
and salaries that would enable them to enjoy in practice the rights they theoretically
had. Sophia remembers what President Kennedy said in his challenge to Congress
that, "[t]here is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels
and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket and no job." '633 Sophia rightly
recognizes that one major purpose of the statute was to remedy employment
discrimination which plagued African-American and other racial minorities for
centuries.
In turning to the statute's underlying history, Judge Sophia sees that the method
Congress identified to meet this goal was to eliminate employment practices that used
racial considerations. If such considerations were identified as being unlawful then
black employees or candidates for employment could benefit from color-blind
employment procedures concerning hiring, training, and promotion. Many members
of Congress shared their common belief that if racial considerations were eliminated
from employment practices, the only thing that mattered in making the hiring,
training, or promotion decisions would be the substantive qualifications of the
individual.634 By following this line of reasoning, Sophia sees that any affirmative
action program, be it voluntary or ordered by an official agency could run afoul of
the proscription of using racial factors in employment practices. When considering
the purposes of Title VII, Sophia acknowledges the strength of Mr. Weber's
discrimination claim.635 Still, Sophia is concerned about how the strength of his
argument may continue to exclude African-Americans from the mainstream of the
U.S. economy. After all, because color-blind practices did little to assist minority
workers for 1964-74, the color-blind standard advocated by Mr. Weber would, too,
most likely offer little help to minorities. Sophia develops the following analogy to
632. See id. at 202-03. "Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act - the integration of
blacks into the mainstream of American society - could not be achieved unless ... blacks were able to
secure jobs 'which have a future."' Id.
633. See Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 248 PUB. PAPERS
483 (June 19, 1963); see also Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, 82 PUB. PAPERS 221
(Feb. 28, 1963).
634. See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964). As Sen. Humphrey stated, "Title VI is designed to
encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion." Id. (emphasis added).
635. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
better understand the predicaments of Weber and African-Americans: Sophia
imagines a line of people trying to enter a house in order to seek shelter from a harsh
climate. Those who are at the front of the line just outside the doorway happen to be
white people who got in line first. People are slowly admitted to the shelter as
vacancies arise. However, as time passes, virtually no blacks are admitted because
they are at the rear of the slow-moving line. Many blacks measure the slow progress
of entering the house and wonder if they will ever be admitted.
At this point, Sophia encounters a paradox. It seems that racial considerations
in voluntary affirmative action programs are designed and established to help one
race overcome discriminatory employment practices that have traditionally excluded
them from better jobs. However, use of such programs could adversely affect
members of other groups by discriminating against them on racial grounds.
The questions of what the 88th Congress intended and what problems did it
identified and attempted to resolve by enacting the Civil Rights Act are no longer the
only relevant questions which must be addressed. An important and crucial
component to understand the statute is the context in which Title VII is applied. The
context of 1964 when the law was enacted is important to construing the statute;
however, grappling with the contemporary context is also significant. When
considering the context in which the statute is applied, Sophia sees something very
different about the problems Title VII is capable of addressing than when she
restricted her investigation to the time frame of the 1963-64 legislative history.
Sophia realizes that to understand and apply the law to this difficult case, the
positions and needs of all those involved must be considered. In doing so, Sophia
considers the following: when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it saw
the need to encourage society to be blind about considerations of race, sex, color,
religion, and national origin which have an adverse impact on crucial employment
practices. These employment practices ended up tolerating and even encouraging
discrimination in the workplace. In 1964, Congress envisioned that the solution to
these discriminatory employment practices would be to make it unlawful to consider
race in hiring, training, and promoting people in the labor force.636
A decade after the Civil Rights Act was passed, Kaiser and the United
Steelworkers of America agreed that certain minorities were still being excluded
from the workplace. Ethnic and racial imbalance was seen in several of their plants
including the one at Gramercy. While there was not a conscious effort to exclude
racial minorities from the prized craftworker positions,"' racial minorities were
making virtually no headway into higher paying positions. They were like those
racial minorities who were at the end of the shelter line. The goal of the Civil Rights
Act to provide equal employment opportunities to all qualified individuals was
somehow not being met.
636. See id. at 204-06.
637. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764-65 (E.D. La. 1976)
aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 443 U.S. 193 (1974).
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Kaiser and the union implemented the affirmative action program to address the
racial imbalance in the workforce extending from what appeared to be de facto
societal discrimination.638 The voluntary affirmative action plan appeared to be a
justifiable response to this lingering problem in the sense that it was designed to do
something about achieving a major goal of Title VII, i.e., the integration of racial
minorities into the American economy by giving opportunities to those who were still
excluded from a particular strata of the labor force. But, the search for a just
resolution does not end here.
Sophia sees Brian Weber and other white employees who have greater seniority
than the black candidates chosen being turned away. Again, Sophia goes back to the
image of the line of people who are waiting to enter the shelter. She sees Brian
Weber who slowly made progress to enter now being told to step out of line so that
others behind him can either take his place in line or be admitted to the shelter
immediately. Sophia is disturbed at seeing any person being denied the opportunity
of moving up the socioeconomic ladder because of race. By removing the
impediments that traditionally blocked racial minorities from being integrated into
the economic mainstream through affirmative action plans, are people like Brian
Weber now being discriminated against?
As a conscientious judge, Sophia recognizes that a proper solution to this
dilemma has a moral component to it. The moral question, in part, concentrates on
the propriety of displacing one group of people (those who happen to be white) to
make room for another group of individuals (those who happen to be black). This
question is akin to the one moral philosophers and ethicians have debated for some
time: what does the person in charge of an overcrowded life boat do to help those
who swim up to it looking for refuge?639
Sophia recognizes that it is desirable, in principle, to take affirmative steps to
promote racial minorities who have historically been excluded from higher paying
jobs. Kaiser took this abstract principle and implemented it through its affirmative
action program." A major problem which arises with the application of this
principle through the Kaiser affirmative action plan is that it displaces and denies
other individuals from the same opportunity because of their race which is what Title
VII was originally designed to avoid and prohibit."4' Sophia sees that this principled
approach to justice does have its limitations: here the principle is to eradicate the
racial imbalance in the workplace by giving preference to those who have tradition-
638. See Weber, 563 F.2d at 225.
639. See Lifeboat (Alfred Hitchcock, director 1944).
640. See Weber, 563 F.2d at 225.
641. See 88th Congress 2nd Session, 2 U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News, 2355,2362
("In a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal - racial discrimination has no
place.").
ally been denied the opportunity to move into the higher paying jobs. 42 But, by
implementing this principle, Sophia sees that Brian Weber, and others who could
have moved into the craft positions, as being displaced by workers who had less
seniority but who were members of a racial minority.
Thus, Sophia is faced with the following dilemma: through a principled
approach that relies on a rule recognizing affirmative action, does she displace from
the realm of employment opportunities the Brian Webers' of the world so that
members of racial minorities can be given the chance to improve themselves? What
happens to Brian Weber and his opportunities for advancement from the unskilled
production jobs to the craft positions? Sophia sees herself as the commander of the
life boat; if she orders someone out of the boat in order to allow someone else in,
what will happen to the person displaced? What will happen to Brian Weber?
But Sophia finds that this approach to applying Title VII has serious limitations.
Her understanding of the limitations of the principled approach focuses on the
conflict and tension between the political justification of the statute and its
underlying moral principles.643 Sophia looks at the Weber case and asks what is the
"best political justification" of Title VII? She considers the legislative history in
addressing this question.
Upon review of the legislative materials of Title VII, she identifies the emphasis
on individuals belonging to racial minorities and their entrenched societal discrimina-
tion. In 1974, many individuals who belonged to these racial minorities continued
to suffer discrimination in the workplace. Ten years earlier, Congress decided to take
legislative action designed to eliminate racial and other discriminations from the
workplace.1 4 At the time of the statute's enactment, Congress envisioned a color-
blind society as the best way of ensuring that racial and other types of discrimination
would be eradicated.6 45 Even the very language of the statute states that using race
as a grounds for limiting or classifying employees which in any way deprives or
tends to deprive any employee of employment opportunities will constitute an
unlawful employment practice prohibited by Section 703(a)(2).646
However, as her investigation and deliberation continue, Sophia sees other
forces at work. Since color-blind practices have not proven to be as effective as was
once thought in stamping out racially motivated unlawful employment practices,
interest groups representing racial minorities and sympathetic public officials see
affirmative action programs as being a method to overcome discrimination that
continues in the American workplace. 647 This method consciously uses employment
642. See supra notes 633-35 and accompanying text.
643. See supra notes 244-72 and accompanying text.
644. See supra note 633.
645. See 88th Cong., supra note 641, at 2393 ("[N]ational leadership provided by the enactment of
federal legislation will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms
of discrimination.").
646. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
647. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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practices which give preference to racial minorities. While there is conflict between
these two political justifications, Sophia puts this tension aside to concentrate her
attention on the relationship between the contemporary best political justification
(i.e., affirmative action) and the moral principles underlying anti-discrimination
legislation.
Sophia recognizes that the law identifies a fundamental moral principle: racial
and other discrimination is an evil which society must address;"4 therefore, it will be
unlawful to use race (and other considerations such as sex, national origin, and
religion) to deprive individuals of employment opportunities including admission
into training programs (as happened to Weber). But the political environment may
justify affirmative action plans as the best course of action to correct long-standing
racial imbalance which color-blind employment practices have failed to eliminate.
By relying on affirmative action as the new remedy, the underlying moral principle
of Title VII, the elimination of race as a consideration in employment practices, is
violated.
One group of facts illustrates that racial minorities still experience difficulty in
entering the craftworker jobs. 9 Another set of facts demonstrates that when
affirmative action plans are implemented, other workers are denied admission into
training programs solely because of racial considerations.65 ° Is there ajust solution
to this predicament which confronts Judge Sophia?
Sophia begins by examining the text of not only Section 703 but the entire body
of Title VII.65 This review provides her with the fundamental blueprint of the
statute. In the text, she discovers the basic outline of concepts which members of a
reasonable interpretive community would conclude the statute covers. Sophia
acknowledges that the core of Title VII, along with that of Section 703, involves the
elimination of discriminatory practices that use racial, ethnic, sex, and religious
considerations to distinguish between employees or candidates for employment.
Sophia' s approach enables her to comprehend the statute in a dialectical fashion.
The text of the statute is surrounded by the intent of the legislature, the purpose for
which the statute was designed to achieve, the contemporary context in which the
statute is being applied and interpreted, and the underlying principles which can
influence the interpretive process. The legislative history of the statute unifies all of
these concepts.
The legislative history can be seen as a continuum which records the evolution
648. 88th Cong., supra note 641, at 2430 ("The right to be free from all forms of racial intolerance
is so fundamentally the privilege of each and every citizen of the United States that it cannot be made
the plaything of politics.").
649. See Weber, 563 F.2d at 225-26.
650. See id. at 223.
651. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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of the statute. The legislative history begins with the statute's origins as a bill (or
series of bills), to textual modification debates, to interpretations about the meaning
of the statute as offered by sponsors of the legislation and committee members, and,
finally, to the record for the vote of the legislature. In some cases, this history
contains further insights offered by members of subsequent convocations of the
legislature. --
An important part of the social, political, and economic history of the Civil
Rights Act is the legal struggle involving racial minorities over the course of
American history recorded by Supreme Court cases such as Dred Scott v.
Sandford,653 Plessy v. Ferguson,654 and Brown v. Board of Education.655 Each of
these cases entails a part of the history of racial minorities in their struggle for
equality with the members of the majority race.
Sophia derives some initial understanding about the meaning of Title VII from
the language chosen by Congress to combat racial and other discrimination in the
workplace. The text helps her focus on the immediate concern of the 88th Congress
to identify and ban discriminatory practices by employers and labor unions.
Discriminatory practices have had a deleterious effect on the careers of American
citizens, not because of these workers' inability to perform a particular job, but
because of nonsubstantive issues having no bearing on ability to perform success-
fully. Congress was especially concerned about nonsubstantive criteria pertaining
to an individual's race, ethnic background, sex, or religious persuasion being used
to prohibit racial minorities* and members of other groups from entering and
competing in all segments of the labor market.
Sophia then examines the institutional intent of Congress which identified
general employment practices that used these nonsubstantive criteria to deny workers
employment opportunities that would otherwise be open to them. She identifies the
general intent of Congress to take action directed against these practices which the
legislature deemed harmful to the American worker.
Closely related to these reflections about intent of the legislature is identification
of the purpose or the goals of the Civil Rights Act. Sophia traces through the social,
economic, and political history leading up to the introduction of the 1963 civil rights
bill and she identifies that Congress' principal target was the elimination of
nonsubstantive criteria that adversely affected an individual's employment
opportunity. She instead sees the goals of Title VII as being directed against the use
of nonsubstantive criteria.
The goal, therefore, of Title VII is eliminating nonsubstantive and discriminatory
criteria by employers and unions. According to the history of the legislation, Sophia
concludes that Congress initially believed this goal would be achieved by cultivating
652. See HETZEL, LIBONATI AND WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 438 ( 2 d Ed. 1993)(detailing a list of the different components of legislative history).
653. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
654. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
655. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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a society in which decisions about hiring, training, and promotion would be done
without any consideration being given to the criteria of a person's sex, race, religious
beliefs, or skin color. Thejudge recognizes that this was an objective and potentially
effective mechanism for achieving a discrimination-free workplace in 1964. In the
context of the time during which Title VII was enacted, there was a consensus that
the goals of the statute could be achieved through the implementation of color-blind
employment practices. But, in 1974, the color-blind approach for achieving the
purposes of Title VII was not working in employment markets such as Gramercy,
Louisiana. Although the Civil Rights Act had been in place for a decade, the
African-American workers in Gramercy were still excluded from the higher paying
positions that were available to white workers at the Kaiser plant.
656
What seemed to have been a solution to the problem of racial discrimination in
1964-the encouragement of color-blind employment practices-was not addressing
the problem of racial imbalance a decade later. In 1974 less than two percent of the
higher paid craftworkers consisted of racial minorities while forty percent of the
work force in the Gramercy labor market was African-American. Color-blind
employment practices were not successful in the Gramercy-Kaiser work environ-
me nt.657 Even though there was no evidence demonstrating that Kaiser's employment
practices used racial considerations to prevent entry and promotion of African-
Americans, the fact of the matter is that racial minorities were still being excluded
from higher paying jobs.
A critic of Sophia's method might raise the point that her approach is too
656. See Weber, 563 F.2d at 222.
657. Some critics of affirmative action programs have suggested that this type of remedy against
racial discrimination may have an adverse effect on racial minorities, viz. the implication that they are
inferior to whites. See S. Steele, A Negative Vote On Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 13,
1990, at 46. Professor Steele argues that affirmative action is "more bad than good" for minorities in
that they stand to lose more than they gain from such remedial programs. As he states, "I think one of
the most troubling effects of racial preferences for blacks is a kind of demoralization. Under affirmative
action, the quality that earns us preferential treatment is an implied inferiority." Id. at 48. See also
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques Of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (discussing
how discrimination (and racism) psychologically reinforce the notion of "inferiority" cultivated by
affirmative action). Although Professor Kennedy suggests that there is "nothing necessarily wrong"
with affirmative action plans that use racial preferences (indeed, they may be needed to address and
remedy some forms of racial discrimination), he does "not want race conscious decision making to be
naturalized into our general pattern of academic evaluation." Id. at 1807. By doing so, the notion that
some individuals cannot compete with others in particular fields institutionalizes the erroneous belief
that some people could never compete due to such "inferiority." I would think that Professor Kennedy's
comment need not be restricted to the academic environment. Professors Groves and Broderick have
pointed out that the notion that African-Americans might be considered inferior by whites or by
themselves is "pious hypocrisy." See Groves and Broderick, Affirmative Action, supra note 615, at 34 1.
See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991)
(discussing affirmative action in contemporary America).
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subjective and leads to indeterminacy about the meaning of legislative texts. But
Sophia has a response built upon considerations of true justice. To render the most
just decision possible, Sophia places herself in the position of each of the principals
who are or might be involved with the statute's application. By doing this, she
accomplishes two important objectives. First, she experiences what each person
involved with the case endures. Second, she brings under one roof, the accumulation
of these experiences and relates them to one another.
Sophia understands and accepts the importance of this moral principle calling
for the rescue of racial minorities who have long been discriminated against. After
all, Title VII's goal is, to stop discrimination and to prevent it's reoccurrence. This
is also the goal of the affirmative action plan adopted by the Kaiser-United
Steelworkers joint committee: redress long standing discrimination which has
excluded African-American from the higher-paying craft work. But this temporary
plan adversely affects the original justification of the statute by assaulting the idea
of equal opportunity for all, because some workers are excluded as beneficiaries of
the plan on racial grounds. Mr. Weber was not a beneficiary of the affirmative action
plan. He was twice denied the chance to move into the training program because of
the existence and operation of the plan. Sophia acknowledges that the initial
justification for implementing color-blind employment practices is contradicted by
Kaiser plan. This contradiction emanates from the fact that affirmative action
promotes a new form of discrimination that directly conflicts with the text of Title
VII, the intent of the 88th Congress to establish color-blind employment practices,
and the goals of Title VII.
Sophia seeks a solution to this contradiction. A major source of contradiction
is found in the imbalance of paying too much attention to the historical exclusion of
racial minorities and not enough attention to the newly developed exclusion of the
majority., Sophia realizes that the majority in Weber stated that Mr. Weber did not
suffer discrimination because white workers were accepted into the training program
even though he himself was not.658 However, Sophia recognizes that Weber, as an
individual, not as an anonymous member of a class, was twice denied admission
because of his race. The fact that some whites were admitted into the training
program does not hurt his argument because as an individual he was still excluded
on the basis of racial considerations.
Sophia is in search of an understanding of the law that renders justice to all
concerned. Most, if not all law, exists to make society more just. For example,
environmental statutes seek to protect mankind's natural surroundings. Health and
safety legislation protects workers in their places of employment from industrial
hazards and to ensure the maintenance of their health. The justice underlying anti-
discrimination legislation seeks to reconcile the existing and potentially conflicting
interests of Weber and the African-Americans who formed the Kaiser-Gramercy
labor pool. In addition, the values associated with justice deal with the very heart of
658. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 195.
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Title VII anti-discrimination legislation: the permanent elimination of considering
race, sex, national origin, and religious beliefs in employment practices in the
American workplace.
Sophia must acquire an understanding ofjustice which will give her a basis from
which to understand and apply statutes in such a way that both the individual and
society in general can flourish together." 9 This pursuit is not conducted to solicit an
unattainable ideal. Rather it is a process by which the judge, the parties, the lawyers,
and everyone else concerned with the outcome can objectively and determinatively
charter a course to a better future.6"
As she plots her course, Sophia has in mind the notion of interpreter as
Cardozo's "wise pharmacist"66' who from the general language of a statute can
develop not only a fitting remedy but one that is capable of finding and utilizing the
just goals underlying Title VII.
Sophia now takes the text of Section 703 and identifies that the value to be
promoted is the cultivation of a labor environment in which the individual worker can
flourish because of one's personal ability and desire to do certain work competently,
not because of one's sex, skin color, ethnic heritage, or religious affiliation. The
texts of Section 703 and Title VII contain the tools that will assist Sophia in
constructing the promising future in which the individual and society generally can
flourish.
The intent of the 88th Congress and the goals detected from the statute are
identified in the legislative history. The legislative history confirms her belief that
members of society would be better off if individuals could have opportunities to
flourish (to seek better jobs, for example) based on their abilities to perform work
and not on physical characteristics, places of origin, or religious views.
Does this mean that the most important underlying value of the statue (and
659. Some of this search for values underlying programmatic statutes is related to the contemporary
natural law concepts of John Finnis, A. P. d'Entreves, and Ronald Dworkin. The foundation of
Professors Finnis's understanding of natural law is: ( I ) a set of basic principles which indicate the basic
forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized; (2) a set of methodological
requirements of practical reasonableness which distinguish sound from unsound practical reasoning;
and, (3) a set of general moral standards. See FINNIs, NATURAL LAW, supra note 7, at 23. Prof.
d'Entreves views natural law as humankind's "quest for an absolute standard of justice ... [that is]
based upon a particular conception of the relationship between the ideal and the real...between what is
and what ought to be." A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW, supra note 351, at 95. Finally, Ronald
Dworkin views the law as an "interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest
sense .... Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice
to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past. It is, finally, a fraternal
attitude, an expression of how we are united in community though divided in project, interest, and
conviction." DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 413.
660. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 413.
661. See CARDOZO, supra, note 123.
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therefore its interpretation) is to cultivate a color- (or sex-, or religion-, or ethnic-)
blind society. Yes, for the long-term. But, crucial to Sophia's investigation of
Weber is that a color-blind application of Title VII was not producing a racially
balanced workforce in which minorities could experience equal employment
opportunities. While the statute was not designed to deal directly with racial balance,
indirectly it was in this important sense: if any person is excluded from employment
opportunities due to racial considerations, then might this exclusion be attributable
to some persistent, subtle form of discrimination which has survived long after
outright discrimination was purged?
In other words, is it possible that some forms of discrimination can resist
interpretations and applications of Title VII? 66 2 It would seem to Sophia that this is
indeed the case because her examination of the record reveals that Kaiser and the
union were not considering race in their respective employment practices.
Nevertheless, enrollment of African-Americans in the higher paying, more desirable
craft positions changed minimally in the decade since the passage of Title VII.
Again, the statistics show that in 1974, while forty percent of the labor force in the
Gramercy labor pool was comprised of African-Americans, less than two percent of
those holding the better-paying craftwork jobs at Kaiser were black.6 3
But the case's history also demonstrates that Weber was twice denied admission
into on-the-job training programs established to promote unskilled production
workers into higher paying jobs.6" The reason for his being twice turned down was
not because of any lack of competence nor was it because other individuals with
more employment seniority were to be first invited into the training program.
Rejections, instead were based on his race. Why does this then not constitute an
unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Title VII under the synthetic
approach?
Sophia concludes that to be just, the law must promote and preserve a labor
market in which employment practices will not rely on race, sex, national origin, skin
color, and religion. But, if within the context of a given labor market individuals
from an identifiable racial group such as African-Americans are being excluded, then
Sophia sees that the just goals of the statute (equal opportunity without regard to
662. Professor Greenawalt provides a good example of sex discrimination that seemingly uses sex-
neutral language. See KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 136 (1992). The example he
presents consists of sex-neutral language contained in the rule specifying that candidates for police
officers must be of a certain height. See id. There is no formal requirement that the candidate must be
of a particular sex. See id. As a matter of fact, the rule has standard language stating that the police
department welcomes applicants from all backgrounds regardless of race, national origin, religion, skin
color and sex. See id. However, the physical requirements, particularly that concerning height ("a
height requirement of five feet ten inches"), could effectively preclude most female candidates. See id.
Even though the requirements for police candidates say nothing about an applicant's sex and thus
appear to be sex-neutral, they in fact discriminate against women because many more men would meet
the height requirement than women. See id.
663. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 210. Kaiser's work force, was less than fifteen percent black. See id.
664. See id. at 198.
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racial and other considerations) are not being fulfilled. True, race did not seem to be
a factor in the employment practices of Kaiser in 1974; but, what is also true is that
for some reason, African-Americans had not proportionally moved into the craft
positions as their white colleagues had. The moral values underlying anti-discrimina-
tion legislation emphasize that each individual, regardless of race, is entitled to equal
employment opportunity, and that is the fundamental value ofjustice contained in the
Weber case.665
Sophia realizes that there exists the potential for abuse of affirmative action
plans which consider race in making employment decisions. Extraordinary remedies
can be easily abused when they are not carefully designed and persistently monitored
once implemented. As with many extraordinary remedies [such as chemotherapy
which poisons the body to eradicate cancer], a great deal of care has to be used. A
substantial element of the care to be exercised in using affirmative action programs
is to monitor periodically and thoroughly the progress being made integrating those
currently excluded groups into the mainstream of the economy and the labor market.
At the same time, this scrutiny must see if any other groups are being pushed out of
this mainstream, such as non-minority individuals who have no advocacy group
lobbying on their behalf.666 One component of this scrutiny is to be attentive to any
person or group who becomes marginalized from the mainstream of the economy and
are excluded from the training programs as new positions within these programs
become available. This is where the interests of Brian Weber, and all individuals,
must be taken into account if justice is to be achieved. If Weber were to be
repeatedly turned down in his applications to enter the training program, this could
reveal a continuing pattern of exclusion that would constitute discrimination fostered
and perpetuated by the extraordinary remedy of affirmative action. Affirmative
action, if it is to be just, must consider and relate the interest of non-benefactors as
well as to those to the who benefit from the preferential treatment.
Sophia sees a need to give structure to this scrutiny that exists in order to
determine whether affirmative action is harming any individual or group of
665. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The Supreme Court upheld a policy
of the Federal Communications Commission granting minority preferences in the field of radio and
television station licensing. See id. at 552. It appears from this 5-4 decision that the concept of
affirmative action is still regarded as a means for ensuring that no segment of the population is
discriminated against. The majority found that the F.C.C. policy did not violate the equal protection
clause. See id. However, Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting, has
resigned from the court. Justice Brennan's successor, Justice David Souter, has not had an official
opportunity to reveal his views on the subject consequently, there is a question about whether the Court
will uphold similar affirmative action plans in the future.
666. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 657-70 (1987)
(acknowledging Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and in part Justice White concern about trammeling the
legitimate interest of hon-minorities).
individuals who previously had not suffered from discrimination in the labor market.
It is vital that the interests of each person affected by the law be considered. It is
equally important that these interests be considered and evaluated in relation to one
another. The first step is to frequently examine the racial status of those being
promoted by affirmative action plans and those being excluded. If members of
certain racial groups are repeatedly denied admission into employment programs
affected by the affirmative action plans, there is evidence revealing a need to redefine
the affirmative action plan and its administration. If the plan is voluntary the initial
responsibility of monitoring falls on the parties who initially devised and adminis-
tered it. If, however, the plan is a remedy ordered by an official institution (such as
a government agency or court), then the agency or court shares in the responsibility
to monitor any potential or actual abuse derived from the plan's implementation.
As a practical matter, most judges simply do not have the time to retain the
responsibility to monitor cases once the court's decision is issued.6"7 However, this
does not mean that some kind of monitoring is impossible.
One method of dealing with this problem is to ensure that judicially issued or
approved affirmative action plans are sufficiently precise so that the parties (along
with appropriate government agencies) will be adequately informed about the kind
of evidence needed to trigger judicial involvement with the case. Another way of
dealing with affirmative action programs is to ensure that they contain a sunset
provision (as some statutes do). Thus, prior to the plan's expiration date, the
affirmative action program can be evaluated to determine if it can be repealed (if its
purpose has been achieved), renewed for a specific period of time (if its goals have
not yet been reached), or modified. Under these two methods, much of the burden
of monitoring the plan falls not on the shoulders of the courts but on the parties who
have a stake in the outcome of the plan's implementation.668
A second component of monitoring is the exercise of an objective standard by
which the affirmative action plan is conducted. At the heart of this standard is the
fact that each person who is involved always remains in the sight of those resolving
667. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications Of The Supreme
Court's Limited Resources For Judicial Review OfAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987)
(commenting on the limited resources of the Supreme Court in meeting the demands of a large and
potentially enormous case load). Professor Strauss considers "whether, and in what ways, the stresses
on the Court might be manifesting themselves in its opinions and, particularly, in doctrine." Id. at 1094.
The demands on the lower Federal courts (which do not have the same personnel and resources as does
the Supreme Court) are even greater since they have less discretion about which cases to hear and which
ones will not. Simply put, the lower courts have less, resources but a numerically greater case load.
668. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
498 U.S. 237 (1990) (explaining how the plaintiffs in a school desegregation case shouldered the
burden of reopening a case involving a judicially-approved school busing plan). In an earlier opinion
issued by the Tenth Circuit, the court pointed out that while the busing decree was still operative, the
court would not supervise its implementation. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Public
Schools, 795 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1986). It is up to the parties in the case to bring to the
court's attention the need to reassert the order and the rights it established and the duties it imposed.
See id.
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the controversy or dispute. In this fashion, all individuals are able to flourish. The
conscionable and justjudge like Sophia can achieve this ideal by placing herself into
the different positions of the individuals involved with the application of the
affirmative action plan.669 Sophia looks at the implementation of the plan from as
many different perspectives as possible.67 This means that she attempts to see the
operation of the plan from the perspective of the employer, the union, the govern-
ment agency involved with administration of the plan, and the legislature which
enacts statutes designed to remedy social problems, those groups of people targeted
as the primary beneficiaries of the plan, those individuals, such as Weber, who might
or are being displaced from employment opportunities by the program's operation.67'
In assessing the individual interests being promoted or harmed by the application
of Title VII, Sophia's scrutiny of the affirmative action plan is a continuing
669. See Radio And Television Report To The American People On Civil Rights, 237 PUB. PAPERS
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 461 (June 11, 1963). In his address to the American people, President Kennedy
appealed to the nation prior to his submitting the Administration's civil rights bill to Congress by asking
every individual to place one's self in the circumstances of others. He stated:
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal
opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated.
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public,
if he cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the
public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all
of us want, then who anong tis would be content to have the color of his skill changed and
stand in his place? Who among us would thent be content with the counsels of patience and
delay?
Id. (emphasis added).
670. Around 1894, the French artist Claude Monet painted several scenes depicting the same subject,
the cathedral at Rouen. Monet painted the facade of this church at different hours of the day when the
light played differently upon the stone. In one depiction, the facade is flooded with the brilliant light
of midday. In another, the structure is shrouded with the shadows of dusk. In still another, the stone
is beginning to reflect the warmth and brightness of a new day at dawn. Monet was both artist and
interpreter. Like the interpreter of statutes, Monet took the same scene (as the interpreter takes the same
statute) and looks at it in a different light to arrive at a different interpretation. As shade, lighting,
perspective, and weather conditions influenced Monet's interpretation of the same subject, the facts of
cases usually influence the interpretation of the same statute. Although there is one body of facts in a
given case, the judge should understand these facts from the different perspectives of those parties
affected by the outcome of her interpretation. By looking at the statute from the different perspectives
involved in a particular case, the judge should be able to arrive at the best meaning of the statute in this
case.
671. This is an important facet ofjudicial interpretation that should be shared with legislators and
administrators. By each branch of the government (or at least the people who hold the offices in the
different branches) placing itself in the position of the other branches and reflecting upon their
experiences, each branch broadens and deepens its understanding of the role it has in conjunction with
the other branches in making and implementing rules that affect the lives of the citizenry. See generally'
ROBERT A. KATZMAN, THE UNDERLYING CONCERNS, IN JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS; TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 7, 7-20 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
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process.672 This process calls for ongoing examination and reflection. She
periodically checks to see who is being promoted into the training programs and she
simultaneously determines who, if anyone, is finding it more difficult to get into the
training slots and the craft worker positions. If, for example, Mr. Weber and those
similarly situated are being continuously denied access to the on-the-job training
designed to promote workers into the higher paying jobs, Sophia may conclude that
affirmative action subsequent to 1974 may no longer serve its goals. Justice can help
identify such abuse and arrest its practice. What is due each person can -only be
determined once each person's view is considered-audi alteram partem. What is
due each person must then be considered and understood in relation to the due of
every other person. Indeed this is work, but it is a labor imposed by true justice. For
a society which claims to be just and which seeks justice, it is a charge that cannot
be abandoned.
VI. CONCLUSION
I conclude this essay (but not the debate, nor the discussion) on the search for
true justice in the forum of race, racial distinctions, race relations, racial discrimina-
tion, and racial reconciliation by drawing attention to an insight of Philip Rossi.673
Rossi framed the solution to the question about true justice by recognizing the
similarity of individuals and their interests.674 With this insight, he acknowledged the
common good that emerges from "the recognition of communality at the heart of
moral life: 'I am as she; she is as I."675 I convey this fundamental point into the
present day controversies surrounding racial relations and affirmative action by
arguing that many of the problems that emerge from racial difference do not take
stock of the sameness or mutuality of human existence.
The notion of the common good which I have attempted to present in this
discussion about race relations, racial discrimination, and harmonious relations
amongst all people regardless of race is the following: when we are willing to engage
one another on some common ground and explore our mutual interests in addition
to those things which separate us, we can and do learn about one another. By
cultivating the virtues of wisdom, compassion, courage, prudence, and justice, we
can learn what we did not know before about racial injustice and one of the most
effective ways of eliminating it. By proceeding from a virtuous foundation, we can
learn what we thought but what we did not want to admit: we discover that we are
different, surely, because that is what makes us individuals. But, more importantly,
672. Again, this process is subject to the time and resources available to the judge. Ideally, Sophia
would like to be more involved with the process. But since the demands of her office militate against
assuming too much of this burden, she will follow the course of action I outlined earlier. See supra
notes 633-36 and accompanying text.
673. See generally Rossi, supra note 602.
674. See id. at 143.
675. See id. at 154.
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we also discover that we are similar to one another in many ways. Each time we
engage in conversation with one who seems different, we see a reflection of
ourselves in the other with whom we converse. What is just for the self, that is, what
is each person's due, can only be identified and understood in the context of what is
simultaneously just for the other. Each person's due, therefore is defined by what
is due to all others. Our individual rights-oriented culture reinforces the differences
which make us superficially opposite but, in truth, mask our fundamental similarity.
By being honest about our human nature, that we are individuals who must flourish
in a community, we discover our resemblance each time we engage one another in
dialogue and debate. We see in each of our conversations a piece of a mosaic that
reflects the other. When we assemble more of the mosaic, not only do we see the
other, but, we also see ourselves.
This is how the questions about distinction and similarity come together. The
more we discuss these issues, the more we see that the concerns of people from
different racial groups are similarly our concerns. Racial distinction does not mean
that individuals do not have common interests that transcend racial identity. There
is, after all, interrelatedness between and amongst all communities.676 A person of
one racial identification or another, each shares concerns of our common habitat,
e.g., health care, the safety of communities, the quality of the environment, and
access to good educational and employment opportunities. A threat to one person
is a threat to the community. Moreover, a threat to one group within the community
is also a threat to all others. Therefore, solutions for one group would also be
solutions for others. Just as significant, when we hear about the concerns of those
not from our own racial group, we see the concerns that belong to us. When we see
that other human being, we also see ourselves. When we make this discovery, and
allow it to penetrate into our deepest consciousness, we can then acknowledge that
the portrait that emerges from our many conversations is common to us all. It is both
our portrait and the portrait of the other.
Dr. King was right when he said that more important than our external
characteristics is a far more precious and important internal quality: the content of
our character.677 And it is the content of our individual character which reflects much
of the content of the character of others. What is just for the one can never be
676. See Oppenheimer, supra note 457, at 836. Dr. King states that he was "cognizant of the
interrelatedness of all communities and states. ... Injustice anywhere is a threat to Justice everywhere.
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever
affects one directly, affects all indirectly." See id.
677. As Dr. King exclaimed in his speech at the civil rights march in Washington, D. C. on August
29. 1963. "1 have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not
be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character." Reprinted in, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS (1991).
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comprehended until what is just for each other person who is connected with the
question is taken into account. To understand properly what is due each person, it
is essential to discern what is due every other person concerned with the issue.
Justice for the individual is incomplete without comprehending what isjustice for the
community of individuals who are related to the issue. This is justice as right
relationship.
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